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Abstract
This research focused on the issue of children’s understanding of the pretend-reality 
distinction. In particular, it investigated several features of the availability hypothesis 
(Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall & Harmer, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994) and the 
pretence continuation account (Golomb & Galasso, 1995) which have been previously 
offered as competing explanations for children’s behaviours during pretence. 
Specifically, the experiments reported here explored the role of differing forms of 
affect in both of these accounts and assessed the constraining influence of empirical 
evidence of reality on the effects of increased cognitive availability. To this end, a 
series of seven related experiments were conducted in which four to seven year old 
children (N = 591) were asked to pretend about the contents of empty boxes. The 
children’s behaviours on a series of box selection tasks were then observed under 
conditions of differing affect and varying levels of empirical evidence (experiments 1 to 
5). The children’s spontaneous behaviours were also video recorded (experiments 6 
and 7). Taken together, the results suggest that there are interactions between 
individual differences, age, affect and levels of empirical evidence which predict 
children’s propensity towards making pretend-reality confusions. In relation to 
previous explanations of children’s behaviour, the pretence continuation account 
(Golomb & Galasso, 1995) is unable to explain the complexity of the current findings 
and the results are instead more consistent with an account involving individual 
differences such as that proposed by Johnson and Harris (1994). However, there are 
two crucial contributions which the experiments reported here can make to these 
explanations. First, there are developmental changes which take place between four 
and seven years of age in relation to pretend-reality understanding and these changes 
interact with the individual differences identified by Johnson and Harris (1994). 
Second, the present data provide evidence of the central role played by affect in 
children’s pretence. Overall, this thesis offers an account of children’s understanding 
of the distinction between pretence and reality which incorporates both developmental 
and individual differences.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Ovei*view
The overall aim of the present chapter is to provide an account of the background to 
the research reported here. The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the nature 
of pretence and the developmental changes it undergoes in the period between its 
onset at twelve months of age and its decline some four or five years later. The 
discussion will then focus on two areas of debate within the literature relating to 
children’s pretence. First, the issue of whether children understand pretence as a 
representational or behavioural activity will be discussed. Second, the extent to which 
children understand and maintain a distinction between pretence and reality will be 
considered. This latter discussion will highlight a paradox. Whilst children as young 
as three years old show clear evidence of understanding the basic distinction between 
pretence and reality, children of nine years old have been shown to believe in the 
magical causation of impossible outcomes and children as old as seven years have been 
found to experience confusion between what is real and what they have merely 
imagined. This paradox, and the various explanations that have been offered in an 
attempt to account for it, formed the focus of the current research. This chapter will 
show that the paradox cannot be simply attributed to methodological factors such as 
the types of dependent measures used in various studies or the types of entity that 
children have pretended about. Instead, psychological explanations for pretend-reality 
confusions must be considered. The discussion of these explanations will then lead to 
a statement of the aims of the present research - to develop a cohesive model to 
explain why some children, in some situations, become confused about the- distinction 
between pretence and reality.
Definitions of pretence
Pretence is a form of play more readily identified and defined than other forms of play 
activity because it has several distinctive characteristics (Fein, 1981). The first of these 
characteristics is that the pretender cognitively constructs a reality that is somehow 
different, or thought by the pretender to be somehow different, from the true situation 
(Austin, 1970; Bateson, 1972; Bretherton, 1989; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1989; Lillard, 
1993 a, 1994; Piaget, 1951). In this sense, pretence can be considered a non-literal
(Garvey & Bemdt, 1977; Vygotsky, 1967, 1978) or fictional (Woolley, 1995a, 1995b) 
cognitive activity. These transformations of the pretender’s conception of reality can 
be broadly grouped into three types of pretence (Leslie, 1987, 1988, 1994):
i) object substitution pretence in wliich one object is treated as if it is some other 
object. For example, the pretender might respond to a banana in the same way that 
they would respond to a telephone.
ii) attribution of pretend properties in which an object or situation is endowed with 
properties that it does not actually have. For example, the pretender might respond to 
an empty cup as if it was full.
iii) imaginary objects pretence in which a non-existent object is treated as if it exists. 
For example, the pretender might respond to an imagined person as if they actually 
existed.
The second distinctive feature of pretence is that these transformations of reality are 
deliberate (Garvey, 1991; Lillard, 1993a, 1994; Woolley, 1995a). It is not the case 
that the pretender mistakenly believes that the imagined state of affairs is true - the 
pretender instead knowingly responds in ways that are discrepant from the truth or 
what they believe to be true. Third, these activities are engaged in playfully (Piaget, 
1951) and are often accompanied by a non-serious emotional tone (Lillard, 1993a, 
1994). Finally, in distinguishing pretending from imagining, it can be argued that 
whilst pretence has an imaginative component, it is more strongly associated with a 
behavioural component than imagining (Woolley, 1995a, 1995b). That is, whilst one 
can imagine something without action, to pretend something requires that it is 
imagined and typically involves action that is in keeping with what has been pretended.
Developmental trends in children’s pretence
Age-related changes in children’s pretence have been very well documented, for 
example, by Piaget (1951). The following section provides a broad overview of the 
typical findings obtained in the numerous studies conducted since which have 
considered such changes in children’s pretence.
The clearest developmental trend in children’s pretence relates to changes in its 
prevalence. Children of younger than twelve months old are thought not to engage in 
pretence (Fein, 1981; Piaget, 1951). However, Belsky and Most (1981) argue that 
‘enactive naming’, whereby the child’s behaviour might be symbolic but lacks clear 
pretence signals, was evident in infants of only nine to ten and a half months old. For
example, an infant might raise an empty cup to their mouth but not then make pretend 
drinking sounds. Belsky and Most went on to argue that enactive naming is a 
precursor to the true pretence which did indeed emerge in their sample at around 
twelve months of age. Similarly, Reddy (1991) considers teasing to be an early 
indication of pretence. For example, an infant may offer a parent an object but refiise 
to let go at the last moment. This teasing emerges at around eight months and shares 
with pretence a non-literal quality and thus like enactive naming, may be a precursor 
to, or an early form of pretending.
Piaget (1951) argued that in the three to four years following its onset, pretence 
increases in prevalence until the age of six to seven years when it becomes less 
frequent and is replaced by realistic and rule based play activities. Evidence obtained 
by Wall, Pickert and Gibson (1989) supports this view, demonstrating an increase in 
the prevalence of pretence between the ages of five and six years. Moreover, in her 
review of the evidence, Fein (1981) concluded that on balance, the findings do support 
the inverted-U shaped developmental trend predicted by Piaget’s work. However, it is 
not simply the case that the prevalence of pretence is subject to age related changes, 
the nature of children’s pretend play activities also changes very dramatically during 
the pre-school and early school years.
It has been argued that the developmental changes in the nature of children’s pretence 
proceed tlirough a series of sequentially ordered stages. Figure 1.1 (see page 5) is a 
modified version of Nicolich’s (1977) comparison of her own proposed sequence of 
levels of pretence with the stage based scheme proposed by Piaget (1951) - for further 
comparison, the sequence supported by research conducted by Belsky and Most 
(1981) has been added. The overall trend that is apparent from Figure 1.1 is one of 
increasingly complex and increasingly symbolic activity.
The onset of pretence at twelve months of age is marked by simple pretend gestures 
wliich the child directs towards themselves. These autosymbolic schemes (Nicolich, 
1977 - level 2) or ‘pretend self (Belsky & Most, 1981 - level 7) activities tend to 
include behaviours which the cliild usually carries out, but in pretence these are caiTied 
out playfully, outside of their usual contexts. For example, a child at this stage might 
‘drink’ from an empty cup. Subsequently, children begin to direct their pretend 
activities towards other people who at first tend to be passive recipients of the child’s 
activities. During this period of development the child might, for example, ‘feed’ a 
doll from an empty spoon. In the developmental sequences offered by Piaget (1951)
and Nicolich, a separate activity that also emerges at this stage is the pretend imitation 
of other people’s activities. For example, children might sit and ‘read’ a newspaper as 
their parents do. The child’s increasingly sophisticated attempts at combining these 
pretence schemes by carrying out the same pretend action on several recipients and 
then by carrying out ordered sequences of actions are discussed by Nicolich and by 
Belsky and Most. In both of these developmental schemes, the child is considered 
likely to, for example, make a teddy, a doll and then a parent ‘drink’ from an empty 
cup, before they are likely to ‘feed’ a doll and then put it to bed. Both of these forms 
of combinations of pretend schemes are thought to emerge prior to object substitution 
pretence. Object substitution pretence itself is said to develop such that the use of one 
object to symbolise another, is thought to emerge before the child uses their own body 
to represent some other person or object (Nicolich - levels 5.1 A and B; Piaget - types 
IIA and IIB).
In all three accounts of the developmental sequence in cliildren’s pretence summarised 
in Figure 1.1, the most complex or sophisticated forms of pretence are said to be those 
in which several pretend schemes are combined into a single, complex planned 
sequence. These combinations of pretend activities tend to be quite realistic in nature, 
in that they are based upon the enactment of real events. However, Piaget (1951), 
unlike Nicolich (1977) and Belsky and Most (1981), differentiates three forms of 
pretence at this stage. First, simple combinations in which the child enacts familiar 
events. Second, compensatory combinations in which the child effectively corrects 
reality, for example, by carrying out in pretence activities which would in reality be 
forbidden. Third, liquidating combinations in which the child re-enacts a difficult or 
frightening situation ensuring they emerge as competent or as having mastered the 
situation.
Taken together, the sequences or stages in the development of children’s pretence 
offered by Piaget (1951), Nicolich (1977) and Belsky and Most (1981) differ in terms 
of some of the specific divisions of stages, or levels, that are made. However, all three 
models reflect veiy clearly the idea that children’s pretence becomes increasingly 
sophisticated with age. The ways in which children’s pretence becomes more 
sophisticated can be considered in terms of three key processes; decontextualization, 
decentration, and integration. In the sections which follow, these processes will be 
defined and evidence relating to each will be discussed.
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Decontextualization
The decontextualization of pretence can be described as the process by which 
behaviours and objects used in pretence become increasingly detached from their 
real-life contexts and uses (Flavell, 1985). Although it is evident in other types of 
pretence, this process is best illustrated by the developmental changes apparent in 
children’s object substitution pretence. Broadly speaking, with increasing age children 
use progressively less and less realistic objects to symbolise other objects until 
ultimately such props are not required and children behave towards imaginary objects 
during their pretend play (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1989; Fein, 1981; Flavell, 1985). In 
fact, about a third of three to five year old children go on to construct imaginary 
friends (Manosevitz, Prentice & Wilson, 1973; Taylor & Carlson, 1997) - a very 
specific form of imaginary object pretence.
In their investigation of object substitution pretence. Elder and Pederson (1978) asked 
children to pretend using substitute objects that were physically similar to the real 
object that would be used in that activity (for example, to comb their hair using a 
rectangular, flat piece of wood), or using dissimilar substitute objects which had their 
own, alternative function (for example, to make a telephone call using a saucepan) or 
with no object present. The results gave clear evidence of decontextualization - two 
and a half year old children were only able to use similar objects in their substitutions 
whereas three year old children could successfully use similar and dissimilar substitute 
objects. Similar findings have been obtained by researchers such as Corrigan (1987) 
and Fein (1975). A recent study has also shown that children’s comprehension of 
pretend actions carried out by other people also undergoes a process of 
decontextualization - by two years of age children understand the use of substitute 
objects by other pretenders (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993a).
By the age of three and a half years, the children in Elder and Pederson’s (1978) study 
began to successfully produce appropriate pretend actions in the absence of any 
substitute objects. In other words, these children had begun to produce imaginary 
object pretence. Overton and Jackson (1973) and later, Boyatzis and Watson (1993) 
have investigated the nature of children’s actions when they are asked to pretend to do 
something and there are no substitute objects available to them. The results obtained 
suggest a developmental process of decontextualization within children’s responses. 
Both studies found that children of under three years old failed to produce any form of 
imaginary object pretence and that children aged three to four years responded by 
inserting a body part as a substitute object. So for example, when asked to pretend to
brush their teeth, three to four year old children used a finger to represent a 
toothbrush. By the age of five years, the children in the Boyatzis and Watson study 
were able to use imaginar>  ^ objects in the pretence, demonstrating that their pretence 
was independent of the features of the immediate context. A slightly different pattern 
of results was observed by Overton and Jackson who found that between the ages of 
four and six years children became increasingly able to use imaginary objects in 
self-direct pretend actions, but only between the ages of six and eight years could they 
use imaginaiy objects in pretend actions directed towards others. Recently, O’Reilly 
(1995) has investigated children’s understanding of imaginaiy object pretence carried 
out by another person. She found that children of three years old were able to 
understand pretend actions in which a body part was used as a substitute object but 
that only cliildren over five years of age could successflilly comprehend imaginary 
object pretence.
Taken together, the findings from investigations of children’s object substitution 
pretence clearly reflect a process of decontextualization - initially children are 
dependent on the use of realistic props in their pretence, these become less and less 
realistic until a point at which children can pretend without substitute objects of any 
form.
Decentration
Through the process of decentration, with age, pretence becomes less exclusively 
self-directed and focused on the child’s own everyday activities, and increasingly 
directed towards other people and the enactment of activities that the child would not 
normally cany out. In other words, pretence becomes an increasingly social activity. 
Evidence of this process can be obtained from at least three aspects of children’s 
pretend play. First, the use of the self and other people as referents in pretence. 
Second, the enactment of social roles. Third, sociodramatic and social pretend play.
In terms of self and other referencing in children’s pretence, the process of 
decentration is reflected in the gradual shift from all pretend actions being 
self-directed, to being directed towards (passive) others, until finally others are treated 
as independent agents who carry out activities of their own volition (Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1989; Fein, 1981; Flavell, 1985). The basic finding that self-directed 
pretence emerges in children’s behaviour prior to other-directed behaviour has been 
obtained in numerous studies (for example, Belsky & Most, 1981; Corrigan, 1987; 
Nicolich, 1977; Piaget, 1951; Watson & Fischer, 1980). Once other-directed pretence
emerges it undergoes further developmental changes which can also be interpreted as 
reflecting the process of decentration. The development of children’s use of other 
agents in their pretence was investigated in a study by Watson and Fischer (1980) who 
observed a gradual process of decentration whereby initially the child could only act 
with themselves as pretend agents (at twelve months). By the age of two years, 
children were able to imitate and to spontaneously produce acts in which some other is 
an active agent (for example, that a doll is walking). Comparable findings were 
obtained in a recent study by Kavanaugh, Eizemuan and Harris (1997) in which 
children’s comprehension of other people’s pretence when they treat other objects as 
having independent agency was assessed. The two year old children in this study 
understood the experimenter’s actions when, for example, a mother doll was made to 
feed a baby doll. By two and a half years of age, children were found to be highly 
competent in this domain, no longer making errors when asked to complete a pretence 
act which involved an independent agent and which had been started by the 
experimenter.
The findings relating to children’s enactment of social roles during pretence provide 
further evidence of decentration. Initially, children simply pretend to do what are 
effectively their own everyday activities. The child then begins to imitate the activities 
of other people during their pretence (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1989; Piaget, 1951) and 
this is followed by the onset of social pretend play at the age of two to two and a half 
years. Initially, social pretence is simple and most frequently involves the child’s 
mother as the play partner. However, by the age of three years, children are more 
likely to pretend with other cliildren, particularly an elder sibling (Haight & Miller, 
1992; Howes, 1985; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). By the age of three to four years, 
children begin to engage in sociodramatic play (Fein, 1981; Flavell, 1985; Watson & 
Fischer, 1980) whereby they play together co-operatively by enacting the social roles 
involved in a specific theme (Fein, 1981). The process of decentration in children’s 
sociodramatic play was very clearly shown in a study by Gaiwey and Berndt (1977). 
These researchers observed that three year old children tended to enact family based 
roles and importantly, these tended to be self-referenced. For example, the children 
enacted parent-child relationships. In contrast, although family relationships were still 
a popular theme, the five year old children in the study tended to enact more diverse 
roles, including those which they could not have experienced directly themselves (for 
example, husband-wife relationships).
Integration
The integration of pretence can be described as the process through which increasingly 
long and complex sequences of pretend actions are produced (Bretherton & Beeghly,
1989). The developmental trend apparent from the research literature is that children 
initially produce brief single pretend gestures, gradually combining these into ordered 
sequences of actions of longer duration (Belsky & Most, 1981; Corrigan, 1987; 
Nicolich, 1977; Slade, 1987) until ultimately, complex sequences of pretend actions 
following plots emerge, often in the form of sociodramatic play (Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1989). In terms of children’s comprehension of other people’s pretend 
activities. Hams, Kavanaugh and Meredith (1994) offer evidence that two year old 
children understand that the pretend actions carried out by other people can be 
integrated into a coherent and causally connected episode. For example, the children 
predicted that when a duck was made to ‘pour’ pretend milk into a matchbox and then 
to ‘pour’ this over a horse, this made the horse ‘milky’. The younger two year old 
children involved in the study were less systematic in their responses than the older 
two year old children. Nevertheless, the study provides a clear indication that 
integrated pretend episodes are understood, as well as produced, early in the 
development of pretence.
The evidence reviewed in this section suggests that there is considerable agreement 
over the sorts of behaviours that are thought to characterise pretence and over the 
developmental progression that these behaviours follow. However, within the 
literature on children’s pretence there remain two main areas of continued debate. 
First, whether children understand pretence as a cognitive, mentalistic activity, or 
merely as a form of behaviour. Second, the nature of children’s understanding of the 
distinction or boundary between pretence and reality. This second issue forms the 
basis of the research to be reported here and will therefore be discussed in some depth. 
However, the discussion now turns to the debate about children’s understanding of 
pretence as a mentalistic or behavioural activity.
Children’s understanding of the nature of pretence
In recent years there has been a growing interest in children’s understanding of their 
own and other people’s minds - children’s ‘theory of mind’ (for example, Astington, 
1994; Astington, Harris & Olson, 1988; Lewis & Mitchell, 1994; Wellman, 1990; 
Whiten, 1991). One feature of this research has been a considerable interest in the
extent to which children understand pretence as a mental representational activity in 
which the pretender holds two conflicting mental representations of certain objects and 
situations - what has been pretended and what is really the case. It is very striking that 
children of under the age of four years fail on a variety of tasks that require them to 
hold two conflicting representations of the same situation, whilst the conceptually 
similar ability to pretend emerges at least two years earlier. Children of less than four 
years old typically fail tasks designed to assess their understanding of the 
‘appearance-reality’ distinction in which it is necessary for the child to simultaneously 
mentally represent what an object really is and what it looks like. For example, young 
children seem unable to state that whilst an object might look like a rock, it is in fact a 
sponge (Flavell, 1986; Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1987; Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1990). 
Similarly, three year old children tend to fail false-belief tasks in which they must 
mentally represent their own (correct) beliefs about a situation and a protagonist’s 
(incorrect) beliefs about the same situation (for example, Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 
1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and tasks wliich require them to report their own 
previous beliefs (for example, Astington & Gopnik, 1988; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; 
Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991). These apparently paradoxical findings have lead to a 
lively debate about whether children’s pretence reflects a precocious understanding of 
mental representation or whether children of under four years old have a simpler, 
non-representational understanding of pretence.
The view that pretence can be considered a representational activity was originally 
associated with the work of Piaget (1951) who argued that the onset of pretence 
marked the emergence of the semiotic flinction. That is, pretence marks a qualitative 
change in the child’s thinking which means that rather than equating symbols with 
what they signify, the child appreciates that the signifier can be differentiated from 
what is signified. The child becomes able to use one object as a symbol for, or to 
represent, another, and hence the emergence of pretend play. More recently, the idea 
that pretence is understood by children as a representational activity has been 
developed by Leslie (1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1994; Leslie & Frith, 1990). Like 
Piaget, Leslie argues that during pretence children must hold a representation of the 
true situation and a representation of what is being pretended. Flowever, Leslie goes 
further to make some veiy specific claims about the nature of these conflicting 
representations, the cognitive system required to generate and manage them, and the 
relationship between the child’s capacity for pretence and their theory of mind.
10
Leslie (1987, 1988) begins with the claim that humans have a basic capacity to form 
accurate, literal representations of the world - primary representations. However, in 
pretence the child forms two representations of the same situation such that they 
simultaneously represent reality and what has been pretended. Leslie argues that the 
representation of the pretence must somehow be differentiated or separated from the 
literal primaiy representation, othei-wise the primai-y representational system would be 
severely compromised by the arbitrary changes in meaning that are made during 
pretence. In other words, a child who treated a pretend representation of a banana as 
a telephone, as a primary representation would soon be very confused about the 
properties and functions of these objects. Leslie argues that pretence therefore 
requires the generation of a copy of the primary representation which is ‘decoupled’ or 
‘quarantined’ such that normal assumptions about reference, truth and existence do not 
apply. This secondary representation is termed by Leslie a ‘metarepresentation’ since 
rather than being a representation of the world, it is a representation of a (primary) 
representation. Overall, Leslie believes that pretence is a representational activity and 
is an early manifestation of the cliild’s ability to understand their own and other 
people’s mental states. According to Leslie’s model (1987, 1994; Leslie & Frith,
1990) the same cognitive system that is responsible for raising, manipulating and 
interpreting pretend metarepresentations is responsible for the child’s understanding of 
mental states such as belief, in which assumptions about reference, truth and existence 
also need to be suspended. Leslie subsequently terms this cognitive system the ‘theory 
of mind module’ (Leslie, 1991, 1992, 1994).
According to Leslie (1987, 1988, 1994), the delay between the onset of pretence and 
the ability to succeed on tasks in which the child is required to hold conflicting 
representations of the same situation cannot be a consequence of a lack of a cognitive 
system that can manage such representations. Leslie instead argues that this lag is a 
consequence of the relative complexity of false belief tasks relative to pretence. In 
pretence the alternative representation of the situation is simply stipulated or made up. 
In contrast, in the case of belief there is a correct alternative representation which must 
be inferred or calculated on the basis of the person’s experience of the situation. 
Furthermore, false belief tasks require the child to comprehend the causal relationship 
between beliefs and situations in the world.
Leslie’s (1987) view of the representational nature of pretence and the relationship 
between pretence and the child’s theory of mind has received considerable criticism. It 
is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into a full discussion of the issues raised by
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these critiques, for example, the claim that the theoiy is non-developmental (Bradley, 
1993; Hobson, 1990) and that is it a non-social account of children’s understanding of 
other people (Hobson, 1990), and Leslie’s response to some of these criticisms (Leslie 
& Frith, 1990; Leslie, 1994). However, one criticism of Leslie’s theoiy which is 
particularly pertinent to the current debate was levelled by Perner (1991) who, in 
offering an alternative account of children’s understanding of pretence, criticised 
Leslie’s use of the term metarepresentation to describe the representations that are 
generated during pretence. Whilst Perner agrees that pretend representations emerge 
as copies of primary representations, he believes that rather than being representations 
of representations (metarepresentations) these are simply representations. To make his 
point clearer, Perner asks the question of what is obtained by making a copy of a 
picture. The answer for Perner is another picture, or in other words, another 
representation - it is not a representation of a representation, or a picture of a picture, 
it is simply another picture (a similar point is also made by Jarrold, Carmthers, Smith 
& Boucher, 1994). Perner argues that the same logic also applies to pretence and that 
Leslie had therefore been unjustified in attributing children with the capacity to 
understand metarepresentation. In Ms response to this criticism, Leslie (1994) denied 
that he had made any claim that children explicitly understand metarepresentation, 
instead arguing that children have a mentalistic understanding of pretence with an 
implicit understanding of the mind as representational.
Perner’s (1991) criticism of Leslie’s (1987) account of children’s understanding of 
pretence emerges out of his conviction that children are not capable of fully 
understanding the mind as a representational entity until the age of four years. Below 
that age, children are said to operate as situation theorists (Perner, 1988, 1991; Perner 
& Astington, 1992). That is, in Perner’s view pretence simply marks the child’s 
emerging ability to construct mental models of hypothetical situations and to behave in 
terms of these situations, or to act as-if these situations were true, by switching action 
control from their mental model of the real situation to their mental model of an 
alternative situation. Pretence simply reflects the cMld’s ability to think about how the 
world is not, and to act as if the world were like that. Perner strongly denies that this 
requires any representational or symbolic activity - the child’s understanding remains 
entirely at the level of behaviour in terms of differing situations. In terms of how they 
understand pretence in others, Perner sees children as able to conceive 6f other people 
as responding to actual and possible situations, however the child does not view the 
other person as metarepresenting those situations.
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Recently, Perner (1995; Perner, Baker & Hutton, 1994) has discussed the young 
child’s inability to distinguish pretence (knowingly acting in terms of an untrue 
situation) and belief (mistakenly behaving in terms of an untrue situation). Rather than 
conceiving of pretence and belief as separate mental states, the child is said to 
understand them in terms of an undifferentiated concept of ‘prelief - they understand 
that they and other people might behave in terms of something that is untrue but do 
not differentiate whether or not it is known to be untrue. Consequently the child fails 
to differentiate between pretence and false beliefs. Overall, Perner’s view is that 
young children have a very limited understanding of pretence that is restricted by their 
inability to conceive of the mind as representational before the age of four years.
Although they offer quite different explanations of the nature of children’s 
understanding of pretence, other authors have likewise argued that young children 
have a non-representational understanding of pretence. Harris and Kavanaugh (1993 a, 
1993b) argue that children understand pretence as a special form of activity, or 
behaviour, that is directed at make-believe objects and situations. In doing this, 
children do not need to conceive of the underlying mental representations held by the 
pretender. Instead, children observe an action with a missing component, for example, 
nothing is ‘poured’ from an empty tea pot, and perceive this as a special or ‘deviant’ 
activity. The child then processes the action in a constructive fashion by imaginatively 
restoring the missing components, for example, by imagining that tea is being poured. 
In this case, the tea is ‘flagged’ as being make-believe tea (Harris, 1994a). According 
to this model, objects to be used as props in the pretence are flagged as such and 
whenever the props are acted upon the flags are read and edited as appropriate. This 
allows the child to keep track of sequences of events and pretend transformations, for 
example, by allowing them to infer, based on their real world knowledge, the 
consequences of spilling pretend tea. At the end of the pretend episode these flags are 
discounted and thus no representational abuse occurs (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993a).
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993a) further develop this model of children’s pretence in 
terms of an analogy between the comprehension of pretend episodes and story 
comprehension. In pretence, the child must keep track of the pretend identity of 
make-believe props (use of flagging) and similarly in text comprehension the reader 
must keep track of the identity of objects and situations that have been referred to. In 
both pretence and stoiy comprehension, referents are temporarily focused on, causal 
inferences are required to integrate sequences of events and constructive processing is 
required to give an interconnected representation of the pretend episode or story
(Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993a). In terms of the current discussion, the important point 
to be drawn from this, is that it proceeds without an understanding of the pretender’s, 
or story writer’s, representational state. In pretence, a situation and the objects therein 
are flagged as make-believe and the child simply behaves and interprets other people’s 
behaviour in terms of their mental stance towards what is stipulated within that 
make-believe situation.
The child’s ability to reason in terms of pretend stipulations and to imaginatively 
construct or simulate events and outcomes accordingly, relates to Harris’ account of 
the child’s ability to predict and explain other people’s behaviour in terms of their 
mental states. In offering his ‘simulation account’ of the child’s theoiy of mind, Harris 
(1989, 1991, 1992, 1993; see also Johnson, 1988) argues that to predict another 
person’s behaviour in terms of their beliefs and desires requires that the child sets aside 
their own beliefs and desires (adjusts the default settings) and simulates, or 
imaginatively constructs, a representation of what they would do if they shared the 
other person’s beliefs and desires. Similarly, in reasoning about pretend scenarios, the 
child sets aside what they know about cuiTent reality and imaginatively simulates 
events in terms of the pretend stipulations (Harris, 1994a). For Harris, therefore, 
neither pretence nor an understanding of other minds, requires the child to conceive of 
the mind as representational. The additional difficulty in understanding concepts such 
as false belief, is for Harris, related to the greater number of default settings that must 
be adjusted and the need for the child to appreciate the actor’s understanding of the 
hypothetical situation as tme or not. Thus for Harris, the delay between the onset of 
pretence and the child’s success on theory of mind tasks such as the false belief task, 
does not reflect difficulty in understanding the mind as representational since this 
conceptualisation of the mind is not necessary in either case.
A further account which suggests that children understand pretence in terms of 
behaviour rather than mental representation is offered by Lillard (1993a, 1993b, 1994, 
1996; Lillard & Flavell, 1992). Lillard’s position on this matter is similar to that of 
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993a, 1993b) since she too argues that young children simply 
understand pretence as acting as-if something were the case. To clarify her argument, 
Lillard (1996) gives the example of how children understand what is happening when 
another person pretends to brush their teeth with a pencil. Lillard claims that children 
understand the person as engaging in toothbrush-like actions with the pencil - the child 
does not conceive of the pencil as being mentally represented as a toothbrush. Thus 
Lillard, like Harris and Kavanaugh, sees young children’s understanding of pretence as
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a behavioural one in which the child acts as-if. Indeed, Lillard goes even frirther to 
argue that young children do not conceive of the mind as necessaiy for pretence - 
instead, all that is needed is a body to cany out pretend actions (Lillard, 1996).
The preceding discussion has offered four accounts of the nature of young children’s 
understanding of pretence. To recap, Leslie (1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1994; Leslie & 
Frith, 1990) argued that children understand pretence as a metarepresentational 
activity in which, for example, one object represents or symbolises another. In 
contrast, Perner (1988, 1991, 1995; Perner & Astington, 1992; Perner, Baker & 
Hutton, 1994), Harris and Kavanaugh (1993a, 1993b; Harris, 1994a) and Lillard 
(1993 a, 1993b, 1994, 1996; Lillard & Flavell, 1992) conceptualise young children as 
understanding pretence in simpler, behavioural terms. However, there are also more 
subtle similarities and differences between each of these accounts - these will be briefly 
discussed before some of the research evidence relating to this issue is described.
Although they disagree on the nature of children’s understanding of pretence, Leslie 
(1987, 1994) and Perner (1988, 1991; Perner & Astington, 1992) are in agreement 
that prior to the onset of pretence children are only able to represent the world in 
accurate and literal ways. Leslie refers to these as primaiy representations, whilst 
Perner discusses single updating mental models. These authors are also in agreement 
that pretence marks the child’s emerging ability to generate secondary representations 
or further mental models, that originate as copies of the primary representations from 
which they must be separated if representational abuse is to be avoided (Leslie, 1994; 
Perner, 1991). However, it is at this point that the two accounts begin to diverge. For 
Leslie, these secondary representations are representations of primary representations 
(metarepresentations) whereas for Perner they are models of alternative, possibly 
hypothetical situations and as such have no metarepresentational content (Perner,
1991).
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993a) note that their account of children’s understanding of 
pretence shares with that offered by Leslie (1987), a commitment to the idea that 
children can deploy their real world knowledge about causal events when 
comprehending pretend sequences, and an agreement that pretend representations 
must somehow be differentiated from representations of reality (this latter point is also 
made by Perner, 1991). It is at this point that the two accounts diverge. Harris and 
Kavanaugh argue that this differentiation is achieved through a process of flagging 
whereby the pretender starts with a pretend stipulation and locates an appropriate
15
prop, which is flagged as having make-believe content. These flags are read and edited 
in accordance with subsequent pretend transformations. In contrast, Leslie’s 
decoupling model posits that a prop is obtained and the primary representation of it is 
copied into a decoupled secondary representation which is then edited as appropriate. 
A further difference between these accounts is that whilst Leslie suggests that pretence 
reflects a new logical capacity (to metarepresent) on the part of the child, by drawing 
an analogy between pretence comprehension and story comprehension, Harris and 
Kavanaugh note that pretence is simply another aspect of the child’s developing 
capacity for involvement in fictional worlds.
There are two very noticeable similarities between the Harris and Kavanaugh (1993a, 
1993b) account of children’s pretence and that offered by Perner (1988, 1991; Perner 
& Astington, 1992). First, both accounts see children’s understanding of pretence as 
behavioural, that is, in terms of people acting as-if something untrue were true. 
Second, that understanding of pretence does not require any metarepresentational 
capability. The differences between these two accounts are actually quite subtle. 
Whilst Perner argues that pretend actions are understood as being directed at 
hypothetical situations, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993 a) argue that pretence is 
understood as actions directed at make-believe stipulations and objects. The Lillard 
(1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1996; Lillard & Flavell, 1992) account is probably best treated 
as most similar to that offered by Harris and Kavanaugh - that pretence is understood 
in terms of acting as-if, and not as a mental representational activity. However, the 
Lillard account is the more extreme of the two since she would argue that children 
have absolutely no insight into the mentalistic nature of pretence.
As can be seen from this discussion, broadly speaking these four accounts are divisible 
in terms of the level of psychological insight into pretence that is attributed to the 
young child and in terms of what the child’s as-if behaviour is directed towards 
(hypothetical situations or make-believe objects). The research evidence pertaining to 
these accounts will now be summarised.
There have been a number of studies investigating children’s ability to comprehend 
pretend stipulations and complex causal sequences of pretend transformations (Harris 
& Kavanaugh, 1993a; Harris, Kavanaugh & Meredith, 1994; Leslie, 1994; 
Walker-Andrews & Harris, 1993). The results from these studies provide convincing 
evidence that children as young as two to three years of age can deploy their 
knowledge of real causal events to draw inferences about what is happening in
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pretence. For example, two year old children could appreciate that ‘spilling’ pretend 
tea caused the (di-y) surface below to be wet. These findings have been interpreted by 
Leslie and Harris and Kavanaugh as supporting the common feature in their otherwise 
differing accounts of children’s pretence - that children’s knowledge of the real world 
is utilised when they make inferences about changes in objects represented by 
decoupled or flagged pretend representations. Consequently, these data do not enable 
any judgement to be made about whether pretence is understood representationally or 
behaviourally.
However, there is some evidence which does not support the view that pretence is a 
metarepresentational activity. Hall, Frank and Ellison (1995) directly tested a series of 
predictions about children’s language that they developed on the basis of Leslie’s 
(1987, 1988) account of pretence as an early manifestation of the child’s theoiy of 
mind. For example, they tested the predictions that children should be adept at 
linguistically signalling pretend transformations and that given that pretence is thought 
to precede understanding of other mental states, children should discuss pretence 
before they begin to use other mental state tenus. However, contrary to their 
predictions. Hall et al found that children tended to discuss activities (what they were 
going to do) rather than mental representations (what objects symbolised) during 
pretence, and overall the children’s pretend lexicon was less sophisticated than Leslie’s 
model had been taken to suggest.
Lillard has conducted a series of studies in which she has directly investigated young 
children’s appreciation that pretence involves an underlying mental representation 
(Lillard & Flavell, 1992; Lillard, 1993b, 1996). From these studies, Lillard concludes 
that children have a very simple understanding of pretence as action and do not 
understand that in order to pretend about something, the pretender needs to know 
about it and to mentally represent it. For example, until the age of five years, children 
claimed that a protagonist was pretending to be a rabbit by hopping even though he 
did not know that rabbits hopped and was not thinking about rabbits at the time 
(Lillard, 1993b). For these children, acting like a rabbit was a necessary and sufficient 
condition for pretence. In an additional study, Lillard (1996) conducted a further test 
of children’s conceptualisation of pretence. Previously, Johnson and Wellman (1982) 
demonstrated that children under the age of four years have a very limited 
understanding of the function of the mind and brain, claiming these were only needed 
for intellectual, mental activities such as thinking and spelling and that they were not 
needed for physical activities such as walking. Lillard followed on from this study by
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asking children whether a mind was needed for pretending. For children of up to six to 
eight years old it was not - whilst a person might need a mind to plan the pretence, tliis 
plan would apparently then be carried out without any contribution from the mind 
(Lillard, 1996). Lillard interprets the findings from her studies as providing powerfi.il 
evidence that children understand pretence as a form of action and do not consider it in 
terms of any underlying mental activity (Lillard, 1993b, 1994, 1996; Lillard & Flavell,
1992).
However, Custer (1996) has recently criticised Lillard’s (1993b) studies, arguing that 
the experimental design made the action component of pretence considerably more 
salient than the mental representational component. For example, Custer argues that 
by saying that the protagonist is hopping like a rabbit, the emphasis is placed on his 
actions. Custer argues that Lillard’s data should therefore not be interpreted as 
suggesting that children never take mental representations into account when 
comprehending pretence. Indeed, Custer’s own data shows that three year old 
children could correctly identify a pretender’s mental representation when they were 
directly asked to do so. The idea that children never understand pretence in terms of 
mental representation is also challenged by Woolley who, like Custer, argues that in 
pretence the action component is particularly salient, but that children do understand 
the mental representational component of fictional mental states (Woolley & Wellman, 
1990, 1993). In support of this, Woolley (1995b) offers evidence from a study in 
which children successfully identified the mental representation underlying imagination 
which she considers to be a fictional mental state which does not have an action 
component.
Research looking at children’s memories for their previous mental states also supports 
the claim that children have a representational understanding of pretence. Gopnik and 
Slaughter (1991), for example, found that three year old children were able to 
remember their previous pretence, even when there was no accompanying action 
component. This finding was interpreted as suggesting that these very young children 
were recalling their earlier mental representations, A related study by Amsel, 
Bobadilla, Coch and Remy (1996) obtained similar findings.
Hickling, Wellman and Gottfried (1997) have directly tested between the competing 
perspectives that children understand pretence as mental representation or as 
behaviour. Like Jarrold, Carruthers, Smith and Boucher (1994), these authors point 
out that the idea that children have no appreciation of the mental representational
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underpinnings of pretence is incompatible with the fact that children successfully 
engage in social pretence in which pretend roles are communicated between children. 
Hickling et al argue that the dichotomy between pretence as behavioural or 
representational is misleading and that children should instead be conceived as 
understanding pretence as a special form of activity that is a product of a particular 
mental state. In support of this, Hickling et al offer evidence from a study in which 
three year old children were shown to correctly realise that a pretender who did not 
obseiwe a pretend transformation would not be pretending about the modified situation 
but would instead continue to pretend about the pre-transformational state of affairs. 
Thus even three year old children saw the importance and relevance of the pretender’s 
mental representation. Hickling et al note that their data do not rule out the possibility 
that the children could not differentiate pretence from belief and indeed, evidence from 
Perner, Baker and Hutton (1994) certainly seems to suggest that these mental states 
are undifferentiated into a single state o f ‘prelief by children of a similar age.
Taken together, the evidence obtained in the studies described above seems to suggest 
that it is unlikely that children have absolutely no understanding that pretence requires 
mental representation. It is equally unlikely that young children’s understanding is 
metarepresentational. However, the observation that children have some 
conceptualisation of the mentalistic underpinnings of pretence is compatible with both 
the Perner (1988, 1991, 1995; Perner & Astington, 1992; Perner, Baker & Hutton, 
1994) and Harris and Kavanaugh (1993a, 1993b) positions, since they acknowledge 
that although according to their theories children need not have tliis level of 
understanding, they may have some conceptualisation that they or other people are 
responding to hypothetical situations or make-believe objects. At present, however, 
the data are not sufficient to allow any clear decision to be made between these 
competing accounts. One possible interpretation of the data is that whilst children are 
capable of interpreting the mental representations underlying pretence, the salience of 
the action component and the efficacy of interpreting pretence in terms of behaviour, 
leads children to sometimes discount mental representational states when 
comprehending pretend episodes, instead interpreting them behaviourally.
Children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction
The second key issue in children’s pretence about which there remains an ongoing 
debate is children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. It is tliis issue of
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whether children are able to consistently and reliably keep objects and situations that 
are pretend, separate from those that are real, which formed the focus of the current 
research.
The pretend-reality distinction, also termed the fantasy-reality distinction (for example, 
Woolley, 1997a; Woolley & Phelps, 1994), comes under the broad heading of the 
mental-real distinction. The basic question that researchers continue to address here, 
is whether children divide the world into separate categories of real and mental 
phenomena and whether they do so on the same basis as adults (Wellman, 1988,
1990). For example, do children understand that mental entities such as thoughts, 
dreams, memories and imaginings can not be physically acted upon (seen and 
touched), can not be seen by other people, and do not have a consistency of existence 
that is independent of the child’s mental processes? For Wellman this basic ontological 
distinction between internal mental phenomena and external physical phenomena is the 
foundation from which the child’s theory of mind develops. The specific issue of 
whether children understand the pretend-reality distinction also has far reaching 
implications. The question here is whether children ever get so carried away by their 
pretence that they begin to believe it has somehow, perhaps magically, become true 
(Harris, 1989, 1994b), In other words, do children ever reach a point in their pretence 
when they expect features of what has been pretended to ‘seep’ into reality (Lillard, 
1993 a, 1994)7 A failure to differentiate the world of the real from the world of 
pretence would mean that the child was no longer pretending (Lillard, 1994). The 
implication of this is that the child might truly believe that the wooden block they are 
pretending to be a cookie actually is a cookie and thus they might mistakenly attempt 
to eat it (Woolley, 1995b; Woolley & Wellman, 1990). This failure to differentiate the 
real and pretend identities of objects could then result in representational abuse, or 
conceptual confusion about the properties and functions of objects that have been 
pretended about (Leslie, 1987). To recap, the issue relating to children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction centres around questions of whether 
children have an adult like conceptualisation of the differing characteristics of mental 
and real entities, and of whether children ever confuse pretence and reality such that 
what has merely been pretended is assumed to be real.
Piaget (1929) provides one answer to these questions. Piaget argued that under the 
age of seven to eight years, children are subject to ‘childhood realism’ in that they 
completely fail to discriminate between mental and real entities. Thus for the young 
child, the thought of an object, the memory of an object or the pretence of an object is
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essentially identical to the corresponding real object. In other words, the Piagetian 
view on this issue was that young children did not understand the mental-real 
distinction and were thus subject to a variety of confusions, including confusion 
between pretence and reality.
However, as Lillard (1994) points out, it seems highly unlikely that children are 
completely unable to differentiate pretence from reality. For example, Lillard suggests 
that the ‘knowing smiles’ that children produce during their pretend play must surely 
signal that the child has at least a basic awareness that they are pretending. 
Furthermore, Lillard notes that the representational abuse that might be expected if 
children were totally unable to discriminate pretence and reality simply does not occur 
- children do not routinely become uncertain of the differing properties and functions 
of objects they have pretended about. Even more compelling evidence than this has 
been obtained in the various studies which have directly assessed young children’s 
understanding of the differing features of mental and real phenomena, and their ability 
to discriminate between pretence and reality.
The evidence relating to children’s understanding of the mental-real distinction is 
relatively clear cut and has been obtained primarily from two sources - children’s 
language and experimental studies. Shatz, Wellman and Silber (1983) studied young 
children’s spontaneous use of various mental state verbs including know, tliink, 
remember, guess and pretend. Using strict criteria and analysis of the conversational 
context to establish when these tenns were used to refer to a mental state rather than, 
for example, being a repetition of a previous utterance or having a conversational use 
such as ‘you know’ at the end of a sentence, Shatz et al established that the earliest 
clear references to mental state fiinctions were produced at the end of the child’s 
second year. For example, one child made his first explicit contrast between what was 
real and what he had pretended at the age of two years ten months. Thus on the basis 
of the Shatz et al results and a replication by Woolley and Wellman (1990) using the 
CHILDES data base, it would seem that by the age of at least three years, children are 
capable of linguistically marking the mental-real distinction.
The experimental evidence tends to support the findings from studies of children’s 
language. Wellman and Estes (1986) argued that there are three basic criteria that can 
be used to discriminate between mental and real entities. First, whether or not the 
entity can be seen and touched, and occupies its own physical space 
(behavioural-sensory evidence). Second, whether the entity is similarly experienced by
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other people (public existence). Third, whether the entity continues to exist once an 
individual ceases to mentally represent it (consistent existence). To establish whether 
children distinguish mental and real entities on the basis of these characteristics, 
Wellman and Estes asked children questions about two characters, one who had, for 
example, a real cookie, and another who was thinking about a cookie, or remembering 
a cookie, or pretending about a cookie, and so on. The results showed that even three 
year old children realised that the real entity but not the mental entity could be acted 
upon by the depicted child, acted upon by other people, and could be further acted 
upon in the future.
The basic findings from the Wellman and Estes (1986) studies have been found to be 
highly replicable. In a series of follow up studies, Estes, Wellman and Woolley (1989) 
demonstrated that even when the real entities very misleadingly shared 
behavioural-sensory properties with mental entities, children as young as three years 
old still discussed them as real, physical entities. For example, the children’s 
performance was unaffected by the fact that shadows and smoke are difficult to touch 
and do not have a particularly consistent existence. Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall 
and Harmer (1991 - experiments 1 and 2) found that four to six year old children’s 
ability to comment on the behavioural-sensory properties and reality status of mental 
entities was unaffected by whether the entities had a supernatural status (for example, 
a mental image of a witch) or were supernatural and fear arousing (for example, a 
mental image of a witch chasing the child). Kinoshita (1994) also replicated the 
Wellman and Estes findings when asking five to six year old children about the 
properties of pretended about and dreamed about entities.
However, it is not simply the case that children conceive of mental entities in negative 
terms, that is, only in tenns of the fact that they cannot be touched, and that other 
people cannot see them, and so on. Estes et al (1989) note that there are also some 
positive features of mental entities compared to real entities - the former, but not the 
latter, can be manipulated and transformed by mental effort alone. Estes et al’s data 
demonstrate that three year old children also appreciate this feature of mental entities, 
realising that they could stretch a balloon they were imagining just by thinking about it, 
but that they could not do the same thing with a real balloon.
There have, however, been some failures to replicate the Wellman and Estes (1986) 
findings. In a study investigating Indian children’s ability to differentiate real and 
mental entities corresponding to concrete items, toy items such as dolls and celestial
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items such as stars, Wahi and Johri (1994) found that children of under five years old 
were not reliable in their judgements. Furthermore, unlike Estes et al (1989) and 
Harris et al (1991) who found no effect of item type on children’s performance, in this 
study the children were most likely to align real celestial items with mental items. The 
precise mechanism causing these differing results is not clear, although Walii and Johri 
speculate that there may be underlying cultural differences influencing children’s 
performance, particularly with respect to the celestial items. A non-replication which 
cannot be attributed to cross-cultural differences arises out of a study by Taylor, 
Cartwright and Carlson (1993) in which they note lower performance levels in their 
three year old American children compared to those in the Wellman and Estes studies. 
Taylor et al suggest that these differing results might be attributable to the different 
sampling techniques used in the two studies. However, even if they do not support the 
precocious understanding of the mental-real distinction previously observed in three 
year old children, the findings nevertheless mitigate against the prolonged period of 
cliildhood realism proposed by Piaget (1929).
In his summary of the evidence in this domain, Wellman (1990) concluded that 
children, like adults, categorise the world in terms of a basic ontological distinction 
between mental entities and real entities. With the possible exceptions of the Wahi and 
Johri (1994) and Taylor, Cartwright and Carlson (1993) data, the findings obtained 
since Wellman’s summary give no reason to amend this conclusion. Instead, the 
findings lend themselves to the conclusion that children and adults have remarkably 
similar tendencies for categorising the world into mental and real phenomena and that 
they do so on the basis of similar beliefs about the characteristics which differentiate 
these categories.
There have been numerous studies which have directly assessed children’s 
understanding of the distinction between pretence and reality. In particular, a number 
of studies have asked children to state the real identity of an object used in pretence 
and then its pretend identity (for example, Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1987; Harris, 
Kavanaugh & Meredith, 1994; Lillard & Flavell, 1992; Woolley, 1995b; Woolley & 
Wellman, 1990). The results obtained in these studies have been highly consistent. 
Children as young as three years old (and even two and a half years old in Harris, 
Kavanaugh & Meredith’s study) have been found to be able to reliably state what an 
object really is and what it has been pretended to be. For example, in the Flavell et al 
study, children correctly stated that although the experimenter was pretending that a 
sponge was a truck, it was really a sponge. In addition, three to four year old children
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can recall the real and pretend identities of items they have used in several different 
sequences of object substitution pretence (Amsel, Bobadilla, Coch & Remy, 1996; 
Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991). Furthermore, when told what a character is pretending 
and what is really the case, children can correctly identify the character’s mental 
representation of the situation and thus demonstrate their ability to clearly identify and 
differentiate real and pretend states of affairs (Custer, 1996; Hickling, Wellman & 
Gottfried, 1997). Taken together, these studies strongly suggest that children of three 
years of age are proficient at distinguishing pretence from reality.
However, a study by Taylor, Cartwright and Carlson (1993) suggested that for some 
children the distinction between pretence and reality might not always be maintained. 
These researchers found that many four to five year old children with imaginary 
companions reported that these companions were real and could therefore be seen or 
touched. This finding might in itself be taken as suggesting that these children fail to 
separate what is real from what they are pretending. This possibility was subsequently 
dismissed by Taylor et al since several of these children spontaneously made additional 
comments that the friend was not a real one but was a pretend one. Furthennore, the 
children’s good performance on other measures of their understanding of the 
pretend-reality distinction mitigates against there being any general confusion amongst 
these children. For example, the children successfully differentiated pretend and real 
entities on the tasks developed by Wellman and Estes (1986) and accurately 
categorised pictures of fantasy and real events as such on a task developed by Taylor 
and Howell (1973). On the basis of these findings, Taylor et al interpreted the 
children’s earlier responses that their imaginary companions were real, as a 
consequence of their involvement in the pretend play rather than any genuine 
pretend-reality confusion.
The possibility that there might be a developmental sequence in the extent to which 
children understand the pretend-reality distinction was investigated in a study by 
DiLalla and Watson (1988). From their analyses of young children’s ability to 
incorporate interruptions (for example, the experimenter leaving the room) in their 
pretend play into that play, DiLalla and Watson concluded that children of three years 
old and under had no understanding of a boundary between pretence and reality. That 
is, these children equated the worlds of pretence and reality and so were unable to 
return to their pretence when it had been disrupted. By three and a half years of age, 
the children had developed a concept labelled a ‘flizzy boundary’ between pretence 
and reality - they realised that the two realms existed separately but were inefficient at
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controlling the boundaiy between them and therefore did not stop the pretence or 
acknowledge interruptions to it. Children of about four years of age behaved in terms 
of what DiLalla and Watson termed a ‘rigid boundary’ between pretence and reality. 
In dealing with the interruptions to their pretence these children temporarily 
discontinued the pretence and subsequently re-entered pretend mode. Finally, five year 
old children were considered to have a concept of an ‘integrated boundary’ between 
pretence and reality such that the interruptions were seamlessly incorporated into the 
pretence from within the pretend mode.
However, by DiLalla and Watson’s (1988) own admission, their proposed 
developmental sequence was based entirely on the child’s ability to incorporate 
interruptions into their play. It could be that this is a specific skill and does not give a 
full picture of the child’s level of understanding. Moreover, it could be that the 
children did not, rather than could not, incorporate the interruptions into their 
pretence. Golomb and Kuersten (1996) further criticise the specific details of the 
interruptions to the pretence, arguing that the experimenter’s unexplained departure 
from the room would be highly disruptive of any ongoing activity, not just pretence 
and that the changing of the symbolic meaning of a prop and the change in the 
experimenter’s pretend role probably tell us more about the children’s responses to 
unexpected pretend transformations than about their understanding of the boundary 
between pretence and reality. Golomb and Kuersten addressed these issues in a study 
based on DiLalla and Watson, but which incorporated reality based intrusions into the 
pretence. For example, the experimenter stepped into a pretend river and bit into a 
pretend (play dough) cookie. Overall, the results failed to support the DiLalla and 
Watson developmental sequence since the majority of children, regardless of age, 
temporarily stopped pretending to deal with the reality intrusion and then 
re-commenced the pretend play. In other words, most children displayed what DiLalla 
and Watson had termed a ‘rigid boundary’ between pretence and reality. In 
concluding, Golomb and Kuersten argued that children’s ability to distinguish pretence 
from reality was robust, even at three years of age.
Overall, it seems that children do understand the pretend-reality distinction and that 
this understanding is empirically testable from an early age. To use Lillard’s words,
“at least by 3 years of age children appear to have a good grasp of the 
fact that the pretend world is separate and different from the real world, 
and that the pretend representation is different from reality” (Lillard,
1994, page 221).
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However, all of this evidence highlighting children’s competence at distinguishing 
mental from real phenomena and pretend from real entities, stands in stark contrast to 
various pieces of evidence which suggest that children are not always entirely 
confident of the reality status of objectively imaginary entities and events.
Several studies have investigated children’s ability to label specific entities as pretend 
or real - the results tend to show that children find these tasks difficult and often 
incorrectly categorise imaginary entities as real. For example, Taylor and Howell 
(1973) asked three to five year old children whether a series of depicted events, such 
as a rabbit baking a cake, could happen in real life. Despite an overall developmental 
trend of increasingly accurate judgements, even five year old children were prone to 
mistakenly thinking that the fantasy events could actually take place. Similar results 
have been observed using the same basic task design in studies by Samuels and Taylor 
(1994) and Taylor, Cartwright and Carlson (1993). In a slightly different task, 
Morison and Gardner (1978) showed children sets of three cards showing a mixture of 
real and imaginary entities including Mickey Mouse, Big Bird, monsters and dragons. 
The children were asked to identify which two entities went together - on each trial a 
legitimate fantasy pairing (for example. Big Bird and Mickey Mouse) and an 
alternative non-fantasy pairing (for example. Big Bird and a real bird) could be made. 
The incidence of fantasy based pairings did increase over the age range studied 
(approximately four to eleven years) however, it never reached a point of dominating 
over alternative pairings. In contrast, when children were asked to sort the cards into 
the categories of fantasy and real entities, they did rather better, with even the 
youngest children making correct judgements on about 70 % of the trials. Therefore, 
although these children did not spontaneously use the categories of fantasy and reality, 
they were able to do so when prompted.
These experimental findings relating to children’s difficulty in making fantasy-reality 
categorisations are consistent with parental reports that their three to five year old 
cliildren believe in the genuine existence of imaginary entities such as monsters, 
witches, dragons, and fairies and event-related entities such as Santa, the Easter Bunny 
and the Tooth Fairy (Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling & 
Gel man, 1994). It seems that children’s skill at handling the pretend-reality boundary 
does not prevent them from believing in certain fantasy figures. However, Woolley 
(1997a), like Wellman (1990), urges caution in interpreting these data as being 
suggestive of any generalised confusion about fantasy and reality. Woolley instead 
argues that children’s beliefs in many of these figures is culturally supported. For
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example, at Christmas adults describe Santa’s activities as if he is a real person. 
Indeed, about half of the parents in Rosengren et al’s study admitted that they actively 
encouraged their children to believe in fantasy figures such as Santa, the Easter Bunny 
and the Tooth Faiiy. Similarly, many of the parents in the Rosengren and Hickling 
sui*vey acknowledged that, if their child asked, whilst they would tell them that entities 
such as monsters, ghosts and witches were not real, they would tell them that Santa 
was real. It therefore seems that children’s beliefs in certain fantasy figures are to a 
certain degree the product of a cultural myth that is perpetuated by the behaviour of 
adults (Taylor, 1997). Woolley (1997a) goes on to argue that children must learn 
about the reality status of fantasy figures on a case by case basis and that the fact that 
children, but not adults, believe in the existence of these figures as reality, is a 
reflection of a lack of domain specific knowledge and of adult encouragement of these 
beliefs, rather than being a result of a failure to distinguish fantasy from reality.
A similar line of argument may also explain children’s apparent difficulty in 
distinguishing pretence from reality as depicted on television. Whilst there is evidence 
to suggest that between the ages of four and six years children come to realise that 
cartoon or animated programs are only make-believe, children of the same age 
continue to consider any program involving live, human actors to be real rather than 
pretend (for example. Brown, Skeen & Osborne, 1979; Downs, 1990; Skeen, Brown 
& Osborne, 1982). In addition, parental reports and interviews with children 
themselves suggest that many children are frightened by what they see on television 
(for example. Cantor & Nathanson, 1996; Cantor & Sparks, 1984; Sparks, 1986). 
Moreover, children of under seven years of age tend to be frightened by impossible 
events and fantasy programs whereas older children are more likely to be frightened by 
the depiction of events that have happened, or which could happen in reality (for 
example, news presentations and the depiction of violence and physical injury). 
Authors such as Cantor and Nathanson have argued that young children’s fears of 
fantasy events on television reflect their inability to differentiate fantasy from reality.
However, as Skeen, Brown and Osborne (1982) point out, learning what is real and 
what is pretend on television might be particularly problematic for cliildren simply 
because these differing events tend to be similarly depicted, that is, realistically. For 
example, news footage of physical injury due to war can be very difficult to distinguish 
from fictional depictions of similar events. Perhaps Woolley’s (1997a) argument can 
be applied here - that children must learn on a case by case basis the reality status of 
pretend events as they are portrayed on television in varying genres such as cartoons.
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soap operas, dramatic reconstmctions and dramas. The speed with which children 
learn the fantasy-reality distinction here may well also have a cultural component and 
may depend to some extent on the amount of exposure children have to these 
programs and parental framing of the reality status of the content.
There remains a considerable amount of evidence of children becoming confused about 
what is real and what they have merely pretended that is less readily dismissed. 
Observations of children during pretend play have lead to a number of descriptions of 
incidents when children seem to have become uncertain about the reality status of what 
they have pretended. For example, Garvey (1991, page 140) cites the example of 
children pretending about ghosts who seemed to need to reassure themselves of the 
status of the pretence, commenting “and by the way, we’re only pretending” and later 
in the same episode, “there’s no such thing as ghosts”. Garvey and Berndt (1977, 
page 4) quote the following dialogue between two children aged five years;
“Pretend there’s a monster coming, okay
No, lets don’t pretend that
Okay, why?
Cause it’s too scary, that’s why”.
DiLalla and Watson (1988) offer the example of a three year old boy who, whilst 
pretending to be a monster, burst into tears and later explained that he was afraid of 
the monster. Similarly, Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall and Harmer (1991) describe 
two pre-school children who were pretending there was a monster behind a closed 
door - whilst one child went to open the door, the other retreated somewhat 
nervously. Fonagy and Target (1996) describe a three year old boy who, after 
dressing up in a realistic Batman costume and seeing himself in the mirror, became so 
frightened that he reflised to ever wear the costume again. Taken together, these 
examples seem to suggest that despite their early competence at distinguishing pretend 
and real entities, young children do not always seem completely convinced of the 
reality status of what they are pretending. Importantly, it is not simply the case that all 
of these incidents involve frightening and/or supernatural pretend entities - Garvey and 
Berndt (1977) describe two pre-school children who pretended to make a telephone 
call to each other. One child enquired, “They’re not really real phones, are they?” 
(page 3). Nevertheless, probably the most striking evidence suggesting uncertainty 
about the pretend-reality distinction does indeed come from children’s fears of 
imaginary creatures such as monsters and ghosts. When asked to report what they 
were frightened of approximately three-quarters of four to six year old children and 
half of six to eight year old children described their fears of such entities (Bauer,
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1976). Several commentators have asked the question of why fears of imaginary 
creatures should be so prevalent and so persistent even in middle childhood, given the 
overwhelming evidence that the basic pretend-reality distinction is understood by 
pre-school children (for example, Astington, 1994; Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & 
Harris, 1994; Wellman, 1990).
In addition to reports of children’s fears of imaginary creatures and other anecdotal 
accounts suggesting pretend-reality conflision, there is also a growing body of 
evidence of children in controlled experimental conditions behaving in ways that 
indicate confusion about pretence (or fantasy) and reality. These finding will now be 
discussed in some detail since they relate directly to the issues addressed in the present 
research.
A number of studies have investigated children’s tendency to engage in magical 
thinking, or fantastical thinking, whereby outcomes are thought to be caused by a 
person’s thoughts (control by thinking) or by other supernatural processes, rather than 
by natural physical causes. The rationale for including these studies in a discussion of 
children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction, is that the magical events 
and outcomes considered in these studies involve phenomena that are, in reality, 
impossible but which could conceivably occur in the world of fantasy. For example, 
magical outcomes include objects spontaneously appearing, disappearing, changing 
shape or identity, and inanimate objects apparently moving of their own volition 
(Johnson & Harris, 1994; Woolley, 1997a). The question is the extent to which 
children consider events such as these to be possible or impossible, and whether they 
consider them to have a magical cause. The evidence relating to children’s magical 
thinking thus relates to their ability to differentiate fantasy from reality.
One fundamental issue which has been addressed by research in this domain is whether 
magic is effectively an empty category for children, or whether they do conceive of 
some events and phenomena as having magical causes. Furthermore, the selectivity in 
the types of event and phenomena that children consider to be magical has also been 
assessed. Johnson and Harris (1994) offer clear evidence that children of three to six 
years old use the categoiy of magic, and importantly, that they do so in a highly 
selective manner. In the first of their experiments, Johnson and Harris asked children 
about a series of transformations, enquiring whether the child thought he or she could 
bring about the specified outcome or whether it would be magical. For example, 
children were asked whether they could move a marble with their hands, and whether
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they could do so just by thinking about it. The results showed that whilst children 
were more likely to invoke magical causes for the impossible transformations, they had 
a tendency to over-extend their use of the category to include some of the possible 
transformations.
In experiment 2, Johnson and Harris (1994) ruled out the possibility that in the first 
experiment, the children simply equated magic with things that they did not think could 
occur. Children were asked to decide which of two characters had brought about an 
outcome that had already happened. The children were very reliable in attributing the 
magical events to the magic fairy and the everyday events to a normal boy or girl. 
However, the results are limited in that they apply to hypothetical transformations 
(experiment 1) and outcomes that were described rather than experienced (experiment 
2). This latter problem also applies to the data obtained by Rosengren, Kalish, 
Hickling and Gelman (1994) who found that four to five year old children 
distinguished hypothetical possible (for example, a small animal getting bigger) and 
impossible (for example, a big animal getting smaller) transformations (experiment 2) 
but claimed that these transformations could be brought about by a magician 
(experiment 3).
Taken together, the studies by Johnson and Harris (1994) and Rosengren et al (1994) 
show that children are willing to use magic to explain hypothetical events that have 
been described. A study by Phelps and Woolley (1994) offers further data which 
suggests that children will also attribute a magical cause to events that they actually 
witness. Four to eight year old children were shown a series of unusual phenomenon 
such as two (magnetic) discs repelling each other without physical contact, and were 
then asked to explain what happened. Phelps and Woolley found that the children 
appealed to magic as an explanation only when they were unable to offer a physical 
explanation. Consequently, there was a decrease in the number of magical 
explanations offered with age, and those events that were easier to explain physically 
were less likely to attract magical explanations than those which were more difficult to 
explain. Thus, even if they were incorrect, children were more likely to attempt to 
give a physical explanation for why a picture of a kitten looked bigger when viewed 
through a piece of (magnifying) glass, than they were for a trick in which a coin 
inserted into a box apparently disappeared. A similar methodology was used by 
Rosengren and Hickling (1994) who found that four year old, but not five year old, 
children explained ‘magical’ transformations of objects as being caused by magic. Five 
year old children tended to refer to trickery rather than magic. In both age groups the
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everyday transformations rarely attracted magical explanations and the researchers 
therefore concluded that children are reluctant to use magical explanations unless 
presented with an extraordinary event.
The use of the concept of trickeiy as an explanation for unusual events was also 
observed by Chandler and Lalonde (1994). When shown an impossible event - a 
screen apparently passing through the space occupied by a solid block - the three to 
four year old children in this study initially explained what they had seen as having 
been caused by magic. However, when the event was shown repeatedly and after they 
had the opportunity to explore the experimental apparatus, the children began to refer 
to trickei-y and deception. Chandler and Lalonde note that it is not absolutely clear 
what the children had meant when they initially described the event as magical. Like 
Rosengren and Hickling (1994), these authors acknowledge the possibility that whilst 
the children could take magic to refer to genuine, supernatural magic, they could 
nevertheless alternatively use the term to refer instead to deception and trickery. The 
latter possibility in fact seems quite likely given that the children in Chandler and 
Lalonde’s study mentioned magic but started to look for the trick within the apparatus 
when they had the opportunity to do so.
However, data obtained by Phelps and Woolley (1994) and Rosengren and Hickling 
(1994) suggest that children’s early use of the term magic does indeed refer to genuine 
magic rather than just trickery. Phelps and Woolley asked children whether magicians 
do real magic or tricks - 75 % of four year old children, 56 % of six year old children 
but only 12 % of eight year old children thought that magicians genuinely did magic. 
Comparable findings were obtained by Rosengren and Hickling who found that whilst 
four year old children viewed magic as a real phenomenon, produced by people with 
special powers, five year old children instead saw it as deception and trickery and that 
as such, magic was a skill that could be learned. A slightly different approach was 
taken by Woolley, Phelps and Davis (1995) who asked children aged three to six years 
about their beliefs about wishing. Many of these children discussed wishing as a 
genuinely magical process. Similarly, Vikan and Clausen (1993) found that over 90 % 
of four to six year old children believed that the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of 
other people could be controlled by their thoughts. For example, if they wanted 
someone to be happy this could be achieved through thinking about it.
Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that children do consider some 
events, hypothetical and observed, to have a magical cause. Importantly, children have
been shown to be highly selective about the types of events they are prepared to 
consider to be magical - those events which conform to their understanding of physical 
causality are rarely considered magical, whilst those which violate this understanding 
are considered magical. Furthermore, for young cliildren at least, this category of 
magical events describes genuinely fantastical phenomenon rather than magic simply 
being a label for deception or trickery. The studies considered so far have considered 
children’s explanations of events. There have also been studies considering evidence 
of magical thinking in children’s behaviour.
Evidence that magical thinlcing sometimes influences children’s behaviour has been 
obtained in a series of studies conducted by Subbotskii (1985; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 
1997a, 1997b). In the first of these studies (Subbotskii, 1985), children’s beliefs about 
the possibility of certain magical phenomena were assessed before and after they heard 
a fairy story in which these magical occurrences took place. A feature of the fairy 
story, that is, the apparatus used in the ‘magic’ in the story, was then introduced into 
the child’s environment and their behaviour in the experimenter’s absence obseiwed. 
In the ‘magic box’ experiment, for example, the majority of children initially denied 
that an object shown in a picture could become real (magical creation). However, 
after hearing a story in which Masha used her magic box to produce this outcome, not 
only did more children say that they thought that the outcome could occur, but over 90 
% of the four to six year old children attempted to reproduce the outcome when left 
alone with a ‘magic box’. Moreover, the children showed signs of being disappointed 
when the magic was unsuccessful. Similarly, many children tried to replicate Vova’s 
act of making a car move by using magic words although they had previously denied 
that this magical practise could be effective.
Subbotsky (1994) used a similar paradigm to assess cliildren’s beliefs that physical 
objects are impermeable and that the effects of time are irreversible. The children’s 
earlier beliefs in these principles seemed to be disregarded after they heard a fairy story 
in which they magically did not apply - most four and five year old children and some 
six year old children tried to reach through a glass panel in a box after chanting 
appropriate magic words and similar numbers of children refused to drink ‘magic 
water’ that might make them two years younger.
In summarising the findings from these studies, Subbotsky (1994) argued that the 
children’s understanding of what is possible in reality and through magic is not secure 
and can thus “be attenuated under the influence of a fairy tale and an adult’s
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instruction” (page 105). However, one problem with this interpretation of these data 
stems from the rather leading task instructions used in each case - the child is 
effectively instructed to try out the magical behaviours or to believe in the possibility 
of the magical phenomena. For example, in the ‘magic box’ experiment, children were 
told:
“I’m going out to do some things, and meanwhile you can play. If you 
want you can use the box - only don’t forget that you have to say the 
magic words aloud; otherwise, the box can’t hear them” (Subbotskii,
1985, page 95).
Similarly, the children’s reticence to drink the ‘magic water’ came after they had been 
told that:
“If you drink a little bit - you will probably turn into a little boy/girl . . .
Now you can try the water, if you want. I just want to see if it works.
But if you do not want to try - it is up to you” (Subbotsky, 1994, page 
103).
Given such leading instructions, children’s magical behaviours might simply reflect 
their compliance with the experimenter’s wishes rather than any genuine belief in these 
magical possibilities. That said, the children’s disappointment when their magical 
behaviours were unsuccessful, mitigates against this explanation. Alternatively, the 
task instructions may have led children to expect that something would happen if they 
followed the experimenter’s instmctions and tried the specified behaviours. The 
children’s disappointment might reflect this expectation not having been fulfilled and 
should not necessarily be interpreted as disappointment that the magic failed since the 
children need not have assumed that genuine magic would be causal. However, 
Subbotsky’s more recent studies are much less vulnerable to this kind of criticism, and 
yet have generated some comparable findings.
Subbotsky (1996, 1997a) placed a new postage stamp inside a wooden box which, by 
means of a trap door, transformed it into an old and torn one. This transformation was 
apparently achieved via a connected ‘magical device’, an unconnected ‘magical 
device’, through the incantation of a magic spell or through will-power, or mental 
effort, alone. The children were highly credulous about what they observed and 
indeed many six year old children (and some nine year old children) were unwilling to 
allow the experimenter to place a new stamp they had been promised as a reward, 
inside the box. The same wooden box was used in a further study (Subbotsky, 1997b) 
in which the experimenter accompanied the transformation of the postage stamp with, 
for example, drawing a cross on a piece of paper or cutting a piece of paper in half.
When asked, the six and nine year old children said that they believed the 
experimenter’s manipulations had caused the transformation of the postage stamp, and 
furthermore, that the influence of these manipulations had been magical.
Taken together, the results from Subbotsky’s research (Subbotskii, 1985; Subbotsky, 
1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) suggest that children’s behaviour can be characterised by 
magical thinking and that unusual phenomenon are accepted as being the result of 
magical practices. Add these findings to children’s explanations of unusual events, and 
a picture emerges that children do use the concept of magic to explain certain 
phenomenon and that they sometimes engage in seemingly magical behaviours. These 
data suggest that the boundary between fantasy and reality is not always strictly 
adhered to by children of up to nine years old. That is, children seem to believe that 
fantastical events really can occur. The discussion will now turn to studies that have 
directly assessed children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction.
In a study investigating children’s memory for whether they played with a real toy, a 
substitute object or an imaginary object, Foley, Harris and Hermann (1994) obtained a 
pattern of results which could be interpreted as reflecting children’s confusion between 
pretence and reality. The children in the study tended to make errors in their recall, 
often claiming that they had played with a toy when they had in fact pretended - these 
mistakes were more frequent amongst three year old, than amongst five year old 
children. Very few children made the reverse type of error in wliich they claimed to 
have pretended when they had actually played with a toy. Foley et al interpreted these 
findings as suggesting that whilst pretending the children had contemplated the real 
equivalents of the objects represented and had recalled this, rather than the pretence. 
If this is correct, then the findings probably do not reflect any pretend-reality confusion 
during the pretence, but instead reflect an eiTor in retrieval from memory. However, 
the results may suggest that children do not always keep pretence entirely separate 
from reality.
More direct evidence relating to children’s uncertainty about the pretend-reality 
distinction during, rather than subsequent to their pretence, has been obtained by 
Woolley and Wellman (1993) who asked three to four year old children a series of 
questions about characters in stories who imagined something that was not the case. 
The results showed that the three year old children (but not the four year old children) 
often mistakenly believed that the character’s imagination would reflect reality. For 
example, when Timmy was pretending there was a bear in a box, about half of the
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younger three year old children and about a third of the older three year old children, 
claimed that the bear was real (experiment 1). In their second experiment, Woolley 
and Wellman asked children to imagine that an object such as a pencil was inside an 
empty cardboard box. In this study, over half of the younger three year old children 
but less than a quarter of the older three year old children claimed that they would find 
a real object inside the box. The children made what the authors termed a ‘tme fiction 
error’ (Woolley & Wellman, page 15) or what is termed here, a confusion between 
pretence and reality. In other words, these children failed to maintain a boundary 
between what was real and what they had simply imagined and therefore they had 
come to believe that what they had pretended was real. These data provide striking 
evidence that young three year old children do not always keep the world of fantasy 
separate from the world of reality. However, it could conceivably be argued that these 
very young children are only just learning about the pretend-reality distinction and, as 
novices, their understanding is a little volatile. This criticism is somewhat implausible 
given that these children have presumably spent the previous year or two pretending 
and given the success of children as young as two and a half years old on tasks 
requiring them to state the real and pretend identities of objects (for example, Harris, 
Kavanaugh & Meredith, 1994). Nevertheless, even if tliis evidence was dismissed on 
the basis of the children’s age and inexperience, the same criticism could not be 
levelled at the studies which follow since these have investigated the behaviours of 
somewhat older pre-school and school aged children.
Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall and Harmer (1991) conducted a series of studies 
which formed the basis of the experimental paradigm used in the present research. In 
their first two experiments, Harris et al asked children questions about the 
characteristics of various real and imagined entities (following from Wellman & Estes, 
1986) - these findings were discussed earlier and so will not be repeated here (see page 
22). The tliird and fourth experiments in the series investigated children’s behaviour 
towards empty boxes after they have pretended about the contents. The results of 
these two experiments provide intriguing evidence to suggest that children of four to 
six years old are not always entirely certain of the reality status of what they have 
pretended.
In experiment 3 (Harris et al, 1991) the cliildren were shown two boxes (1 metre^) 
which each had a small hole in the top through which the child’s finger or a stick that 
had been placed nearby, could be inserted. The four to six year old cliildren were 
asked to pretend that in one box there was a friendly puppy that wanted to lick their
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finger. The second box was populated with an imagined horrible monster who wanted 
to bite the child’s finger. The children were then asked a hypothetical question - to 
decide which box they would put their finger in. Subsequently, the children were 
given the alternative of using the stick rather than their finger, before being asked 
whether the puppy and monster were real or just pretend. The children’s actual 
behaviour towards the boxes was then observed. The overall rationale for observing 
children’s behaviour towards the pretend entities within this paradigm was that,
“if children assume that such imaginary creatures have no genuine 
existence, then they should behave indifferently toward the two boxes.
If, on the other hand, children wonder, however fleetingly, whether 
what they have imagined is actually present inside each box, then this 
should be reflected in selective behaviour toward the ‘monster’ box as 
compared with the ‘puppy’ box” (Harris et al, page 113).
The children’s behaviour was indeed selective - they tended to approach the puppy box 
before the monster box and furthermore, displayed some wariness towards the monster 
since they preferred to use the stick rather than their finger when approaching that box. 
These results suggested to Harris et al (1991) that the children had become uncertain 
about the distinction between pretence and reality. However there are a number of 
problems in accepting this interpretation of the data due to certain features of the 
design of the experiment. As Harris et al themselves concede, the children were not 
invited to check that the boxes were empty before the pretending commenced. The 
children therefore quite simply had no way of knowing whether the boxes were empty 
or whether they already contained certain entities. Coupled with the wording of the 
hypothetical task in which the child must choose between “the one with the monster in 
or the one with the puppy in” (Harris et al, page 113), it is not entirely surprising that 
the children responded cautiously towards the box, that for all they knew, may indeed 
have contained a monster of rather grand proportions. In addition, the child’s 
hypothetical decision was which box to put their finger in - they were not initially 
given the stick as an option. It is feasible that the children may have preferred to use 
the stick in both instances but when asked about putting their finger in one of the 
boxes, chose the lesser of the two evils and opted for the puppy box. Basically, the 
task may have confounded two separate issues - which box the child wanted to 
approach first and which box they wanted to put their finger inside. Finally, a further 
problem which Harris et al acknowledge is that the children’s selections may simply 
reflect their interpretation of the task as a game of make-believe in which their role is 
to act as if the two boxes contained a monster and a puppy. Harris et al consider such
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collusion to be an unlikely explanation for the results given the children’s spontaneous 
comments about the whereabouts of the monster, when at the end of the experiment, 
they looked inside the boxes and found them to be empty. Another reason that this 
seems an unlikely explanation for the results is that the children really had no way of 
being certain that the task did only involve pretence - they had not seen that the boxes 
were empty and the task instructions implied that they were not.
These problems were to some extent resolved in Harris et al’s (1991) final experiment. 
Before asking children to pretend about the boxes, the experimenter asked them to 
look inside the boxes and to confirm that they were empty. To rule out the collusion 
explanation, children’s behaviour was observed in the experimenter’s absence - 
children would presumably have no reason to continue a game of make-believe that 
they were playing with the experimenter, when she was no longer in the room. 
Therefore, in experiment 4, the children checked that the boxes were empty and were 
then asked to pretend about the contents of one of the boxes - some children were 
asked to pretend that the box contained a friendly rabbit that wanted to be stroked 
whilst the remainder were asked to pretend about a scai^ y monster that wanted to chase 
them. In both conditions, the second box was termed the neutral box and was not 
populated with an imaginaiy creature. The experimenter checked the child’s memory 
for the nature and location of the pretend entity, asked the child if the entity was real 
or pretend and then made an excuse to leave the room. During the two minutes the 
children were left alone, their behaviour was video recorded.
The results obtained were highly suggestive of pretend-reality confusion amongst some 
of the four to six year old children involved in the study. Even though the children had 
seen that the boxes were empty and had reported that the entities were pretend, not 
real, four children in the monster condition did not want the experimenter to leave 
because they were scared, and moreover, about half of the children opened one or both 
of the boxes during the experimenter’s absence. Importantly, the children often only 
opened the pretend box (rabbit or monster) and when they did open the neutral box, 
this tended to be after they had opened the pretend one. There were no differences in 
the results of the monster and rabbit conditions. About half of the children admitted to 
having wondered whether the imagined entity was in the box when they were 
subsequently asked to explain their behaviour. Harris et al’s (1991) interpretation of 
these data was that the children had looked inside the boxes because they were 
uncertain of the pretend-reality status of the imagined entities. These authors reject 
the idea that the children might have looked inside the boxes out of idle curiosity - the
pretend box was opened sooner and more frequently than the neutral box and the 
children had already seen that the boxes were empty.
Similar findings were obtained in a follow up study by Johnson and Harris (1994 - 
experiment 3) who asked three, five and seven year old children to imagine that there 
was either a faiiy or an ice-cream inside one box - the children were not asked to 
pretend about a second, neutral box. Again, the data were suggestive of 
pretend-reality confusion amongst some children. Although the seven year old 
children were slower to look inside the boxes than either the three or five year old 
children, in each age group approximately half the children looked inside the boxes. 
When asked about their beliefs about the box contents in a post-task inteiwiew, about 
three-quarters of the three and five year old children, and just under half of the seven 
year old children reported having wondered whether the imagined objects were real. 
Furthermore, this credulity was strongly associated with the children having opened 
the boxes in the experimenter’s absence, since nearly three-quarters of those children 
who opened the boxes later admitted to wondering about their contents.
Taken together, the findings obtained by Harris et al (1991) and Johnson and Harris 
(1994) offer convincing evidence that some children are not always able to keep the 
realm of fantasy separate from reality. Indeed, Johnson and Harris argue that:
“when some children imagine an outcome it leads them to wonder 
whether such an outcome has actually occurred even if its occurrence 
would be magical” (page 45).
Johnson and Harris went on to emphasise the point that pretend-reality conflisions are 
experienced by some, but certainly not all, children by describing individual differences 
between two main groups of children:
“credulous children wondered if the imagined entity might be in the 
box, tested that possibility by opening it, and sometimes invoked magic 
by way of explanation. Sceptical children denied that the imagined 
entity could be in the box, did not check whether it was, and justified 
their scepticism in terms of ordinary spatial or physical considerations”
(page 46).
Johnson and Harris are committed to the view that their results reflect a temporary 
breakdown in some children’s ability to differentiate pretence and reality.
Woolley and Phelps (1994) used a modified version of the Harris et al (1991 - 
experiment 3) task design in order to assess situational influences on children’s
behaviour. Woolley and Phelps presented children with an array of four boxes - one 
contained a real item such as a pair of socks, the child imagined there was an 
equivalent item in the second box, the third box was the neutral (empty) box and the 
fourth was left unopened. A second experimenter entered the room and claimed to 
need an object because, for example, she had forgotten her socks. Virtually all of the 
three to four year old children gave the experimenter the box containing the real item 
in response to her request. Very few children handed the experimenter the box 
containing the imagined item even though about a third of them claimed it contained a 
real rather than an imaginary item.
To rule out the possibility that children’s reticence to give the experimenter the 
imagined item box was due to either an overall reticence to offer more than one box or 
due to the contrast with the real item, in a second experiment Woolley and Phelps 
(1994) eliminated the box containing the real item. On this occasion, about one third 
of the three year old children but only 15 % of the four year old children gave the 
experimenter the imagined entity when she asked for a corresponding item. 
Furthermore, nearly half of the three year old children but only 13 % of the four year 
old children reported that the imagined item was actually real. Woolley and Phelps 
argued that the decreased number of children showing signs (behaviourally) of 
pretend-reality confusion in their studies relative to Harris et al (1991) and Johnson 
and Harris (1994) was a result of the changed situational factors. Whilst in the earlier 
studies there were no practical consequences involved in magical thinking and indeed 
such thinking may have been interpreted as being valued, in Woolley and Phelps’ study 
a practical response was requested by another person and therefore a response in terms 
of magical thinking would have real costs for that person. Woolley and Phelps further 
argued that the changed results across their first and second experiments were a result 
of the real counterpart of the imagined entity facilitating children’s judgements about 
the pretend-reality distinction in experiment 1. Overall though, subject to the influence 
of situational factors, Woolley and Phelps agree that children sometimes believe in the 
real existence of imagined entities.
However, Golomb and Galasso (1995) seriously question the assumption that 
children’s behaviour on tasks such as those used by Hams et al (1991 - experiment 4) 
and Johnson and Harris (1994 - experiment 3) in which children were left alone with 
boxes containing pretend entities, reflect any uncertainty about the pretend-reality 
distinction. Golomb and Galasso instead suggest that there are three alternative 
explanations for children’s behaviour when they opened a box they had pretended
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about in the Harris et al experiment. First, box opening in the experimenter’s absence 
might reflect the child’s continued engagement in the pretence theme which the 
experimenter had not explicitly ended before she left the room. Second, the behaviour 
might result from boredom since the children were not provided with any alternative 
play activities for the period they were left alone. Third, the children may have been 
suspicious of trickery by the experimenter. In an attempt to test between these 
possibilities and the possibility that the children were, as Hams et al suggested, 
uncertain about the pretend-reality distinction, Golomb and Galasso (study 1) 
conducted a modified replication of Harris et al’s fourth experiment. However, unlike 
the original experiment, the experimenter in Golomb and Galasso’s version did not 
leave the room, instead children’s behaviour was observed by the experimenter after 
she moved to a corner of the room and no longer interacted with the child. In 
addition, the children were either allocated to a condition in which the pretence was 
not terminated and there were no alternative play activities provided (nonterminated 
pretence, no toys - as Harris et al) or to a condition in which the pretence was 
terminated and there was a box of toys placed conspicuously in the room (terminated 
pretence, toys provided). Within these experimental conditions half of the children 
pretended about a rabbit and half pretended about a monster.
The results of Golomb and Galasso’s (1995) experiment were dramatically different to 
those obtained by Harris et al (1991). Only two of the nineteen participants touched 
or opened either of the boxes during the period following the pretence. Golomb and 
Galasso attribute their findings to the children being less suspicious of the 
experimenter and as being a result of the termination of the pretence and the provision 
of alternative play activities. They further claim that the two children who opened the 
boxes did so as a continuation of the pretence theme rather than as a result of 
pretend-reality confusion.
However, the results from Golomb and Galasso’s (1995) study are in fact totally 
uninterpretable. Termination of the pretence and the provision of alternative play 
activities were completely confounded. In the absence of experimental conditions in 
which the pretence is not terminated but toys are provided (nonterminated pretence, 
toys provided) and in which the pretence is terminated but no toys are provided 
(terminated pretence, no toys) it is impossible to determine which of these factors is 
responsible for the difference in the results across this experiment and that conducted 
by Harris et al (1991). However, given the failure to obtain different results across the 
two experimental conditions that were included, it seems more likely that the
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experimenter’s continued presence in the room is having a constraining effect on the 
children’s behaviour. Although Golomb and Galasso dismiss this possibility, it seems 
very likely that children’s box opening behaviour was suppressed by the fact that the 
experimenter was in the room and observing their behaviour, albeit surreptitiously (this 
point is also made by Woolley, 1997a). However, Golomb and Galasso claim that 
their failure to find differences between the terminated and nonterminated pretence 
conditions was a result of the children interpreting the experimenter’s retreat to a 
corner of the room as an end to the pretence, regardless of whether or not this was 
also signalled explicitly by the experimenter’s comments. Yet Golomb and Galasso 
offer no rationale for believing that an experimenter moving to a corner of a room is a 
clearer signal of the end of the pretence, than is the experimenter actually leaving the 
room as she had done in Harris et al’s experiment. Overall, Golomb and Galasso’s 
first experiment does not provide any convincing evidence to suggest that the original 
Harris et al data should be reinterpreted.
Golomb and Galasso’s (1995) second experiment followed on from their first but with 
the additional aim of investigating the influence of affectively charged pretence themes 
on children’s behaviour. To this end, children were invited to play a game with the 
experimenter in which they pretended they were taking a walk in a forest and were 
going to have a picnic. During the course of the twenty minutes of pretence, one of 
two empty boxes was populated with a positive or negative pretend entity that was 
either adult initiated (rabbit or monster) or child initiated (what the child would or 
would not like to find in the forest). The pretence was then explicitly ended and the 
child’s behaviour observed by the experimenter who, as in experiment 1, moved to a 
corner of the room and no longer interacted with the child. Unlike previous studies 
which have observed children’s behaviour for two minutes, in this experiment the 
children were observed for five minutes. Once again, a box of toys was made available 
to the child. The results showed that only 15 % of the children touched or opened the 
boxes in the period following the pretence - this was unaffected by whether the pretend 
entity was positive or negative, or was adult or child initiated. Golomb and Galasso 
argued that since the children who approached the boxes were no more likely to open 
the pretend than the neutral box, when they did so this reflected a continuation of the 
pretence theme and not confusion about the pretend-reality distinction.
Again, these data are unconvincing. The possibility that the experimenter’s continued 
presence influenced the children’s behaviour should be considered. Furthermore, 
Golomb and Galasso (1995) fail to discuss the 18 % of their three year old children
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who verbally reported that the imagined entity was real rather than pretend (page 806). 
Instead, Golomb and Galasso claim that:
“not a single child exhibited cognitive uncertainty about the pretend 
status of the creatures they had imagined in the boxes” (page 808).
Overall, whilst Golomb and Galasso would argue that their data demonstrate that 
when children open boxes following pretence it is simply a consequence of their 
continued involvement in the pretence, such a conclusion is not really possible given 
the data as it stands. The experiments that Golomb and Galasso conducted differ in 
several important respects from those conducted by Harris et al (1991) and 
consequently it is not completely clear which experimental manipulation is of most 
importance. Therefore, although Golomb and Galasso do collect some intriguing data 
pertaining to the influence of affect on children’s pretence (these findings will be flilly 
discussed in a later section of this chapter), their data do not seriously undermine the 
earlier conclusions drawn by Harris et al and Johnson and Harris (1994), that some 
children experience conftision about the pretend-reality distinction.
Taken as a whole, the results of the studies discussed in this section appear 
paradoxical. On the one hand there is ample evidence to suggest that young 
pre-school children (three years old) are competent in distinguishing mental and 
pretend entities from real entities. On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest 
that even school age children (seven years old) sometimes exhibit uncertainty about the 
reality status of what they have pretended, and furthermore, show a genuine belief in 
the possibility that magic can bring about a variety of ordinarily impossible outcomes. 
Before moving on to a discussion of the various possible explanations for these 
paradoxical findings, an account will be given of the evidence which suggests that 
adults are not entirely different from children in terms of their fantastical thinking.
The literature relating to fantastical thinking in adults can, as with that relating to 
children, be divided into anecdotal and experimental evidence. The anecdotal evidence 
is less prolific for adults than for children. However, as authors such as Astington 
(1994), Lillard (1994), Wellman (1990) and Woolley (1997a) point out, many adults 
can report instances in wliich fictional entities or products of their own imagination, 
have lead them to become fearful. For example, Lillard offers the vivid and very 
familiar examples of the fear that can be aroused by films such as Psycho and the 
power this can have to lead to a certain nervousness when subsequently taking a 
shower, and the unease that can be experienced after having read a horror story late at 
night. Similarly, many adults believe in and are fearful of supernatural entities such as
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ghosts (Bunge, 1991; Woolley, 1997a), believe in magical causality (Lesser & Paisner, 
1985), and believe in the efficacy of magical practises such as superstitions, telepathy 
and witchcraft (Bunge, 1991).
The experimental literature also includes a variety of accounts of adult behaviours that 
are more consistent with magical or fantastical thinking in which the possible and 
impossible are not differentiated, than with scientific reasoning or reasoning in terms of 
everyday causal principles. Some of the clearest evidence that children engage in 
magical thinking was obtained by Subbotsky whose intriguing experiments revealed 
that children show signs of believing in the genuine possibility of magic. Recently, 
Subbotskii (1991; Subbotsky, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) has applied his research 
methodology to adult participants.
Subbotskii (1991) investigated adult understanding of the principle of object 
permanence - that an object can not suddenly appear or disappear, or change into a 
completely different object. The participants were shown a postage stamp which was 
then placed in a wooden box which, by means of a trap door, apparently transformed 
an old stamp into a new one, a new stamp into an old one, or transformed it into an 
entirely different postage stamp. The experimenter accompanied these transformations 
with a show of mental effort (trembling hands and a look of great concentration). 
Before seeing the transformation, most of the participants denied that mental effort 
could bring about any transformation of the stamp. Furthermore, their initial 
explanations on seeing the transformation refened to tricks and other non-magical 
mechanisms. However, when directly asked whether the experimenter’s mental effort 
might have caused the transformation, some adults acknowledged that this was a 
possibility. Subbotskii interpreted these data as suggesting that the participants were 
generally committed to the principle of object permanence but in some circumstances 
could be led to adopt the alternative, magical principle of discontinuity. However, 
credulity about the possibility of magical transformations was certainly not widespread 
amongst these adults. Similarly, Subbotsky (1996, 1997a) observed low levels of 
belief amongst adults that a wooden box could or did cause the destruction of an 
object via a connected ‘magical device’, an unconnected ‘magical device’, will-power 
or by a magic spell.
However, in a very recent study, Subbotsky (1997b) has obtained evidence to suggest 
that adults’ behaviour, even if not their verbal comments, reflects beliefs that magical 
transformations are possible. In the first experiment, children and adults witnessed the
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apparent transformation of a postage stamp, accompanied by the experimenter, for 
example, cutting a piece of paper in half or drawing a cross on a piece of paper. The 
children, but not the adults, verbally acknowledged thinking that the experimenter’s 
actions had magically caused the transformation. In contrast to their verbal comments, 
the adults’ behaviour in two subsequent experiments (experiments 4 and 5) suggested 
precisely this type of magical belief. That is, the adults were unwilling to allow the 
experimenter to repeat the actions that accompanied the transformation of the postage 
stamp once they had placed their own driving license inside the box. Subbotsky 
therefore concluded that,
“in their practical actions adult participants were more likely to 
acknowledge the possibility of phenomenalistic causal connections if 
the cost of disregarding this possibility increased” (page 29).
A fliither aspect of adult magical thinking that has attracted considerable research 
interest is the extent to wliich adults believe in, and act in accordance with, the 
principles o f ‘sympathetic magic’. There are two main magical laws subsumed under 
this heading. First, the law of contagion. According to this principle, objects which 
have been in contact with each other, however briefly, may influence each other 
through the transfer of their properties (Rozin, Millman & Nemeroff, 1986). For 
example, wearing an item of clothing previously worn by an enemy might be 
considered detrimental to the wearer since part of the enemy’s character or ill-intent 
may be transferred to them via the clothing (Nemeroff, Brinkman & Woodward, 
1994). Second, the law of similarity. According to this principle, objects which 
resemble one another share fundamental properties (Rozin, Millman & Nemeroff).
The extent to which adult behaviour is determined by these magical laws was 
extensively researched in a series of studies by Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff (1986) 
who found that in a manner consistent with the principle of magical contagion, the 
desirability of certain brands of fruit juice could be reduced after a sample glass came 
into contact with a dead cockroach. Similarly, through the law of similarity, the 
desirability of foods could be reduced by shaping them such that they resemble 
disgusting objects such as dog faeces. Studies by Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff and 
Rozin, Markwith and Ross (1990) have similarly demonstrated that adult subjects are 
disinclined to drink a sugar solution labelled as ‘cyanide’, or even as ‘not cyanide’, 
despite the fact that they had themselves attached those labels to sugar solutions that 
they had produced. In this case, knowledge of reality did not prevent people from 
responding as if the label reflected the true nature of the sugar solution.
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The operation of these magical laws has also been shown to apply in non-experimental 
settings and in relation to real-life issues. Rozin, Markwith and Nemeroff (1992) and 
Nemeroff, Brinkman and Woodward (1994) have for example, related people’s beliefs 
in sympathetic magic to their reactions, indeed their over-reactions, toward people 
with AIDS. The research shows that despite having a sound factual knowledge of the 
types of behaviour associated with the transmission of the AIDS virus, many adult 
respondents to a questionnaire responded in terms that could be interpreted as 
reflecting the operation of magical contagion (Nemeroff, Brinkman & Woodward). 
For example, over three-quarters of the respondents reported that they would be less 
happy about wearing clothing previously worn by an individual with AIDS, than they 
would be about wearing clothing previously worn by a healthy person. This reaction 
was unaffected by the degree of contact between the garment and the person with 
AIDS (number of times they had worn the garment) and by the length of time since 
that contact (Rozin, Markwith & Nemeroff). These results suggest that adult thinking 
was influenced by the magical law of contagion, despite an othei’wise sound 
understanding of what is, in reality, possible and impossible.
Taken together, the studies by Subbotskii (1991; Subbotsky, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) and 
those investigating the operation of the laws of sympathetic magic offer clear evidence 
that, like children, adults sometimes engage in rather fantastical thinking in which they 
apparently fail to distinguish between what is possible in reality and what is impossible 
other than in the realm of fantasy. The circumstances in which adult magical thinking 
is most likely are, according to Keinan (1994), those in which there are high levels of 
stress. This is because magical thinking gives an individual a greater sense of control 
over their world and moreover, allows them to understand phenomena that would 
otherwise be inexplicable. This is another similarity between adult and childhood 
magical thinking since several of the studies described earlier found that children 
invoke magic to explain phenomena for which they can offer no other explanation (see 
for example. Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Phelps & 
Woolley, 1994). Overall then, it seems that children and adults are perhaps not 
entirely dissimilar in their tendency to engage in fantastical thinking. Indeed, this was 
the conclusion reached in a recent review article dedicated to this issue (Woolley, 
1997a, 1997b). Thus the paradox between children’s ability to distinguish mental or 
pretend phenomenon from reality and their apparent confusions between fantasy and 
reality emerges in a comparable fashion for adults. The discussion will now turn to the 
various explanations that have been offered for these paradoxical findings. These 
explanations have focused in particular on the evidence relating to children. However,
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given that the paradox exists for adults as well as for children, it should be noted that 
any explanation for why children should engage in magical thinking and experience 
pretend-reality confusions, must also offer an explanation for the comparable 
behaviours observed amongst adults.
Explanations of pretend-reality confusions and fantastical thinking
Several explanations have been offered to account for the apparently paradoxical 
findings that were discussed in the preceding section. These explanations can be 
broadly divided into two categories. First, explanations which deny that there is any 
paradox and which instead involve claims that children’s success and failures in 
maintaining the pretend-reality boundary relate to methodological differences between 
studies. Second, there are explanations which acknowledge that the paradox is a 
genuine phenomenon and which therefore seek to explain why children should 
sometimes fail to maintain the pretend-reality distinction despite their otherwise clear 
competence at doing so.
Dependent measures
Several researchers have raised the possibility that children’s apparent successes and 
failures at maintaining a distinction between pretence and reality might simply reflect a 
systematic variability in the types of dependent measures used (for example, Harris et 
al, 1991; Woolley, 1997a; Woolley & Phelps, 1994). Typically, studies highlighting 
children’s competence in this domain have taken verbal measures of children’s 
understanding. For example, Wellman and Estes (1986; and follow up studies by 
Estes, Wellman & Woolley, 1989; Harris et al, 1991; Kinoshita, 1994) asked children 
to verbalise the differing characteristics of mental and real phenomena. In addition, 
children’s early competence in distinguishing the real and pretend identities of objects 
used in pretence have relied on verbal measures (for example, Flavell, Flavell & Green, 
1987; Harris, Kavanaugh & Meredith, 1995; Lillard & Flavell, 1992; Woolley, 1995b; 
Woolley & Wellman, 1990). In contrast, studies offering evidence of pretend-reality 
confusion and magical thinking have typically relied on behavioural measures. For 
example, Subbotskii (1985; Subbotsky, 1994) obsei*ved children’s magical behaviours, 
whilst Harris et al (1991 - experiments 3 and 4), Johnson and Harris (1994 - 
experiment 3) and Woolley and Phelps (1994) have obsei*ved children’s behaviour 
towards boxes that they were pretending contain certain objects. Interestingly, the 
data relating to adults fits a similar pattern. For example, the data showing instances
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of magical thinking do tend to report the adults’ behaviours (Rozin, Markwith & Ross, 
1990; Rozin, Millman & Nemeroff, 1986; Subbotsky, 1997b). It is therefore a 
possibility that there is a difference between what children (and adults) say and what 
they do. This could perhaps be because verbal measures assess underlying conceptual 
awareness whereas behavioural measures might assess, or be influenced by, other 
factors such as emotional reactions to the pretence (Woolley, 1997a).
A closer examination of the data suggests that variations in dependent measures can 
not account for all of the findings that have been obtained. As Harris et al (1991) 
point out, although the children in their studies had initially labelled the box contents as 
pretend, during subsequent post-task interviews, many children reported that they had 
wondered whether the imagined entities might actually be inside the boxes. Similar 
findings have also been obtained in post-task interviews conducted by Johnson and 
Harris (1994), Subbotskii (1985; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a) and Woolley and 
Phelps (1994). Furthermore, adults also verbally expressed a belief in the possibility of 
magical transformations in one of Subbotsky’s (1997b) studies. Likewise, children 
verbally refer to magic when explaining impossible events (for example, Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994).
However, Woolley (1997a) argues that perhaps when children express credulity in 
post-task interviews and offer magical explanations for events, this does not reflect 
fantastical thinking, but instead reflects children stmggling to explain what they have 
done or seen. That is, when asked, children feel compelled to offer some form of 
explanation and opt for a magical one. Although this seems unlikely given, for 
example, the close association between verbal reports of credulity and behaviours 
reflecting pretend-reality confusion observed by Johnson and Harris (1994), this 
possibility cannot be completely dismissed. However, there are two further pieces of 
evidence which suggest that the paradoxical findings are not simply a result of 
children’s differing responses to verbal and behavioural tasks. First, Woolley and 
Wellman (1993) obtained clear evidence of pretend-reality confusion on verbal 
measures which did not relate to the children’s behaviour. The children were asked to 
pretend that there was, for example, a pencil inside a box. A number of children went 
on to claim that the pencil was real. Thus, evidence of pretend-reality confusion is not 
strictly limited to behavioural data. Second, Golomb and Kuersten (1996) found clear 
evidence that children could behaviourally maintain a boundary between pretence and 
reality even when the experimenter incorporated reality based intrusions into the
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pretence by, for example, biting into a pretend cookie. Therefore, not all evidence of 
pretend-reality competence has been exclusively dependent on verbal measures.
Overall, it seems highly unlikely that the paradox between children’s competence at 
distinguishing pretence from reality on the one hand, and their experiences of 
pretend-reality confusion on the other, is simply a methodological artefact relating to 
the differing dependent measures that have been used to obtain data.
Type of imaginary entity: supernatural versus everyday
A further methodological explanation that has been offered to account for children’s 
pretend-reality confusions is that perhaps children are sensitive to the type of entity 
they imagine. It could be that children are more confident of the pretend-reality 
distinction when it relates to everyday items, than they are when it relates to 
supernatural entities such as monsters or fairies (Woolley, 1995a, 1997a; Woolley & 
Phelps, 1994). This point relates to Woolley’s (1997a; see also Taylor, 1997) claim 
that fantasy figures might pose particular difficulties for young children due to certain 
cultural conventions which tend to support children’s belief in their existence. If the 
findings obtained relate directly to whether supernatural or everyday imaginary entities 
have been used, then the paradox described earlier can not be considered genuine - it 
would simply reflect children’s difficulties with a particular type of entity and this 
difficulty can be othei*wise explained in terms of cultural influences on children’s 
beliefs.
It does appear that much of the evidence reflecting children’s competence in 
distinguishing pretence from reality has been obtained when everyday entities have 
been imagined. For example, Wellman and Estes (1986) asked children to discuss the 
characteristics of mental entities relating to objects such as cookies, and Flavell, Flavell 
and Green (1987) asked children to differentiate the pretend and real identities of, for 
example, a sponge that was used as a truck. Furthermore, many of the findings 
relating to pretend-reality confusions have involved supernatural entities. For 
example, anecdotal reports of fears of imaginary creatures typically refer to 
supernatural entities such as monsters and ghosts. Experimentally, Harris et al (1991) 
observed pretend-reality confiision in relation to monsters whilst Johnson and Harris 
(1994) observed such confusion in relation to fairies.
However, this methodological explanation of the findings can be dismissed relatively 
confidently, since it was directly assessed and rejected by Harris et al (1991 -
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experiments 1 and 2) who found that children were as competent at describing the 
characteristics of imagined supernatural entities as they were at describing the 
characteristics of imagined everyday items. Furthermore, there is also evidence to 
suggest that children can experience pretend-reality confusion in relation to everyday 
entities such as puppies and rabbits (Harris et al - experiments 3 and 4), ice-cream 
(Johnson and Harris, 1994 - experiment 3) and socks (Woolley & Phelps, 1994).
Type of imaginai^ entity: animate versus inanimate
A further possible methodological explanation for the paradox between children’s 
competence at differentiating pretence from reality and the findings which indicate 
pretend-reality confusion also relates to the type of entities that children have 
imagined. It is possible that children are more able to distinguish pretence from reality 
when these relate to inanimate items, than when they relate to animate items. There is 
some evidence to suggest that this might be the case. Much of the evidence 
demonstrating children’s competence in this domain has been obtained when children 
have pretended about inanimate objects such as cookies (Wellman & Estes, 1986), 
sponges (Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1987) and milk (Harris, Kavanaugh & Meredith, 
1994). In contrast, incidents of pretend-reality confusion often involve animate entities 
such as imagined monsters, puppies, rabbits (Harris et al, 1991) and fairies (Johnson & 
Harris, 1994), and children’s fears of imagined creatures tend to relate to animate 
entities such as monsters and ghosts.
However, this explanation can also be dismissed with some certainty. Harris et al 
(1991 - experiment 2) found no evidence that animate imagery caused children any 
difficulties - children as readily stated the behavioural-sensory characteristics of an 
imagined witch that was chasing after them, as they did for an inanimate object such as 
a cup. Moreover, researchers have obsei'ved pretend-reality confusions in relation to a 
variety of inanimate objects including a pencil (Woolley & Wellman, 1993), ice-cream 
(Johnson & Harris, 1994) and a pair of socks (Woolley & Phelps, 1994). Clearly, the 
animacy of the imagined entities does not have a consistent influence on children’s 
judgements about the pretend-reality distinction.
Categorisation of imagined entities
Samuels and Taylor (1994) raise the possibility that the paradoxical findings relate to 
systematic differences between studies in terms of whether an adult initially categorises 
an entity as imaginary and then asks the child to discuss it (for example, Wellman & 
Estes, 1986), or whether it is the child who must make the initial categorisation.
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Samuels and Taylor argue that children’s apparent pretend-reality concisions might 
stem from a difficulty in making an initial categorisation of an entity rather than from 
any conceptual difficulty. In support of this, these authors cite evidence relating to 
children’s difficulties in card sorting tasks (for example, Morison & Gardner, 1978; 
Taylor & Howell, 1973) which suggest that children have difficulties in differentiating 
fantasy figures from real ones. However, this evidence is not compelling given the 
cultural conventions supporting children’s beliefs in fantasy figures such as those 
involved in these studies (Woolley, 1997a). Furthermore, the Morison and Gardner 
data suggest that whilst children do not spontaneously use the category of pretend in 
these tasks, once this category has been suggested children use it accurately. 
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that children suffer pretend-reality 
confiision even when the adult has made the initial categorisation (by instructing the 
child to pretend or to imagine) and even when the child goes on to verbally confirm 
their understanding that the entities are not real (Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 
1994; Woolley & Phelps, 1994).
In summary, this section has reviewed a number of methodological explanations for 
children’s apparent failures to maintain a boundary between pretence and reality, and 
in light of the research evidence, these explanations have been dismissed. It seems that 
the paradoxical findings discussed earlier can not simply be attributed to 
methodological differences between the studies reviewed.
The transmigration hypothesis
The transmigration hypothesis was suggested by Harris et al (1991) as a possible 
explanation for children’s pretend-reality confusions. These authors argued that it is 
possible that although children can clearly differentiate between pretend and real 
entities, they are not entirely certain of the causal relationships between the mind and 
reality. In other words, children are perhaps not aware of the lules that control 
transformation of entities from the realm of the imaginary into reality. However, 
Johnson and Harris (1994) later dismissed this hypothesis on the basis of children’s 
responses to a post-task interview - very few children made any comments that might 
have been interpreted as suggesting any uncertainty about the generative powers of the 
imagination. That is, very few children suggested that their imagination could create a 
real entity.
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Magical thinking as context specific
Several researchers have noted that children may be more prone to pretend-reality 
confusions or magical thinking in some situations than in others (Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1994; Subbotskii, 1985, 1991; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; 
Woolley, 1997a; Woolley & Phelps, 1994). Subbotsky develops this idea by arguing 
that magical thinking and so-called scientific, or rational tliinking, co-exist in the minds 
of both children and adults - this view has been echoed recently by authors such as 
Boyer (1997), Harris (1994b, 1997) and Johnson (1997). For example, Harris (1997) 
argues that magical thinking shares much in common with eveiyday reasoning that is 
not typically considered magical. That is, reasoning in terms of beliefs and desires to 
predict and explain behaviour (theory of mind). Harris argues that humans have a 
propensity to attribute non-observable causes to observable phenomena and that tliis 
mode of thinking has been dominant throughout much of the development of the 
human species. It is therefore not surprising that magical thinking co-exists with 
scientific thinking. Subbotskii (1985, 1991; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) 
went on to claim that these two types of thinking rarely conflict since they emerge in 
quite different sets of circumstances:
“in the domain of everyday reality notions of space and time are based 
on the structures of mutual impermeability of solid objects and the 
irreversibility of complex processes . . .  in the domain of unusual reality 
(fairy tales, dreams, fantasies) unusual properties of space and time are 
attributed a legitimate status” (Subbotsky, 1994, page 98).
The overall tenet of Subbotslcy’s argument is that children and indeed adults do engage 
in magical or fantastical thinking whereby, for example non-existent, imagined objects 
might be assumed to be real. Subbotsky does not argue that people are generally 
confused about fantasy and reality - in normal circumstances, rational or scientific 
reasoning prevails. However, in the face of unusual phenomena or in unusual 
circumstances, magical reasoning can be called into play.
Woolley and Phelps (1994) make a similar point. They argue that in studies such as 
those conducted by Subbotskii (1985, 1991; Subbotsky, 1994), Harris et al (1991) and 
Johnson and Harris (1994), the context of the experiment could be considered 
supportive of magical or fantastical thinking - there were no real life costs or 
consequences to be incurred from such thinking. Indeed, as Woolley and Phelps’ own 
experiment demonstrates, pretend-reality confusion becomes less likely, although not 
completely eradicated, when magical thinking would have real-life implications for 
another person. That is, magical thinking is somehow suppressed when there are costs
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associated with it. In sum, Woolley and Phelps argue that in experimental settings, and 
presumably in eveiyday life,
“a context is created, and when believing in magic or superstition 
involves little costs, or conversely, when not believing involves a 
potentially high cost, adults and children both may appear to entertain 
magical beliefs” (page 65).
The idea that magical thinking may be context specific is consistent with many of the 
research findings relating to pretend-reality confusions and magical thinking. First, 
children only invoke magical explanations for events when these are unusual and can 
not be explained in terms of the child’s understanding of physical causality (for 
example, Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 
1994). Second, children engage in magical practises and verbally acknowledge that 
magic is possible after hearing a faiiy story (Subbotskii, 1985; Subbotsky, 1994). 
Third, children engage in magical thinking and show signs of pretend-reality confusion 
in settings where doing so has no real-life consequences (for example, Harris et al, 
1991; Johnson & Hams, 1994). Fourth, children engage in magical thinking in 
circumstances where not doing so might have a potentially high risk. For example, 
children refuse to drink ‘magic water’ which might make them two years younger 
(Subbotsky, 1994). Similarly adults engage in magical thinking by not drinking a sugar 
solution labelled as cyanide (Rozin, Millman & Nemeroff, 1986; Rozin, Markwith & 
Ross, 1990) and refusing to place their driving licence in an apparently destructive 
‘magic box’ (Subbotsky, 1997b). Finally, Woolley and Phelps (1994) demonstrated 
that levels of pretend-reality confiision amongst children are reduced when such 
thinking would have a practical consequence for another person.
Overall, context effects can explain many of the research findings that have been 
obtained. However, this explanation lacks predictive power. For example, in the 
studies by Wellman and Estes (1986) there are no obvious consequences of engaging 
in magical thinking, yet the children did not do so. Furthermore, this account does not 
explain why, within the same context, not all children and not all adults engage in 
magical thinking - why should some individuals be resistant to the effects of social 
context? It seems that there must be some intervening causal factor or mechanism that 
leads to these individual differences. That is, there must be some additional 
mechanism which leads to pretend-reality confusion or magical thinking in some 
individuals and in some circumstances. There are two main candidates for this
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additional factor - the influence of increased cognitive availability and the influence of 
the affect, or emotion, that is evoked within these situations.
The availability hypothesis
This explanation was originally suggested by Harris et al (1991) and was later 
developed by Johnson and Harris (1994) in an attempt to account for children’s 
experiences of pretend-reality confusion. The availability hypothesis is based on the 
‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) which will now be described 
briefly before returning to a discussion of the availability hypothesis.
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) argued that through experience, individuals learn that it 
is easier to recall instances from large classes of objects and events, than it is to recall 
instances from small classes of objects and events, and that objectively likely events are 
easier to imagine than rare ones. These authors went on to argue that his basic 
knowledge can be deployed as a short-cut, or heuristic, when evaluating the 
frequencies and likelihoods of events. Tliis was termed the availability heuristic, 
whereby an individual estimates frequencies or probabilities in tenns of the ease with 
which they can bring examples of what is to be judged to mind. That is, high cognitive 
availability is taken, for example, to be an indicator of high fi equency. Whilst this 
availability heuristic can be a very effective means of making these sorts of judgements, 
cognitive availability is sometimes influenced by factors other than fiequency or 
likelihood - this leads to systematic biases in judgements using the availability heuristic. 
For example, in one of a series of ten experiments investigating the operation of the 
availability heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman asked subjects to report whether there 
were more words in the English language starting with, for example, the letter R, or 
with this as the third letter. Objectively, there are more words with R in the third 
position, however, words with R in the first position are more cognitively available - 
they are easier to bring to mind. Accordingly, the respondents incorrectly judged there 
to be more words with the target letter in the first than in the third position.
Studies investigating the operation of the availability heuristic have been prolific and 
have tended to provide further support for its influence. For example, studies such as 
those by Fitzgerald, Slade and Lawrence (1988), MacLeod and Campbell (1992), 
Manis, Shedler, Jonides and Nelson (1993) and Williams and Durso (1986) provide 
evidence to support the claim that judgements of the frequencies of category members 
are influenced by cognitive availability. Thus for example, in the Manis et al study the 
frequency of the names of famous men in a list were over-estimated relative to the
frequency of the names of less famous women in the same list. The argument here is 
that famous names were easier to bring to mind and were thus judged to be more 
frequent than the less famous names. In terms of the influence of availability on 
estimates of the probability of future events, studies have shown that these judgements 
are systematically influenced by imagining the outcome (for example, Carroll, 1978; 
Levi & Pryor, 1987; Littrell & Magel, 1991), generating reasons why the event is 
likely or unlikely (for example, Cervone, 1989; Hoch, 1984), personal experience of 
the outcome (for example. Greening, Dollinger & Pitz, 1996), the amount of 
information available to the subject when they make their judgement (for example, 
Agans & Shaffer, 1994) and whether the event is predicted to happen soon or after a 
long delay (for example, Milburn, 1978). All of these findings have been interpreted as 
suggesting the operation of the availability heuristic.
The data relating to the use of the availability heuristic by children is very limited. 
However, a recent study by Davies and Wliite (1994) demonstrated that seven to ten 
year old children used the availability heuristic when judging whether a list had 
contained more human or animal characters. As in the original study by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973) and the replication by Manis et al (1993) the less frequent category 
involved famous names, yet the children reported that this category was the more 
frequent. These findings were interpreted by Davies and White as evidence that 
children had made their judgements on the basis of the ease of bringing category 
examples to mind.
Overall, there seems to be much evidence to support the operation of the availability 
heuristic in a variety of contexts. One notable exception to the ovei'whelming support 
for Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) data and arguments is a study by White (1991) 
which failed to replicate the findings relating to people’s judgements of the relative 
frequency of words with target letters in the first or third position. That said, the 
overall impression from the evidence in this area is that adult, and perhaps childhood, 
reasoning is influenced by the use of the availability heuristic. The discussion will now 
return to how Harris et al (1991) and Johnson and Harris (1994) applied the 
availability heuristic to the task of explaining pretend-reality confusions.
Harris et al (1991) and Johnson and Harris (1994) argued that the act of imagining an 
entity causes an increase in the ease with which ideas about such entities can be 
brought to mind. In other words, the imagination leads to an increase in the cognitive 
availability of what has been imagined. Consequently, the child experiences an
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increase in the subjective likelihood of the imagined entity being real. Therefore 
children wonder and, in the case of the Harris et al (experiment 4) and Johnson and 
Harris (experiment 3) studies, test out the possible existence of the imagined entities 
by investigating the appropriate box. The data obtained by Johnson and Harris further 
suggested there are individual differences between children in relation to this - some, 
but not all children investigated a box containing an imaginaiy entity and reported 
wondering about the possible existence of this entity. These individual differences 
between ‘credulous’ children who opened the boxes and reported having wondered 
about the contents and ‘sceptical’ children who did neither of these things, were then 
related to Subbotskii’s (1985, 1991; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) argument 
that magical thinking co-exists in children’s minds with everyday reasoning in terms of 
normal physical causality. Whilst Subbotslcy, and Woolley and Phelps (1994) argue 
that there are contextual influences on the operation of these methods of reasoning, 
Johnson and Harris ftirther claim that some children are more likely than others to 
engage in magical thinking. Johnson and Harris propose that children experience an 
increase in the subjective likelihood of the pretence and can then flii1:her judge the 
likelihood of the entity being real in terms of either the everyday principle of 
non-creation or the alternative principle of magical creation. For sceptical children, 
reasoning in terms of physical causality prevails - they use their understanding of 
object permanence to reassure themselves that the empty box they have pretended 
about will continue to be empty. These children therefore do not investigate the 
boxes. In contrast, amongst credulous children, magical thinking prevails and they do 
not dismiss the possibility that the imagined entity might become real. These children 
then open the boxes and later admit to having wondered whether the imagined entity 
had really been inside the box.
It is not the case that Harris et al (1991) and Johnson and Harris (1994) are claiming 
that children are generally confused about the distinction between pretence and reality. 
Instead they argue that,
“the imagination provides a breeding ground for magical fantasies: 
these fantasies may be opposed by the child’s common-sense principles, 
or bolstered by latent magical principles” (Johnson & Harris, page 47).
Johnson and Harris add to this the idea that activities other than pretence may also lead 
to these magical fantasies, for example, hearing a fairy story or watching a cartoon 
may have a similar effect on the cognitive availability for certain magical outcomes.
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The availability hypothesis appears to provide a sound explanation for much of the 
research evidence relating to children’s failures to maintain a boundar)' between 
pretence and reality. First, the data obtained by Woolley and Wellman (1993), Harris 
et al (1991 - experiments 3 and 4), Johnson and Harris (1994 - experiment 3) and 
Woolley and Phelps (1994) in wliich children pretend about the contents of empty 
boxes and subsequently show verbal or behavioural signs of believing the contents to 
be real, are consistent with the effects of availability on credulous children in certain 
situations. Second, Subbotskii’s data (1985; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) 
can be interpreted in terms of the availability hypothesis. For example, children 
engaged in magical behaviours after hearing a fairy story involving these activities 
(Subbotskii, 1985; Subbotsky, 1994). Presumably, the faiiy stoiy made the magical 
outcomes easier to bring to mind, and given that the children were involved in a 
context which supported magical thinking, the resultant shifts in the subjective 
likelihood of magical outcomes were flirther bolstered by reasoning in terms of magical 
principles. In the later studies (Subbotsky, 1996, 1997a, 1997b), witnessing an event 
such as the impossible transformation of a postage stamp could also have lead to 
increased cognitive availability. Third, anecdotal accounts of children’s pretend-reality 
confusions tend to be consistent with the overall principle that imagining an outcome 
makes it seem more likely.
Importantly, the evidence relating to magical thinking amongst adults can also be 
interpreted in terms of the availability hypothesis. The studies by Subbotskii (1991; 
Subbotsky, 1997b) involved showing the adult participants a magical transformation - 
this could act as a prompt which leads to an increase in the cognitive availability for 
these magical possibilities. In addition, the studies by Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff 
(1986) and Rozin, Markwith and Ross (1990) can be similarly interpreted. For 
example, perhaps the cognitive availability for the idea of the sugar solution actually 
being cyanide became so great that the subjects could not risk drinking that solution.
The availability hypothesis can be seen to have clear explanatory power for the 
literature relating to magical thinking and pretend-reality confusion in children and 
adults. Indeed, coupled with Woolley and Phelps’ (1994) and Subbotskii’s (1985, 
1991; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) claims that such thinking is more likely 
in some circumstances than in others, and with the idea of individual differences 
between children (Johnson & Harris, 1994), the availability hypothesis provides what 
seems to be a very convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon.
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However, there remain some unresolved issues relating to the availability hypothesis. 
If, as Johnson and Harris (1994) claim, a wide variety of activities including pretence 
can lead to increased cognitive availability, then surely pretend-reality conftisions 
should be more widespread than they actually are. In other words, if hearing a fairy 
story or any act of pretence can lead to an increase in the subjective likelihood of an 
outcome, wondering about the reality status of fantastical outcomes should be 
extremely prevalent. Yet very few children confuse pretence and reality during their 
everyday play activities, and anecdotal accounts of pretend-reality confiision are not 
commonplace (Lillard, 1994). One possibility is that there are mechanisms which 
serve to limit, or to constrain the effects of increased cognitive availability. Two such 
mechanisms already discussed are individual differences and situational or contextual 
constraints. However, an additional possibility is that empirical evidence of reality, or 
visual confirmation of the outcome of the pretence (Woolley, 1995a, 1997a) can 
contribute by reassuring children of the reality status of what they have imagined That 
is, being able to see that an object is pretend should reduce the subjective probability 
of the possibility that it is real. There is some evidence to support this claim. Woolley 
and Wellman (1993) observed that whilst some children made pretend-reality 
confusions about the imagined contents of a box, very few children had done so on a 
warm-up example where they had imagined there was an ice-cream in the room with 
them. Perhaps the increased probability of the ice-cream being real had been offset by 
the fact that the children could not see any ice-cream. In contrast, no such empirical 
evidence was available when the children later pretended about a box - the effects of 
availability were not constrained and the children therefore wondered if the contents 
were real. One of the primary aims of the present research was to directly test the 
possibility that empirical evidence of reality constrains the effects of increased 
cognitive availability during pretence.
The second problem with the availability hypothesis is that although Johnson and 
Harris (1994) claim that availability operates for innocuous as well as frightening 
imaginary creatures, a full account of how the effects of availability might relate to the 
emotional content of the pretence has not been offered. Arguments relating to the 
possible role of affect in children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction will 
be discussed in the section which follows, however it is worth noting here that the 
effects of increased cognitive availability may be more or less easy to discount when 
the pretence has a positive or negative affective content. At present the availability 
hypothesis is silent on this issue. Therefore a further primary aim of the current
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research was to explore the influence of affect on the effects of increased cognitive 
availability on children’s beliefs about the pretence.
To recap, the availability hypothesis suggests that children’s imagination can lead to an 
increase in the cognitive availability of certain outcomes and that this can lead to the 
imagined outcomes seeming increasingly likely. Whether or not this leads children to 
question the reality status of what they have imagined seems to be contingent on a 
combination of context effects and individual differences between children. However, 
whilst the availability hypothesis has sound explanatoi^ power when applied to 
evidence of magical thinking and pretend-reality confusion in children and adults, there 
are some unresolved issues which will be investigated during the course of the research 
to be reported here.
Emotional involvement in the pretence
The possibility that the affect evoked during pretence might lead children to become 
uncertain about the pretend-reality distinction has been noted by several authors (for 
example, Bretherton, 1989; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1989; Garvey, 1991; Samuels & 
Taylor, 1994; Woolley & Phelps, 1994). For example, Garvey (1991) comments that, 
“in the heightened excitement of good fantasy play, children may 
suddenly feel uneasy and in need of reassurance about matters that in a 
cooler moment they would probably judge as ‘just make-believe’ or 
‘not real’” (page 140).
This impact of affect could result from children’s inability to reassure themselves with 
the knowledge that the source of their emotion is only pretend (Woolley, 1997a), or 
may result from children assuming that because the emotion experienced during 
affectively charged pretend play feels real (Bretherton, 1989; Bretherton & Beeghly, 
1989; Fein, 1989; Lillard, 1994; Marjanovie-Shane, 1989) it must have a real source 
(Taylor, 1990).
The data available certainly seem to suggest that affect may play a role in at least some 
instances of magical thinking and pretend-reality confusion. Anecdotal evidence 
typically reports children experiencing fear of the products of their own imagination 
and similarly, those relating to adults tend to relate to fear evoking fictional material 
such as ghost stories and horror movies. In terms of the experimental literature, Harris 
et al (1991) obsei*ved pretend-reality confusion regarding a scary monster and 
Subbotskii (1985; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) reports magical thinking 
about desirable and undesirable outcomes. For example, children attempted to
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magically defy the laws of physical impermeability of solid objects by putting their 
hand through the side of a box to reach a desired object and showed a belief in the 
possibility of the magical reversibility of time when refusing to drink ‘magic water’ 
which could have the undesirable outcome of making them two years younger 
(Subbotskii, 1985). The experimental literature relating to adults is also consistent 
with the influence of affect. Subbotskii (1991; Subbotsky, 1997b) observed adult 
magical thinking in relation to the undesirable outcome of the destmction of the 
subjects’ driving license. In terms of sympathetic magic, reticence to eat a piece of 
fudge shaped as dog faeces and to drink a sugar solution labelled as cyanide can 
certainly be explained in terms of the negative affect these stimuli might provoke 
(Rozin, Markwith & Ross, 1990; Rozin, Millman & Nemeroff, 1986).
However, there are also data which suggest that pretend-reality confusions sometimes 
occur in the absence of any obvious emotional content to the pretence. For example, 
Woolley and Phelps (1994) observed some uncertainty about the reality status of an 
imagined pair of socks and Garvey and Berndt (1977) cite the example of the child 
who was not entirely convinced that a telephone was pretend. Furthermore, although 
Prawat, Anderson and Hapkiewicz (1985) found no relationship between the scariness 
of monsters and how real children judged them to be, Samuels and Taylor (1994) 
found that young children were likely to claim that even real frightening events could 
not happen in real life, despite their accuracy when categorising emotionally neutral 
events as real or imaginary. Therefore it is not the case that affect always leads to true 
fiction errors.
The relationship between cliildren’s experience of affect and their understanding of the 
pretend-reality distinction is clearly not straightforward. However, it seems higlily 
unlikely that affect is a completely unrelated aspect of the pretence. One aim of the 
present research was therefore to explore the relationship between affect and 
children’s understanding of pretence in relation to the availability hypothesis (discussed 
above) and in relation to the pretence continuation account which will now be 
discussed.
The pretence continuation account
In drawing parallels between the emotional reactions of children and adults to 
frightening fantasy content, several authors have argued that behaviours which may 
appear to reflect pretend-reality confusion are in fact simply a reflection of these 
emotions (for example, Lillard, 1994; Taylor, 1997; Taylor, Cartwright & Carlson,
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1993; Wellman, 1990; Woolley, 1995a, 1997a). For example, adult fear whilst 
watching a horror movie should not be taken as reflecting any uncertainty about the 
reality status of the movie. Likewise, a child becoming fearful of a monster should be 
interpreted as an emotional reaction to the fantasy and not as a confiision between 
pretence and reality. In other words, according to some commentators, the observed 
behaviours which have been interpreted as reflecting a breakdown in children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction are actually only a product of the
child’s emotional reactions to the pretence. So for example, when the children in
Harris et al’s (1991 - experiment 3) showed wariness towards the scary monster, this 
was a product of their fear and was not because they thought the monster might be 
real. According to this view, the paradox between children’s competence at 
distinguishing pretence from reality and the behaviours that indicate pretend-reality 
confusion is not a paradox at all. Children do not experience pretend-reality 
confusion.
Golomb and Galasso (1995) have developed these ideas into what will be termed here 
the ‘pretence continuation account’, in their attempt to explain the relationship 
between the child’s experience of affect and their behaviour during pretence. Golomb 
and Galasso argue that during pretence with an emotional theme, children constantly 
monitor their experience of affect to ensure that it does not exceed a certain level but 
also to ensure that they are sufficiently involved in the pretence for it to be enjoyable. 
Thus in Golomb and Galasso’s studies,
“children modified or transformed the pretence theme if it became too 
emotionally intense . . . when children became uncomfortable or felt 
threatened, they modified the pretence theme to diminish their fear and
remain engaged in the game . . .  In the positive condition, children
tended to modify the theme to enhance their pleasure” (page 808).
Thus children hid behind the experimenter’s skirt, claimed that the monster had no 
teeth and claimed that a genie would grant them three wishes, all as ways of 
modulating their emotional involvement in the pretence and all as part of a 
continuation of the pretence theme. Golomb and Galasso caution against the 
misinterpretation of behaviours such as these as pretend-reality confusion - these 
behaviours should instead be interpreted as testimony to children’s skill at managing 
their emotional reactions when pretending.
The importance of children’s emotional involvement in pretence was also highlighted 
by Fein (1989) who made the very similar claim that.
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“the child shuttles back and forth between emotives of varying intensity; 
when the intensity of one emotive is too great, the child can shift to a 
lesser one, thereby maintaining play at an affectively tolerable level”
(page 360).
It seems that Golomb and Galasso (1995) are not alone in believing that children’s 
degree of emotional involvement in their pretence is of paramount importance.
In terms of the existing literature, Golomb and Galasso’s (1995) claims probably do 
have some explanatoiy power but they certainly can not account for all of the findings. 
The children in Subbotskii’s (1985; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) studies 
could perhaps be viewed as continuing some form of pretence. This assumes that the 
children had interpreted either the fairy story (Subbotskii, 1985, 1994) or the 
experimenter’s activities (Subbotsky, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) as some form of pretending 
game which they then continued. The affective component would presumably have 
been the child’s excitement about the possibility of the magical transformations. 
However, the idea that the children were pretending is not consistent with the fact that 
they showed overt signs of disappointment when the ‘magic’ did not work and verbally 
reported believing that the magical transformations were possible. Some of the 
findings obtained by Hams et al (1991 - experiment 3) can perhaps be interpreted in 
terms of pretence continuation - the children may have used their finger to approach 
the puppy box to increase their positive affect and used the stick for the monster box 
as an avoidant behaviour designed to reduce negative affect. However, if this is 
pretence continuation, why should the children have spontaneously commented on the 
whereabouts of the monster when they found the box to be empty? Similarly, although 
children’s approach to a box containing an imagined rabbit could be a means of 
increasing positive affect (Harris et al - experiment 4), once again, children’s verbal 
comments suggest pretend-reality confusion rather than pretence continuation. Even 
more importantly, some children approached the box containing an imagined monster - 
a behaviour that does not seem to be consistent with the motivation to reduce negative 
affect. Furthermore, although children in Johnson and Harris (1994 - experiment 3) 
might have approached boxes containing an imagined faiiy or ice-cream out of 
pretence continuation, this certainly does not offer any explanation for why these 
children reported having wondered about the possible existence of the imagined 
entities. Overall, the experimental findings are difficult to explain their entirety in 
tenns of pretence continuation.
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A flirther problem with Golomb and Galasso’s (1995) pretence continuation account is 
in its underlying assumption that children will be motivated to reduce negative affect 
and to increase positive affect. This assumption is not completely unreasonable - 
Frijda (1988) argues the same point in relation to emotions with real causes when 
claiming that positive affect is associated with approach and negative affect is 
associated with avoidance. The difficulty arises when this principle is applied to 
emotions evoked by fantasies. As noted above, in Harris et al’s (1991 - experiment 4) 
study, some children behaved in ways that might have actually increased their negative 
affect. Furthermore, research has shown that some children and adults report enjoying 
the fear they experience when watching horror movies and indeed this fear motivates 
them to watch those films (for example, Allerton, 1995; Johnston, 1995; Murry & 
Dacin, 1996; Sparks, 1986; Tamborini, Stiff & Heidel, 1990). It seems that the 
negative affect elicited by fantasy is not always aversive. This possibility is not 
considered by Golomb and Galasso. One aim of the current research was therefore to 
fully assess the influence of negative affect. In addition, the claim that children simply 
do not experience pretend-reality confiision was tested directly.
In this section a number of explanations for children’s pretend-reality confusions have 
been considered. From this discussion it should be clear that none of the accounts 
described were able to explain all of the findings obtained in this area. The primary, 
over-riding aim of the present research was to assess these explanations in an attempt 
to more fully specify the factors influencing children’s understanding of the 
pretend-reality distinction. This section which follows is a summary of the aims of this 
research and the primary issues investigated.
Aims of the current research
The primaiy aim of the present research was to resolve the conflicting views posed by 
the availability hypothesis and the pretence continuation account of children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. Whilst the pretence continuation 
account proposes that children never become uncertain about what is pretend and what 
is real, the availability hypothesis poses the alternative view that some children, in 
some circumstances, do experience this type of uncertainty. The primary aim of this 
research was therefore to test between these competing views and to establish whether 
or not there are separable groups of children who do and do not experience 
pretend-reality confusion.
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An additional aim of the research reported here was to attempt to resolve some 
outstanding issues relating to the availability hypothesis and the pretence continuation 
account. First, this research investigated the possible influence of empirical evidence 
of reality on the effects of increased cognitive availability. In other words, the 
possibility that being able to see the outcome of the pretence might reassure children of 
the pretend-reality distinction was explored. Second, the relationship between 
differing forms of affect, children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction and 
their consequent behaviour was investigated. Third, developmental trends in children’s 
behaviour towards, and beliefs about, pretend entities were investigated.
In sum, the research reported here investigated children’s understanding of the 
pretend-reality distinction and the relationship between this understanding and the 
emotional content of the pretence. Moreover, this research investigated both 
developmental and individual differences in children’s understanding. The chapters 
which follow report a series of seven related experiments designed to address these 
issues.
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
Monsters, ghosts and witches revisited: The influence of affect and empirical
evidence on children’s pretence
Introduction
The aim of the present experiment was to begin to resolve some of the unanswered 
questions about the availability hypothesis (Hams, Brown, Marriott, Whittall & 
Harmer, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994) and the pretence continuation account 
(Golomb & Galasso, 1995) of children’s behaviour towards pretend entities that were 
discussed in the first chapter.
The first issue to be addressed relates specifically to the availability hypothesis - 
although it does offer a plausible explanation for instances when children appear to 
have become confused about the distinction between pretence and reality, a major 
limitation of the hypothesis is that it would actually predict many more such instances 
than are reported. According to Johnson & Harris’ (1994) discussion of the 
availability hypothesis, any act of pretence or of the imagination might be sufficient to 
cause an increase in cognitive availability which leads the child to question the reality 
status of the pretence. So for example, in the same way that a child who pretends 
about a monster might begin to wonder if the imagined creature is actually real, a child 
who pretends that a stick is a sword might come to doubt the true identity of the stick. 
However, pretend-reality confusions during object substitution pretence such as this 
are extremely rare and children are instead very competent at distinguishing the real 
and pretend identities of objects (for example, Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1987; Harris, 
Kavanaugh & Meredith, 1994; Lillard & Flavell, 1992; Woolley, 1995b; Woolley & 
Wellman, 1990). Why?
One possible explanation is that there are mechanisms that serve to limit or to 
constrain the effects of availability. In addition to the situational constraints suggested 
by Subbotskii (1985; Subbotsky, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) and Woolley and Phelps 
(1994) and the individual differences between credulous and sceptical children 
proposed by Johnson and Harris (1994), a likely candidate for one such limiting 
mechanism is direct empirical evidence, or visual confirmation, of the outcome of the 
pretence (Woolley, 1997a). In other words, when the pretender is confronted with 
evidence pertaining to reality, the effects of the cognitive availability for the pretence
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should be limited and pretend-reality confusion should be unlikely. For example, being 
able to see the true identity of an item used in object substitution pretence could be 
sufficient to eliminate any doubts about the reality status of the pretence. In contrast, 
in circumstances where reality is in some way hidden pretend-reality confusions may be 
more likely - the effects of availability for the pretence are not constrained.
The present experiment was designed to test the possible role of empirical evidence as 
a constraint on the effects of availability. To this end, children’s behaviour under 
conditions of differing levels of empirical evidence was compared in a situation in 
which there were no real life consequences of engaging in magical thinking. In the 
design used by Harris et al (1991 - experiment 3) the children made their first box 
selection without being able to see the box contents. The cognitive availability for the 
pretence would not have been constrained and therefore the children may have 
wondered about the reality status of the pretend objects. However, when they actually 
opened the first box the child obtained visual confirmation that it was empty and the 
contents only pretend. This could have caused a reduction in the effects of availability 
for subsequent boxes and thus led to a change in the child’s beliefs and their behaviour 
towards the remaining boxes. Unfortunately, with the two box design used by Harris 
et al these changes could not be detected - having approached one of the boxes, the 
child’s second selection was pre-determined and may therefore have been independent 
of their beliefs. In contrast, by using a three box design it becomes possible to 
measure any change in the children’s behaviour as they gain experience of finding the 
boxes to be empty - the second choice is not determined by the first. In this 
experiment children were asked to pretend about the contents of three boxes and then 
to predict the order in which they would open them (hypothetical task) before being 
asked to do so (actual task). The decision not to use the stick versus finger task used 
by Harris et al relates to the inclusion of the discarding task and the changed pretend 
entities. By comparing children’s performance on the hypothetical and actual versions 
of the task it was possible to assess the impact of differential levels of empirical 
evidence. During the hypothetical task the child made all three box selections without 
evidence about the contents. In contrast, the second and third actual selections were 
made after the child had seen that the first box was empty.
Due to logical constraints the hypothetical task always preceded the actual one - 
children were asked to predict their behaviour before carrying it out. Consequently, 
any differences in children’s box selection patterns might simply be attributable to a 
task order effect. To test this possibility a second set of tasks were introduced in
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which levels of empirical evidence were held constant across the hypothetical and 
actual versions. When they selected boxes to throw away, rather than to open, the 
children never obtained empirical evidence that the boxes were empty. Any differences 
between the hypothetical and actual discarding tasks must be attributable to an order 
effect rather than differential levels of empirical evidence. The inclusion of these 
additional tasks therefore facilitated the interpretation of any differences observed
across the hypothetical and actual opening tasks.
To summarise, the likely role of empirical evidence in limiting the effects of availability 
led to the prediction that children’s behaviour would vary across the hypothetical and 
actual opening tasks but not the hypothetical and actual discarding tasks. In contrast, 
Golomb and Galasso’s (1995) pretence continuation account can be taken to generate 
vei-y different predictions about children’s performance across hypothetical and actual 
tasks due to the very different role that empirical evidence is likely to have. According 
to the pretence continuation account, children should never question the reality status 
of the pretence. Therefore empirical evidence of reality should have little or no effect 
on children’s behaviour - there are no effects of increased cognitive availability to be 
constrained. Consequently, children should respond by continuing their pretence 
similarly irrespective of whether the task is presented hypothetically or actually.
The second issue to be addressed in this experiment relates to the impact of affect on 
children’s behaviour towards pretend objects. Golomb and Galasso (1995) have 
argued that children continue their pretence in ways that increase positive affect and 
decrease negative affect. This explanation does seem to be consistent with Golomb 
and Galasso’s own findings and some of those from Harris et al (1991). For example, 
children tended to avoid a box they were pretending contained a negative entity
(experiment 3). However, some children (Hams et al - experiment 4) were found to
approach a box that they were pretending contained a scary monster. The Golomb and 
Galasso account does not offer any explanation for why these children spontaneously 
engaged in a behaviour that would presumably have increased the negative affect 
evoked by the monster. In addition, whilst the effects of availability are said to apply 
to innocuous creatures such as rabbits as well as frightening ones such as monsters, 
Johnson and Harris (1994) do not offer an account of the differential impact that 
varying forms of affect might have on these effects. Thus questions of the influence of 
affect on children’s behaviour and how this might be related to the effects of 
availability are far from resolved.
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As a first step towards resolving these outstanding issues, this experiment was 
designed to compare children’s behaviour towards desired, feared and affectively 
neutral pretend entities on a within subject basis. Unlike previous experiments which 
have used adult selected positive pretend objects such as puppies (Harris et al, 1991 - 
experiment 3), rabbits (Harris et al - experiment 4; Golomb & Galasso, 1995 - 
experiment 1), fairies and ice-cream (Johnson & Harris, 1994 - exoeriment 3), in this 
experiment the children were asked to pretend about a positive item of their own 
choosing. However, unlike Golomb and Galasso (experiment 2) in which the child’s 
selection of a positive pretend object was embedded in a pretend scenario in which the 
child and adult encountered various creatures whilst in a forest, here the children were 
asked to pretend about their preferred Christmas present. This experimental 
manipulation ensured that all children were pretending about something that they 
would find desirable. Ideally, the negative pretend entity should also have been child 
selected to ensure that all the children feared, or at least disliked, this entity. However 
there are clear ethical concerns about asking children to think about items that they 
find extremely frightening. Therefore, like previous experiments (Harris et al, 1991; 
Golomb & Galasso, 1995) the cliildren were asked to pretend about a scai-y monster - 
an entity which is typically associated with negative emotional reactions. To address 
the confounding of object pretence and affective neutrality that has occurred in 
previous experiments (Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Golomb & Galasso, 
1995), the neutral box was populated with a pretended object which was neither 
desired nor feared. Furthermore, to minimise the possibility that any child might 
embellish the pretence to make the neutral entity desirable, the children were prompted 
by showing them an empty cup and asking them to pretend that it was inside one of the 
boxes.
The use of a three box design including positive, neutral and negative affect on a 
repeated measures basis was an important feature of the experimental design. In 
Harris et al (1991 - experiment 3) children may have selected the positive box first 
simply because they were avoiding the negative pretend entity. With Harris et al’s two 
box design it is not possible to determine whether this is the case. However, the 
present three box design minimises this ambiguity. If when faced with positive and 
negative affect together children are concerned both to approach the positive entity 
and to avoid the negative entity, they should open the positive box first and the 
negative box last. If on the other hand, children are only concerned to approach the 
positive entity and disregard the negative one, they should open the positive box first 
and behave unsystematically towards the remaining boxes. Similarly, if children are
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only concerned with the avoidance of the negative entity they should open the negative 
box last and behave unsystematically towards the positive and neutral boxes.
These predictions assume that children are likely to be motivated to decrease negative 
affect. However, this assumption is inconsistent with Harris et al’s (1991 - experiment 
4) observation that some children chose to approach a box containing a monster. One 
possible explanation for this striking behaviour is that the children either were not 
afraid of the monster or actually enjoyed the fear associated with the monster. 
Alternatively, it could be that the interpretation of box opening behaviour may be less 
straightforward than it at first seems. Although the most typical motivation for 
opening a box is desire for the contents, there are several alternative motivations that 
might lead a child to open one box rather than another. A child might open a box out 
of curiosity (wanting to find out what is inside), they might open a box when they fear 
the contents (to relieve their fear or because they enjoy the fear), and they might even 
open a box simply through avoidance of an alternative. To overcome the ambiguity 
inherent in interpreting box opening behaviours, an additional measure of children’s 
affective stance towards the pretend objects was included in this experiment. Wlien a 
child chooses to throw a box away, it is most certainly out of avoidance or dislike of 
the contents. That is, discarding is motivated by negative affect. Through comparison 
of children’s behaviour across opening and discarding tasks it became possible to 
determine whether children’s motivation during the pretence was to increase positive 
affect, decrease negative affect or to do both.
To recap, the fundamental experimental manipulations included in the design of this 
experiment were:
- a comparison of hypothetical and actual tasks
- a comparison of opening and discarding tasks
- a three box design, and
- the inclusion of positive, neutral and negative pretend objects.
Taken together these manipulations allowed an assessment of the influence of 
empirical evidence of reality on children’s behaviour towards pretend entities. If the 
effects of availability do influence children’s beliefs about pretend objects and if this 
influence is constrained by direct empirical evidence, marked differences should 
emerge between the hypothetical and actual opening tasks (but not the discarding 
tasks). However, if as Golomb and Galasso (1995) argue availability is not implicated 
and children are simply continuing their pretence, no such differences should emerge.
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Furthermore, this experimental design allowed a preliminaiy exploration into the 
possible differential influence of competing forms of affect.
Method
Subjects
Forty-nine children (19 boys and 30 girls) aged between 5 years 4 months and 6 years 
3 months (mean age 5 years 11 months) were recruited from two predominantly 
middle class schools in Hampshire and Middlesex. This age group was selected to 
correspond to the elder children in Harris et al (1991 - experiment 3 and experiment 4) 
and the middle age group in Johnson & Harris (1994 - experiment 3).
Procedure
The children were tested individually by the author in a quiet area of their school. 
When the child arrived three identical cardboard boxes (measuring 17 x 24 x 27 cm) 
were situated in a row on a table. Wlien the child had settled she/he was asked to look 
inside all three boxes and to confirm that they were empty.
The order of introduction to the pretend objects was counterbalanced. Whilst 
introducing the pretend objects the experimenter used appropriate intonation in her 
voice (as in Harris et al, 1991) - enthusiastic for the positive object (the child’s 
preferred Christmas present), dramatic for the negative object (monster) and nonnal 
for the neutral object (empty cup). The order of the hypothetical and actual tasks was 
fixed such that the child was always asked to predict their behaviour before actually 
carrying it out.
Task iutroductiou. ^  The task and pretend objects were introduced, “It doesn’t 
matter that the boxes are empty because we are going to play a game of pretend. I 
expect you’re good at pretend games aren’t you? . . .  Is there something that you 
would really, really like for Christmas this year? . . . What is it? . . . OK, I want you to 
pretend that the {named object) you want for Christmas is in this box. Now look, this 
is my coffee cup (child shown a plain cup) it’s empty now but that doesn’t matter, I 
want you to pretend that my empty coffee cup is in this box. And, I want you to
^The introduction, memory checks and reality checks were based where possible on 
those used in Harris et al (1991).
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pretend that there is a horrible, mean monster that wants to come out and chase you, in 
this box”. The boxes were indicated left to right.
M enioiy check. The cliild’s memory for the nature and location of the pretend 
objects was then checked, “OK, now can you tell me what you are pretending is in this 
box?”. This question was repeated for each box indicated left to right. If the child 
responded incorrectly to any of the memoi-y check questions they were reminded of 
the objects to be pretended and the memory checks repeated.
Reality check. The child’s understanding of the pretend-reality status of the entities 
was checked, “Is the (name of object} really in this box or are you pretending?”. This 
question was repeated for each box indicated right to left. Incorrect responses were 
not corrected.
Opening tasks. (1) Hypothetical opening. The child was asked, “If I asked you to 
open one of the boxes, which one of the boxes would you open?”.
(2) Actual opening. Once the cliild had nominated all three boxes they were asked to 
act, “OK, you show me now, you open one of the boxes now”. This was repeated 
until the three boxes had been opened.
Before moving on to the discarding tasks the child was reminded of the nature and 
location of the pretend objects.
Discarding tasks. (1) Hypothetical discarding. The child was asked, “If I asked 
you to throw away one of the boxes, which one of the boxes would you throw away?” . 
This was repeated until all three boxes had been nominated.
(2) Actual discarding. The child was then asked to actually discard the boxes, “OK, 
you show me now, you throw away one of the boxes now”. This was repeated until 
the tliree boxes had been discarded.
Debrief. Before returning to their classroom the child was asked to check that the 
boxes were empty and thanked for their help.
Overall, the children made three box selections on each of four tasks, therefore 
producing a twelve trial response pattern reflecting the order of box opening and 
discarding. The order of box selections was recorded in writing along with any verbal 
comments the children made.
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Results
Nine children failed the memory checks and so were not included in the analyses. Of 
the remaining 40 children, 39 (98 %) responded correctly to the reality checks.
The data were subjected to Configurai Frequency Analysis (CFA). This form of 
non-parametric, multivariate analysis of association identifies response patterns that are 
over-represented (types) and under-represented (anti-types) given the null hypothesis 
that these patterns are normally and randomly distributed (Krauth, 1985; VonEye, 
1988, 1990). The results of the CFA for the patterns of box selections on each of the 
four experimental tasks are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Results of Configurai Frequency Analysis on children’s response patterns 
for each of the experimental tasks analysed separately (positive = Christmas present, 
neutral = cup, negative = monster) (n = 40)
'Positive = + 1 
iNeutral = N ! 
iNegative = -j
Opening Tasks j 
Hypothetical (Actual) |
Discarding Tasks ; 
Hypothetical (Actual)
i } 1IPatterii ' frequency i z frequency! z
+ N " • 20 (17). »T 5.66 (*T4.38> 1 (1).. * A -2.77 (*A -2.77)1
+ -N  8 (9) 0.57 (0.99)1 - (-) : - (-)
N + - 3 (4) -1.56 (-1.13) 1 (2) *A-2.77 (*A-2.37)
N - +  2. (3) ; -1.98 (-1.56)1 2. (2) *A:-2.37 (*A -2.37)1
- N + 4 (4) -1.13 (-1.13) 32 (31) *T 9.49 (*T 9.09),
- + N 3 (3) -1.56 ^ 1 5 6 ) 4 (4) -1.58 (-1.58)
’^ T significant response type at p < .001 
*A significant response anti-type at p < .01
On the hypothetical opening task the significant response type was selection of the 
positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last (z = 5.66, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008). This response pattern accounted for the 
behaviour of 20 children. An additional 8 children were also represented by a single 
(but not statistically significant) response pattern - positive box first, negative box 
second and neutral box last. The remaining 12 children were distributed between 4 
low frequency (non-significant) response patterns:
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- neutral - negative - positive (n = 2)
- neutral - positive - negative (n = 3)
- negative - positive - neutral (n = 3)
- negative - neutral - positive (n = 4)
The results for the actual opening task were very similar to those for the hypothetical 
version - the same response pattern emerged as significant (z = 4.38, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008) and accounted for the behaviour of a similar 
number of children (n = 17). There were no other significant results as the remaining 
23 children were represented by 5 non-significant response patterns:
- neutral - negative - positive (n = 3)
- negative - positive - neutral (n = 3)
- neutral - positive - negative (n = 4)
- negative - neutral - positive (n = 4)
- positive - negative - neutral (n = 9)
On the hypothetical discarding task only 5 of the 6 possible response patterns were 
observed - none of the children nominated the positive box first, negative box second 
and neutral box last. One pattern of box selections emerged as a significant response 
type - 32 children nominated the negative box first, neutral box second and positive 
box last (z = 9.49, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .01). The remaining 
8 children were distributed between 4 response patterns of which 3 emerged as 
significant response anti-types:
- positive - neutral - negative (n = 1 - anti-type, z = -2.77, p < .01)
- neutral - positive - negative (n = 1 - anti-type, z = -2.77, p < .01)
- neutral - negative - positive (n = 2 - anti-type, z = -2.37, p < .01)
- negative - positive - neutral (n = 4)
The results for the actual discarding task were very similar to those for the 
hypothetical task - the same response pattern emerged as the significant response type 
(z = 9.09, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .01) and accounted for the 
behaviour of a similar number of children (n = 31). The remaining 9 children were 
distributed between 4 response patterns (1 of the 6 possible response patterns was not 
observed) of which 3 emerged as significant response anti-types:
- positive - neutral - negative (n = 1 - anti-type, z = -2.77, p < .01)
- neutral - positive - negative (n = 2 - anti-type, z = -2.37, p < .01)
- neutral - negative - positive (n = 2 - anti-type, z = -2.37, p < .01)
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- negative - positive - neutral (n = 4)
- positive - negative - neutral (n = 0)
Inspection of the results of the CFA suggests that a group level, children’s behaviour 
across the hypothetical and actual versions of the tasks was vmy similar. The 
significant response types were the same and emerged with similar prevalence 
regardless of whether the task was presented hypothetically or actually. Further 
analyses were conducted to establish whether individual children responded similarly 
across the two versions of each task (Table 2.2). On the opening tasks the majority of 
children either produced the response type (positive - neutral - negative) both 
hypothetically and actually (n = 16) or produced non-significant response patterns on 
both occasions (n = 19, 17 of whom generated the same non-significant response 
pattern across the two versions of the task). However, four children changed from 
producing the response type on the hypothetical task to another response pattern on 
the actual task. Two of these children went on to actually open the positive, negative 
and then the neutral box, one actually opened the neutral box first, positive box second 
and negative box last and the remaining child actually opened the neutral box first, 
negative box second and positive box last. One child changed from selecting the 
positive, negative and then the neutral box on the hypothetical task, to the response 
type on the actual task. The variability in children’s behaviour was not significant 
(McNemar exact significance, p = .38).
A comparison of children’s behaviour across the hypothetical and actual discarding 
tasks also revealed no significant differences (McNemar exact significance, p = 1.00). 
Only one child changed from producing the response type (negative - neutral - 
positive) to producing another response pattern (neutral - negative - positive) on the 
actual task. The remaining children either produced the response type on both (n = 
31) or on neither version of the discarding task (n = 8, 7 of whom produced the same 
non-significant response pattern on both occasions).
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Table 2.2: Comparison of children’s response patterns across hypothetical and actual 
opening tasks (response type; positive - neutral - negative) - figures in brackets are for 
discarding tasks (response type; negative - neutral - positive) (n = 40)
Response Pattern on 
Hypothetical Task
Actual Task Type Other
Type 16 (31) 1 (0)
Other 4 (1) 19 (8)
A further measure of the consistency in children’s behaviour across the tasks was 
obtained by performing CFA on the orders of box selections across all four 
experimental tasks taken together. This produced a single 12 trial response pattern for 
each child. The results are summarised in Table 2.3. Of the 1296 possible response 
patterns, 17 were obseiwed. One pattern of box selections emerged as a significant 
response type (z = 7.83, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .003). 
Fourteen children opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral 
box second and negative box last and then went on to discard (hypothetically and 
actually) the negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last. This 
response type reflects the high level of consistency in children’s behaviour.
There were 4 additional (non-significant) response patterns that were produced by 
more than one child. The behaviour of 7 children was represented by 2 perseverative 
response patterns such that 4 children selected the negative box first, neutral box 
second and positive box last on all tasks and a further 3 children selected the negative 
box first, positive box second and neutral box last on all tasks. Five children opened 
(hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, negative box second and neutral 
box last and then went on to discard (hypothetically and actually) the negative box 
first, neutral box second and positive box last. Two children opened (hypothetically 
and actually) the boxes in the order neutral, positive and then negative and went on the 
discard the negative box first, neutral box second, and positive box last (hypothetically 
and actually). The remaining 12 children each produced a unique response pattern.
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Table 2.3; Summaiy of results of Configurai Frequency Analysis of children’s 
response patterns across all experimental tasks taken together (positive = Christmas 
present, neutral = cup, negative = monster) (n = 40)
P o sit iv e
Response Pattern
■ +-; N eu tra l =  N ; N e g a t iv e  =
Opening Tasks Discarding Tasks
H yp oth etica l (A ctu a l) F lyp oth etica l (A ctu a l) Frequency z
4 - N  - (4- N . ) - N  4- (- N- +) 14 *T 7.83
+  - N (4- _ Ï4) - N  4- (-  14 4k) 5 1.78
- N  + (- N 4-) - N  4- (-  N  + ) 4 1.10
~ +  N (- 74) -  4- N (- 74) > 0.44-
N + - (N 4- - ) - N  4- ( -  N 4-) 2 -0.24
T h e rem aining 12 ch ildren  each  p rod u ced  a u n iq ue  
re sp o n se  p attern  d ifferen t fro m  ea c h  oth.er and. the ab ove.
1 -0.91
*T significant response type at p < .001
Throughout the experimental procedure, children’s spontaneous comments were 
recorded. Although none of the children objected when they found the boxes to be 
empty, 11 (28 %) spontaneously remarked that they would prefer not to discard the 
positive box. Analysis of the behaviour of these children on the hypothetical opening 
task revealed that 7 had produced the response type (positive - neutral - negative), 3 
had selected the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box last and 1 had 
selected the negative, neutral and then the positive box.
To recap, three main findings emerged from this experiment. First, the children 
accurately verbally labelled the entities as pretend rather than real. Second, the 
children tended to open (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral box 
second and the negative box last and to discard (hypothetically and actually) the 
negative box first, neutral box second and the positive box last. Third, children’s 
behaviour did not differ across the hypothetical and actual versions of either the 
opening or discarding tasks.
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Discussion
The findings obtained in this experiment were clear. Consistent with previous research 
(Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Woolley & Phelps, 1994), the vast 
majority of children showed no difficulty or uncertainty when they were initially asked 
to verbally categorise the box contents as pretend or real. However, these children 
went on to respond in a highly systematic manner when they were asked to behave 
towards the boxes.
On each of the experimental tasks a single order of box selections emerged with 
statistically significant frequency. On the hypothetical and actual opening tasks the 
significant response type was selection of the box containing the pretend Christmas 
present first, the cup second and the monster box last. The significant response type 
that emerged on the hypothetical and actual discarding tasks was the reverse of that 
obtained on the opening tasks. A significant proportion of the children discarded the 
negative box first, the neutral box second and the positive box last. On the discarding 
tasks one of the possible response patterns did not emerge and some were generated 
by so few children that they emerged as significant response anti-types. However, this 
is likely to result from the dominance of the significant response type rather than being 
a psychologically meaningful effect in its own right. When children’s responses across 
all of the tasks taken together were considered, once again, a single response pattern 
emerged with statistically significant frequency - a significant number of children 
repeatedly opted to open the positive box first and discard it last and to discard the 
negative box first and open it last.
It was predicted that if the effects of increased cognitive availability were the cause of 
children’s systematic behaviour towards pretend objects, and if these effects could be 
constrained by empirical evidence of reality, there would be differences in children’s 
behaviour across the hypothetical and actual versions of the opening task. Actually 
opening the first box and finding it to be empty was expected to lead to a reduction in j
the effects of availability and that this would lead to a change in children’s beliefs |
about and behaviour towards the remaining boxes. However, several findings from j
this experiment suggested that this was not the case. I
First, the same response pattern emerged as statistically significant on the hypothetical 
and actual opening tasks. Second, these response types emerged with approximately 
the same frequency on both occasions. Third, only seven children produced a different
76
order of box selections on the actual opening task than they had done on the 
hypothetical version of that task. Finally, the consistency in children’s behaviour 
across the tasks was so great that a single response pattern, reflecting a combination of 
the significant response types on the individual tasks, emerged as significant when all 
of the tasks were analysed together. Taken together, these four related findings show 
that the empirical evidence of box contents obtained on actually opening the first box 
did not alter the children’s second and third choices relative to the hypothetical version 
of the task. There are several possible explanations for tliis finding. It could be the 
case that once children have predicted their behaviour, they feel committed to that 
particular course of action and cany it out regardless of any changes in their beliefs. 
That is, the consistency across the hypothetical and actual tasks might simply reflect 
children’s reticence to change their minds. An alternative possibility is that empirical 
evidence does not function as a constraint on the effects of availability and that seeing 
that the first box is empty is not sufficient to reassure children of the pretend status of 
the remaining entities. Alternatively, it could be the case that availability is not the 
primaiy cause of the children’s behaviour. Finally, it remains a possibility that the 
children did not experience any confusion about the pretend-reality distinction and 
were thus unaffected by the empirical evidence of reality. One additional finding that 
might be taken to support this latter explanation of the findings is the fact that none of 
the cliildren showed any overt signs of surprise, relief or disappointment when they 
opened the boxes and found them to be empty during the actual opening task. Surely 
if children had begun to wonder about the possible existence of the objects at least 
some of them would have made some comment.
However, an intriguing finding which might indicate some weakening of the 
pretend-reality distinction emerged from the analysis of children’s spontaneous 
comments. Approximately one third of the children in this experiment spontaneously 
remarked that they would prefer not to discard the box they were pretending contained 
their desired Christmas present. However, none of the children made any comparable 
comments regarding the monster or the cup. Why? There are several possibilities.
The first possible explanation is that the children who made these comments had begun 
to question the reality status of the Christmas present due to the effects of availability. 
The disparity between the comments relating to the Christmas present but not the 
monster or cup would be entirely consistent with this interpretation. This experiment 
was conducted very shortly before Christmas - the festivities and general levels of 
excitement about Christmas could of course contribute to the increased cognitive
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availability of the Christmas present but not the monster or cup. Intriguingly, ten of 
these eleven children who were reticent to discard the positive box had elected to open 
that box first (hypothetical task), suggesting that the verbal comments and response 
patterns on the box selection task could be linked with each other and perhaps also to 
the effects of availability. A less prosaic alternative explanation for these spontaneous 
comments relates to a methodological artefact in this experiment. The positive object 
was the only one of the three that the child was involved in selecting - perhaps 
children’s reticence to discard the Christmas present but not the cup or monster 
reflected the differential levels of the child’s mvolvement. Another alternative is that 
although children respond systematically towards positive and negative pretend objects 
they might perhaps be somewhat more concerned with increasing their positive affect 
than with decreasing their negative affect. Unfortunately, with the data as given it is 
not possible to distinguish between these possibilities.
The second issue addressed in this experiment related to the influence of differing 
forms of affect on children’s behaviour and how children respond when positive and 
negative affect are both evoked by the pretence. The findings relating to this issue are 
very clear. As Golomb and Galasso (1995) would suggest, the children behaved in 
ways which could be interpreted as increasing their positive affect (they opened the 
positive box first and discarded it last) and decreasing their negative affect (they 
discarded the negative box first and opened it last). These results suggest that children 
are concerned both to approach the positive pretend entity and to avoid the negative 
pretend entity. Had children been only concerned to avoid the negative entity, they 
should not have responded so systematically towards the positive and neutral ones. 
Similarly, if children were solely concerned to approach the positive entity, their 
responses to the others should have been less systematic. The finding that children 
respond systematically to positive and negative entities suggests that in Harris et al 
(1991 - experiment 3) the children had both sought the puppy and avoided the 
monster.
However, there was a sizeable number of children whose responses did not fit the 
modal response pattern described above, and whose behaviour therefore does not fit a 
straightforward interpretation of the Golomb and Galasso (1995) account. Some of 
these children could be discounted through having produced a perseverative response 
pattern - they selected the boxes in precisely the same order irrespective of the 
demands of the task. For example, these children may simply have shown a directional 
bias and selected the boxes from left to right. Yet perseverative response patterns
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accounted for the behaviour of a relatively small proportion of the children sampled. 
A more interesting group of children were the sizeable group who elected to open the 
positive box first and then the negative box before the neutral box. Taking this finding 
in isolation would result in two alternative interpretations of the motivation underlying 
this response pattern. First, that these children had not experienced the negative affect 
that is presumably associated with the monster. Or second, that contrary to Golomb 
and Galasso’s predictions, these children were deliberately behaving in a way that 
would increase negative affect. These conflicting possibilities emerge, at least in part, 
as a result of the ambiguity of opening tasks. A comparison of the behaviour of these 
children on the opening tasks with their behaviour on the less ambiguous discarding 
tasks clarifies their motivations. Seven of these eight children went on to discard the 
negative box first. Thus these children may indeed have wanted to avoid the monster 
and so presumably did experience the negative affect associated with it, but 
nevertheless they behaved in a way that increased their negative affect. The behaviour 
of these children is comparable to the behaviour of the children in Harris et al (1991 - 
experiment 4) who spontaneously opened the box they had pretended contained a 
monster. It is possible that these are children who enjoy the negative affect that is 
evoked by their pretence.
Taken together the results of this experiment show that during pretence tasks children 
are responsive to positive and negative affect such that they consistently respond in a 
way that increases positive affect and decreases negative affect. However, the 
behaviour of some children was not consistent with this model. In addition the 
findings suggest that either the availability hypothesis is not an adequate explanation of 
children’s behaviour, or that the effects of availability persist even after children have 
experienced empirical evidence that the objects are only pretend. The children’s 
spontaneous comments are highly suggestive however, that some children had 
experienced pretend-reality confusion and therefore that the influence of increased 
cognitive availability can not yet be mled out. In other words, it is not yet possible to 
determine whether the significant response patterns observed here were the result of 
pretence continuation, or were instead the behaviour of children who were uncertain 
about the pretend-reality status of the box contents, or both.
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Chapter 3; Experiment 2 
A developmental study of children’s sensitivity to the influence of affect and
empirical evidence on pretence
Introduction
The results fi'om experiment 1 suggested that children’s behaviour towards pretend 
objects was systematically influenced by the differing forms of affect evoked. 
Although there were some interesting exceptions, the children tended to prioritise their 
approach towards positive pretend entities and delay their approach towards negative 
ones. However, it was not possible to draw any firm conclusions regarding whether 
children’s responses reflected a continuation of the pretence (Golomb & Galasso, 
1995) or were instead indicative of pretend-reality confusion, nor whether any such 
confusion was caused by the effects of availability (Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall 
& Harnier, 1991; Jolmson & Harris, 1994). The differential levels of empirical 
evidence across the hypothetical and actual opening tasks did not influence children’s 
behaviour in the way that had been expected. Nevertheless, a sizeable number of 
children made comments that could be interpreted as reflecting pretend-reality 
confusion.
However, experiment 1 was conducted using a group of children within a very limited 
age range (five to six years old). The aim of the present experiment was to extend the 
findings obtained in experiment 1 across a broader age range (four to seven years old) 
in order to establish whether children’s sensitivity to empirical evidence and their 
responses to varying forms of affect differ developmentally. The failure to find 
differences between the hypothetical and actual opening tasks in experiment 1 does not 
preclude the possibility that such effects might emerge amongst differently aged 
children. It is possible, for example, that older children are more sensitive to the 
influence of empirical evidence on availability effects and are thus less susceptible to 
pretend-reality confusions. Older children are perhaps better able to use the 
information gained from seeing the outcome of the pretence to offset the increase in 
cognitive availability that the pretence causes. Furthermore, the differential effects of 
positive and negative affect might vary according to the child’s age - perhaps younger 
children are more concerned with negative affect than with positive affect. To explore 
these and other possibilities the present experiment followed the design used in 
experiment 1 across three groups of children:
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- 4 to 5 years old - younger
- 5 to 6 years old - middle
- 6 to 7 years old - older.
The younger group of children (four to five years old) sampled here were comparable 
to the younger children sampled by Han is et al (1991 - experiment 3 and experiment 
4) and the elder children in Golomb and Galasso (1995 - experiment 1 and experiment
2). The middle group of children (five to six years old) were equivalent to those who 
participated in experiment 1, the elder children in Harris et al (experiment 3 and 
experiment 4) and the middle group of children in Johnson and Harris (1994 - 
experiment 3). The older children (six to seven years old) sampled here were 
comparable to the eldest children who participated in Johnson and Harris (experiment
3). Thus the range of children who participated in the present experiment subsumed 
the most frequently sampled ages in previous experimental work using a similar 
paradigm.
There were two minor modifications to the design of this experiment compared to
experiment 1. First, the order of the opening and discarding tasks was
counterbalanced (as in experiment 1, the order of the hypothetical and actual versions 
of each task remained fixed such that children predicted their behaviour before 
carrying it out). Second, a series of additional memory checks were included. After 
making each box selection children were asked to confirm the pretend contents of the 
chosen box. This was to ensure that variability in children’s behaviour did not occur as 
a function of a box selection error caused by, for example, children forgetting what 
they had been asked to pretend was in each box.
Method
Subjects
Three groups of children (N = 98) were recruited from a predominantly middle class 
school in Hampshire. The younger group were 35 children (21 boys and 14 girls) aged 
between 4 years 6 months and 5 years 6 months (mean age 5 years). The middle 
group consisted of 33 children (20 boys and 13 girls) aged between 5 years 6 months 
and 6 years 6 months (mean age 6 years 1 month). The older group were 30 children 
(14 boys and 16 girls) aged between 6 years 7 months and 7 years 6 months (mean age 
7 years).
81
Procedure
The procedure used was identical to experiment 1 (see page 69) with two exceptions. 
First, the order of the opening and discarding tasks was counterbalanced (the order of 
the hypothetical and actual tasks remained constant as before). Second, after each box 
selection children were asked a memory check question - “Which one is that?” - the 
data were coded to reflect the child’s memory for the location of the pretend objects.
Results
Eight children failed the memory checks and so were not included in the analyses. The 
data for an additional child were lost due to an interaiption which required her to leave 
before completing the experimental procedure. Of the remaining 90 children (30 in 
each age group), 87 (97 %) responded correctly to the reality checks. Two of the 3 
children who incorrectly reported that the objects were real came from the younger 
age group, the other came from the middle age group.
The results of the CFA for the patterns of box selections on each of the experimental 
tasks are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Results of Configurai Frequency Analysis on children’s response patterns 
for each of the experimental tasks analysed separately (positive = Christmas present, 
neutral = cup, negative = monster) (n = 90)
Positive = + 
Neutral = N 
Negative = -
Opening Tasks 
Hypothetical (Actual)
Discarding Tasks 
Hypothetical (Actual)
Pattern frequency z frequency z
;+ N - 47 (44) *T 9.05 (*T 8.20)1 3 (2) *A -3.39 (*A -3.68)1
+ - N 18 (14) 0.85 (-.28)1 4 (5) ! *A-3.11 (*A -2.83)1
N + - 8 (13) -1.98 (-.57) 3 (3) *A-3.39 (*A<T39)
.N- + . 4 (5) *A-3.11 (*A -2.83)i 6 (12): *A .2.55 (-85)1
- N + 8 (4) -1.98 (*A-3.11)i 69 (58) *T 15.27 ( n  12.16)
- + N ■ 5 (10) * A -2.83 (-1.41) 5 (10) i *A -2.83 (-1.41)
*T significant response type at p < .001 
*A significant response anti-type at p < .01
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On the hypothetical opening task the significant response type was selection of the 
positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last (z = 9.05, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008). This response pattern represented the 
behaviour of 47 children. The second most fiequent (but non-significant) response 
pattern, generated by 18 children, was selection of the positive box first, negative box 
second and neutral box last. The remaining 25 children were distributed between four 
response patterns of which two emerged as significant response anti-types (see Table 
3.1). The results for the actual task were very similar to those for the hypothetical task 
- the same response pattern emerged as the significant response type (z = 8.20, p < 
.001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008) and accounted for the behaviour of a 
similar number of children (n = 44). Two significant response anti-types emerged, 
accounting for the behaviour of 9 children and the remaining 37 children were 
distributed between 3 non-significant response patterns (see Table 3.1).
On the hypothetical discarding task one pattern of response emerged as a significant 
response type and the remaining 5 response patterns emerged as significant response 
anti-types (see Table 3.1). The significant response type was for the negative box to 
be nominated first, neutral box second and the positive box last (z = 15.27, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008). This response pattern represented the 
behaviour of 69 children. A slightly different pattern of results emerged on the actual 
task compared to the hypothetical discarding task. The same response pattern 
emerged as the significant response type (z = 12.16, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment 
for p at .05 = .008) but accounted for the behaviour of slightly fewer children (n = 58). 
In addition, only 3 of the remaining 5 response patterns emerged as significant 
response anti-types (see Table 3.1).
Analyses comparing children’s responses across the hypothetical and actual versions of 
the tasks were conducted. Inspection of Table 3.2 revealed that on the opening tasks 
the majority of children either produced the response type (positive - neutral - 
negative) on both versions of the task (n = 38) or on neither (n = 37). Nine children 
changed from producing the response type on the hypothetical task to producing a 
different response pattern on the actual task. A further 6 children changed from 
producing one of the other response patterns to producing the response type. This 
degree of variability across the tasks was not significant (McNemar exact significance, 
p = .607). Further analysis of children’s performance across the two tasks (Table 3.3) 
revealed that of the 9 children who produced the response type on the hypothetical but 
not the actual task, 6 actually opened the positive box first, negative box second and
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neutral box last, 2 actually opened the negative, positive and then the neutral box and 
the last actually opened the neutral, positive and then the negative box. Of the 6 
children who produced the response type on the actual but not the hypothetical task, 4 
had hypothetically opened the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box 
last. There were 37 children who produced non-significant response patterns on both 
versions of the task - 25 of these children generated the same response pattern on both 
tasks. Overall, 27 children (30 %) produced different response patterns across the 
hypothetical and actual opening tasks. These children were equally distributed 
between the three age groups.
Table 3.2: Comparison of children’s response patterns across hypothetical and actual 
opening tasks (response type: positive - neutral - negative) - figures in brackets are for 
discarding tasks (response type: negative - neutral - positive) (n = 90)
Response Pattern on 
Hypothetical Task
Actual Task : Type i Other i
jType 1 38 (56) 1 6 (2) :
iOther i 9 (13) i 37 (19) 1
On the discarding tasks (Table 3.2) there was a significant degree of change in 
children’s behaviour (McNemar exact significance, p = .007). Although 56 children 
produced the response type (negative - neutral - positive) both hypothetically and 
actually and a further 19 children produced other response patterns on each occasion, 
13 children produced the response type on the hypothetical task but produced a 
different response pattern when actually discarding the boxes and the 2 remaining 
children produced the response type on the actual but not the hypothetical task. To 
investigate fully the nature of this variability in children’s behaviour, further analyses 
comparing children’s response patterns across the two versions of the task were 
performed. As can be seen from Table 3.3, of the 13 children who produced the 
response type on the hypothetical but not the actual task, 6 actually discarded the 
neutral box first, negative box second and positive box last, 5 actually discarded the 
negative, positive and then the neutral box, one discarded the positive, neutral and then 
the negative box and the last discarded the positive, negative and then the neutral box. 
Of the 19 children who produced the response type on neither task, 15 produced 
identical response patterns across the two versions of the discarding task. Overall, 19
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children (21 %) produced different response patterns across the hypothetical and 
actual discarding tasks. Only one of these children was from the older age group, the 
remainder (n = 18) were equally represented by younger and middle children.
Table 3.3: Analysis of the relationship between children’s response patterns across the 
hypothetical and actual opening tasks - figures in brackets are for discarding tasks 
(positive = neutral = N, negative -  -) (n = 90)
Hypothetical Opening Task (Hypothetical Discaydiag Tasli)
Actual Task + N - + - N N + - N -  + - N + - + N
+ N - 38 (1) 4 (-) - (-) - (-) 1 (1) ’ 1
+ - N 6 (I) : 8 (3) - (-) - (-) - (1) -
N + - 1 (-) 1 (-) 8 (2) - (1) 2 (-) 1
N - + - (-) 1 (1) - 0 ) 3 (4) I (6) -
- N + , - (1) , - (-) - (-) 1 (1) 3 (56) -
- + N 2 (■) 4 (-) - (-) - (-) 1 (5) 3 (5)
Analysis of the frequencies of each response profile on the hypothetical opening task 
according to age group (Table 3.4) revealed that whilst the response type was 
generated by similar numbers of younger (n = 12) and middle (n = 14) children, it was 
generated by more children from the older age group (n = 21). A slightly different age 
related trend was observed on the actual opening task. The response type was 
generated by similar numbers of middle (n = 17) and older (n = 16) children but 
somewhat fewer younger children (n -  11). Inspection of Table 3.5 suggests a more 
linear developmental trend for the children’s behaviour on the discarding tasks. On the 
hypothetical discarding task, 17 children from the younger age group produced the 
response type, 23 children from the middle age group did so, and amongst the older 
age group this response pattern was approaching ceiling - 29 of the 30 children 
responded in this manner. A similar trend also emerged on the actual discarding task. 
No other age related trends were apparent.
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Table 3.4: Summary of response patterns produced on the hypothetical opening task 
(actual opening task in brackets) presented according to age group (positive = +, 
neutral - N, negative = -) (n = 90)
R E S P O N S E  P A T T E  
Hypothetical (Actual)
Age + N - ^ + - N N + - N -  + - N + - + N
Younger 12 (11) 5 (5) 3 (4) 2 (2) 5 (3) 3 (5)
Middle 14 (17) 9 (3) 1 (4 ) 2 (2) 2 (0) 2 (4)
Older 21 (16) 4 (6) 4 (5) 0 (1) ^ I (1) 0 (1)
Total 47 (44) . 18 (14) 8 (13) 4 (5) 8 M) , 5 (10)
Table 3.5: Summai*y of response patterns produced on the hypothetical discarding 
task (actual discarding task in brackets) presented according to age group (positive = 
+, neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 90)
R E S P O N S E  P A T T E R N
Hypothetical (Actual)
lAge + N - 1 + - N N + -  ! N -  +  1 - N + 1 - + N
I Younger 3 (2) I 3 (4) 3 (2) 1 2 (6) 1 17 (13) I 2 (3)
Middle 0 (0) I 1 (1) 0 (1) : 3 (4) ; 23 (17) i 3 (7)
Older 0 (0) ' 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2) ’ 29 (28): 0 (0)
Total 3 (2) . 4 (5) 3 (3) 6 (12) 69 (58): 5 (10)
To further investigate these apparent age related trends in children’s behaviour a series 
of CFA were performed across the twelve trial response patterns generated across all 
four experimental tasks taken together. The results of these analyses which were 
performed taking each age group separately are summarised in Table 3.6. Irrespective 
of age, the same, single response type emerged - a significant number of children 
opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral box second and 
negative box last and discarded (hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, 
neutral box second and positive box last. Amongst the younger age group this 
response type accounted for the behaviour of 6 children (z = 4.20, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .002). A further 3 children produced a single 
(non-significant) response pattern by opening (hypothetically and actually) the positive 
box first, negative box second and neutral box last and discarding (hypothetically and
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actually) the negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last. The 
remaining 21 children produced unique response patterns.
Nine children from the middle age group behaved according to the significant response 
type (z = 6.28, p <.001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .003) and there were an 
additional 2 response patterns (non-significant) that were produced by more than one 
child. Two children opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral 
box second and negative box last and hypothetically discarded the negative box first, 
neutral box second and positive box last. However, when actually discarding the 
boxes these children selected the negative box first, positive box second and neutral 
box last. A further 2 children also opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive 
box first, neutral box second and negative box last and hypothetically discarded the 
negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last. However, these children 
actually discarded the neutral box first, negative box second and positive box last. The 
remaining 17 children in this age group produced unique response patterns.
Of the older age group, 15 children produced the significant response type (z = 6.78, p 
< .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .006). A further 5 cliildren hypothetically 
opened the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last but actually 
opened the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box last. These children 
hypothetically and actually discarded the boxes in the same order - negative box first, 
neutral second, and positive last. Four children responded by opening (hypothetically 
and actually) the neutral box first, positive second and negative last and discarded 
(hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, neutral second and positive last. 
The remaining 6 children produced unique response patterns.
The overall trend which is apparent from the CFA across all tasks taken together is 
that with increasing age, more children respond to the tasks by opening (hypothetically 
and actually) the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last, and 
discarding (hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, neutral box second and 
positive box last. This trend is shown clearly in Table 3.7 which presents the numbers 
of children producing the response type compared to the other response patterns taken 
together, according to age group. This distribution of frequencies was significant (%^  
= 6.3, df = 2, p < .05).
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Table 3.6: Summaiy of results of Configurai Frequency Analysis of response patterns 
across all experimental tasks taken together, presented according to age group 
(positive = Christmas present, neutral = cup, negative = monster) (n = 90)
Response Pattern
P o sitive = +; Neutral = N; Negative = - Age Group
Opening Discarding Younger Middle Older
Hypothetical (Actual) f z f z f z
+ N - (+ N -) - N + (-N4-) 6 *T 4.20 9 • *T 6.28 15 =^T 6.78
+ - N (+ - N) - N + (- N +) 3 1.52 1 -.42 1 -1.36
+ N - (+ N -) - N + (- + N) 2 .42
+ N - (+ N -)  . - N + (N -+ ) 2 .42
N + - CN + -) - N + (- N +) 4 .39
+ N - (+ -N ) - N + (-N + ) 5 ■ .97
N - + ( N- +)  . N - + ( N - + ) 1 -.27' 1 -.42
+ - N ( +- N) + - N ( + - N) 1 -.27 1 -.42
-N  + (N + -) ' - N + ( - N+) 1 -.27 1 ' -.42; '
N + - CN + -) ; - + N (- + N) I : -.27' I -.42
- N + ( - N+)  i - N + ( - N+) 1 : -.27! : 1 -1.36
+ -N • (+N- )  1 - N + (N- +) 7 1 I -.421 1+ -N (+N- )  1 - N + ( - N+) '; I 1 ! -.42| I -1.36
i The remaining 15 younger children, 20 middle children and 3 older children each 
produced a unique response pattern different from each other and the above.
*T significant response type at p < .001
Table 3.7: Children producing the response type across all tasks presented according 
to age group (n = 90)
Age Group
Response Pattern Younger Middle Older
Type 6 9 15
Other 24 21 15
An analysis of the spontaneous comments that children made during the experimental 
procedure revealed that 8 children (9 %) remarked that they would prefer not to open 
or to discard one of the boxes. Two of these children did not want to discard the 
positive box, one did not want to open the negative box and 5 neither wanted to open 
the negative box nor to discard the positive box. Interestingly, 7 of these 8 children
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had produced the response type (positive - neutral - negative) on the hypothetical 
opening task and the other had selected the positive box first, negative box second and 
then the neutral box. Only one child commented about the boxes being empty, 
remarking that she was relieved not to find a monster in the negative box. This child 
had hypothetically opened the positive box first, negative box second and then the 
neutral box but did not comment that she would prefer not to open or discard any of 
the boxes. An additional child, after discarding the boxes and returning them to the 
table in preparation for the opening tasks remarked, “Phew! At least I get my presents 
back”. This child opened the negative, positive and then the neutral box (hypothetical 
task).
Discussion
The results from this experiment were vei-y similar to those obtained in experiment 1. 
Although the vast majority of children accurately labelled the objects as pretend and 
not real, they tended to respond in a highly systematic manner when asked to behave 
towards those objects. On the opening tasks (hypothetical and actual) children most 
frequently selected the positive box first, the neutral box second and the negative box 
last, whilst on the discarding tasks (hypothetical and actual) the majority of children 
selected the negative box first, neutral box second and the positive box last. When the 
tasks were analysed together a single response pattern reflecting a combination of 
these individual response patterns was significant. That is, a significant number of 
children consistently opened the positive box first and discarded it last, and discarded 
the negative box first and opened it last, across all tasks. These significant response 
types were identical to those observed in experiment 1.
In the first experiment, it was argued that if the effects of availability caused children’s 
systematic behaviour towards the pretend objects and that if these effects could be 
constrained by empirical evidence of reality, then there should be differences between 
the children’s behaviour on the hypothetical and actual opening tasks but not the 
hypothetical and actual discarding tasks. In experiment 1 these differences did not 
emerge. Likewise, the children’s behaviour in this experiment did not differ 
significantly across the hypothetical and actual opening tasks. Indeed regardless of 
age, less than one tliird of the children actually opened the boxes in a different order to 
the one they had predicted on the hypothetical task. Interestingly, of these children 
one third changed between opening the positive, neutral and then the negative box and
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opening the positive, negative and then the neutral box. Why should some children say 
that they will open the monster box last (hypothetical task) but change their mind and 
actually open it second, and why should some children say that they will open the 
monster box second but actually open it last?
It is possible that the changes in the children’s behaviour across the hypothetical and 
actual opening tasks reflect the influence of empirical evidence on the effects of 
availability. That is, when the children actually open the positive box and find it to be 
empty, this influences their beliefs about the remaining pretend objects and their 
behaviour changes relative to the hypothetical task. In other words, those children 
who actually open the monster box second after saying they would open it last may 
have gained confidence about the pretend status of the monster after opening the first 
(positive) box and finding it empty. It seems vei*y unlikely that these changing patterns 
of behaviour are merely a reflection of box selection errors - the data were coded to 
reflect the child’s memory of which object was in the chosen box. Furthermore, the 
only other sizeable cluster of response patterns across the two versions of the opening 
task involved those children who said that they would open the positive, negative and 
then the neutral box but who actually opened the negative box first, and then the 
positive and neutral boxes. Thus the variability in children’s behaviour does not 
appear to be randomly distributed between the observed response patterns.
In contrast to the opening tasks, there were significant differences between children’s 
responses on the hypothetical and actual discarding tasks. Less than a quarter of the 
children actually discarded the boxes in a different order to that which they had 
predicted on the hypothetical task. However, the vast majority of these children 
changed from saying that they would discard the negative box first, neutral box second 
and positive box last, to actually discarding the boxes in a different order (it is this 
consistency in the direction of change that lead to the significant result being obtained). 
Most of these children either actually discarded the neutral, negative and then the 
positive box, or the negative, positive and then the neutral box. Thus like the opening 
tasks, there appears to be a systematic pattern to the changes in children’s behaviour. 
However, these variations across the hypothetical and actual discarding tasks are not 
suggestive of an effect of empirical evidence on availability since children do not obtain 
visual confirmation of the box contents on either version of the lask. Therefore it is 
likely that these differences reflect an effect of task order on children’s behaviour - the 
actual task always followed the hypothetical one. This being the case, the possibility 
that the differences between the hypothetical and actual opening tasks also merely
90
reflected a task order effect can not be ruled out. That said, the greater degree of 
variability across the opening tasks compared to the discarding tasks suggests that it is 
unlikely that there is absolutely no effect of empirical evidence on children’s behaviour 
during the actual opening task.
In experiment 1 it was argued that the children had behaved in ways which may have 
served to increase their positive affect and to decrease their negative affect. The 
children had selected the positive pretend object first and the negative one last on the 
opening tasks and discarded the negative pretend object first and the positive one last. 
The children in the present experiment seem to have been similarly motivated - the 
same patterns of results emerged amongst all three age groups. Despite the similarities 
between the age groups there did appear to be a developmental trend in the children’s 
behaviour. Whilst only a fifth of the four to five year old children consistently behaved 
such as to increase positive and decrease negative affect across all tasks, nearly one 
third of the five to six year old children and half of the six to seven year old children 
did so. This seems to suggest that children’s motivation to increase positive affect and 
to decrease negative affect becomes more consistent with age. It is unlikely that this 
finding merely reflects children becoming more accurate or reliable in their box 
selections - similar age related trends were also apparent from the analysis of each task 
separately.
It seems from the present results that, as Golomb and Galasso (1995) would argue, 
children might have been continuing their pretence with affectively appropriate 
behaviours when they made their box selections. Perhaps it is the tendency to do this 
which increases with age. However, there were three findings obtained in this 
experiment which are not consistent with such an interpretation. First, Golomb and 
Galasso’s pretence continuation account would predict that children would behave in 
ways that decrease rather than increase their negative affect. However, in this 
experiment, like experiment 1, a sizeable group of children opened the positive box 
first, and then the negative box second rather than leaving it until last. These children 
behaved in ways which may have increased their negative affect as well as their 
positive affect. Interestingly, although the ftequencies were too low for statistical 
analysis, this response pattern was more frequent amongst five to six year old children 
(middle age group) than amongst either the younger or older groups of children.
Second, contrary to Golomb and Galasso’s (1995) expectation that affectively 
appropriate pretence continuation would occur without pretend-reality confusion.
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there was some evidence of a possible breakdown of the pretend-reality distinction for 
a minority of children. A small group of children in this experiment spontaneously 
commented that they would prefer not to discard the Christmas present box, or to 
open the monster box, or to do both of these things. There were no comments 
referring to the affectively neutral pretend entity.
In experiment 1 the children’s spontaneous comments had exclusively focused on the 
Christmas present. This could have been attributable to the additional increased 
cognitive availability of this pretend object and not the monster or cup, that may have 
been generated by the ongoing Christmas festivities. This disparity between the levels 
of availability for the positive pretend entity compared to the negative and neutral 
pretend entities was eliminated in the present experiment which was conducted several 
months after Christmas (during March), thus cognitive availability for the Christmas 
present was reduced to a level equivalent to that for the monster and the cup - all three 
were elevated only by the pretence. In this experiment children’s comments referred 
to both the positive and negative objects, and ftirthermore, they were of markedly 
reduced prevalence compared to experiment 1. Taken together these changed findings 
suggest that the children’s spontaneous comments were attributable to the effects of 
increased cognitive availability and were perhaps suggestive of some uncertainty about 
the pretend-reality distinction. It may be that the children had begun to wonder if the 
objects were inside the boxes and so made additional attempts to retain the desirable 
object and avoid the feared one. The children’s comments also perhaps suggest that 
availability effects are more pronounced for affectively loaded pretend entities - no 
child made any comments about the neutral pretend object despite a presumably 
equivalent increase in cognitive availability. Interestingly, the vast majority of the 
children making these comments opened the positive, neutral and then the negative 
box (hypothetical opening). If these comments do reflect uncertainty about reality 
then it is interesting to note their association with this particular response pattern. It is 
possible that some of the other children who opened the boxes in this order had also 
become uncertain about the reality status of the pretence but did not make any 
comments.
The third finding that is difficult to reconcile with the Golomb and Galasso (1995) 
pretence continuation account was the observation that two children showed overt 
signs of having expected to find objects inside the boxes. One child described being 
relieved not to have found the monster in the negative box and yet when opening the 
boxes she had selected the positive box first and the negative box second rather than
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last. Similarly, another child expressed his relief at retrieving the positive box after 
having discarded it. These comments were made entirely spontaneously and do seem 
to suggest that these children had become uncertain about the pretend-reality 
distinction.
Overall, some aspects of the findings from this experiment were consistent with the 
Golomb and Galasso (1995) pretence continuation account. The children tended to 
behave in ways that could be interpreted as increasing their positive affect and 
decreasing their negative affect. However, there were also findings that were difficult 
to interpret using this account and which seemed to suggest some uncertainty in 
children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. Yet empirical evidence of 
reality did not significantly influence children’s behaviour. The predicted hypothetical 
versus actual differences on the opening tasks did not emerge. Thus there is a paradox 
within these findings - the data do not fully support the pretence continuation account 
but are also not fully consistent with the availability hypothesis (Harris et al, 1991; 
Johnson & Harris, 1994). This raises the possibility that the pretence continuation 
account offers an explanation for the behaviour of some children and that the 
behaviour of other children is best explained in terms of the effects of increased 
cognitive availability on their beliefs. In other words, perhaps these findings indicate 
individual differences between at least two separable groups of children. These data 
therefore perhaps support the Johnson and Harris dichotomy between credulous and 
sceptical children. However, whereas Harris et al had assumed that sceptical children 
would behave indifferently in box selection tasks, it may actually be the case that 
sceptical children are those who respond by moderating their experience of affect in 
the ways Golomb and Galasso suggest.
However, the prediction of differences between the hypothetical and actual opening 
tasks was dependent on two assumptions - that availability effects were the cause of 
children’s behaviour and that these effects could be constrained by providing empirical 
evidence of reality. That is, that being able to see that an object is only pretend would 
reduce the cognitive availability for the idea that the imagined object might be inside 
one of the boxes. The failure to find hypothetical and actual differences despite other 
indications of pretend-reality conftision suggests two things. First, that empirical 
evidence does not constrain the effects of availability. Second, that empirical evidence 
does influence children’s beliefs, but the evidence provided by the actual opening task 
was not sufficient to do so. This possibility is plausible - perhaps the children in these 
experiments opened the first box and saw that it was empty and experienced a
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corresponding reduction in availability for the pretence. The children were then asked 
to make a second selection - at this point they might have disregarded the evidence 
about the first box and so experienced increased cognitive availability for the pretend 
contents of the second and third boxes. That is, perhaps children treat each box as an 
independent pretend episode (Harris, 1996). This possibility was explored in 
experiment 3.
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Chapter 4: Experiment 3 
Children’s behaviour under conditions of minimal availability
Introduction
The findings from experiment 1 and experiment 2 were difficult to completely 
reconcile with either the pretence continuation account (Golomb & Galasso, 1995) or 
the availability hypothesis (Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall & Harmer, 1991; 
Johnson & Harris, 1994). Contrary to the prediction that the effects of availability 
would be constrained by the visual confirmation of the box contents obtained on 
actually opening the first box, the children tended to respond consistently across the 
hypothetical and actual versions of the opening task. This would seem to suggest that 
either the effects of increased cognitive availability were not influencing children’s 
behaviour and that they were perhaps simply continuing their pretence, or alternatively, 
that the effects of availability were not constrained by empirical evidence in the manner 
predicted. The first of these possibilities seems unlikely given that a number of 
children spontaneously made comments that were suggestive of pretend-reality 
confusion. However, it is possible that finding the first box to be empty was not 
sufficient to constrain the effects of increased cognitive availability because each box 
selection functioned as an independent pretend episode (Harris, 1996). That is, 
perhaps after the first box had been opened, levels of availability for the remaining 
pretend entities increased - the children were therefore not reassured of the status of all 
of the objects by finding that one of them was only pretend.
The simple but dramatic experimental manipulation of asking children to pretend about 
the contents of transparent rather than opaque boxes minimises the effects of 
availability and rules out the effects of children treating each box as independent. 
When transparent boxes are used, children are continually confionted with visual 
confirmation of the fact that the boxes are empty before, during and after every box 
selection, regardless of whether the task requires selection of a box to open or to 
discard, and regardless of whether the task is presented hypothetically or actually. 
Consequently, the increase in cognitive availability for the pretence which might have 
occurred between the end of one box selection (pretend episode) and the beginning of 
the next with opaque boxes, should not occur. The use of transparent boxes 
maximises empirical evidence of reality and hence, the possibility for cliildren to 
become uncertain about the reality status of the pretence is minimised. Put simply, the
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constant sight of the empty boxes must surely reassure children that the contents are 
pretend, not real.
If the effects of availability were the sole cause of children’s behaviour towards the 
pretend objects in the preceding experiments, the results observed in this experiment 
where the potential for availability to influence children’s beliefs is inhibited, should be 
different. When children no longer wonder about the box contents they should be 
indifferent, or at least less systematic, in choosing between them. In contrast, if 
pretence continuation without pretend-reality confusion led to the results of the 
preceding experiments, the present experiment should obtain very similar results since 
empirical evidence of reality should not impinge on children’s pretence behaviours. To 
test between these predictions, the present experiment followed the design and 
procedure used in experiment 2 but with a single modification - transparent rather than 
opaque boxes were used in the pretence tasks.
Method
Subjects
Three groups of children (N = 92) were recruited from a predominantly middle class 
school in Middlesex. The younger group were 32 children (16 boys and 16 girls) aged 
between 4 years 6 months and 5 years 5 months (mean age 4 years 11 months). The 
middle group consisted of 30 children (16 boys and 14 girls) aged between 5 years 6 
months and 6 years 5 months (mean age 5 years 11 months). The older group were 30 
children (16 boys and 14 girls) aged between 6 years 6 months and 7 years 4 months 
(mean age 6 years 11 months).
Procedure
The procedure used was identical to experiment 2 (see page 82) with the exception 
that the opaque boxes were replaced by three identical transparent (perspex) boxes of 
the same size ( 1 7 x 2 4 x 2 7  cm).
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Results
Two younger children failed the memoi*y checks and so were not included in the 
analyses. Of the remaining 90 children (30 in each age group), 4 children from the 
younger group failed the reality checks (96 % correct).
The results of the CFA for the pattern of box selections on each of the experimental 
tasks are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Results of Configurai Frequency Analysis on children’s response patterns 
for each of the experimental tasks analysed separately (positive = Christmas present, 
neutral = cup, negative = monster) (n = 90)
Positive = + 
Neutral = N
Opeuing Tasks Discarding Tasks
iNC^clLlVC---
! Pattern
my pu 
frequency Z
ciiiaij nypui
frequency! Z
..luai j
i+N- 53 (47) *T 10.75 (*T 9.05) 4 0 ) *A -3.11 (*A<3 39)
I+-N 14 (16) -.28 (28) 3 ( 4  1 *A-3.39 (*A<T11)
1N + - 8 (7) -1.98 (-2.26) 2 0 0  ! *A-3.68 (*A -3.39)
N - + 4 (3) *A-3.11 (*A-3.39) 6 (14)! *A -2-55 (-28)
- N + 3 (7) *A-3.39 (-2.26) 68 (60) : H=T 14.99 (*T 12.73)
- + N 8 0 0 ) -1.98 (-1.41) 7 (6) -2:26 (*A2.55)
*T significant response type at p < .001 
*A significant response anti-type at p < .01
On the hypothetical opening task the significant response type was selection of the 
positive box first, neutral box second and the negative box last (z = 10.75, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008). This response pattern represented the 
behaviour of 53 children. The remaining 37 children were distributed between 2 
significant response anti-types and 3 non-significant response patterns (see Table 4.1). 
On the actual opening task the same response pattern emerged as the significant 
response type (z = 9.05, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008) and 
accounted for the behaviour of a similar number of children (n = 47) as on the 
hypothetical opening task. However, amongst the remaining response patterns there
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was only one significant response anti-type - none of the other response patterns were 
significant (see Table 4.1).
On the hypothetical discarding task one pattern of response emerged as a significant 
response type and 4 of the remaining 5 response patterns emerged as significant 
response anti-types (see Table 4.1). The significant response type was selection of the 
negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last (z -  14.99, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008). This response pattern accounted for the 
behaviour of 68 children. A similar pattern of results emerged on the actual discarding 
task - the same pattern of response emerged as the significant response type (z = 
12.73, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008) and accounted for the 
behaviour of a similar number of children as it had on the hypothetical discarding task 
(n = 60). The remaining 30 children were distributed across 4 significant response 
anti-types and one non-significant pattern of response (see Table 4.1).
A comparison of children’s responses across the hypothetical and actual tasks is shown 
in Table 4.2. Forty-one children generated the response type (positive - neutral - 
negative) on both versions of the opening task and 31 did so on neither (23 of these 31 
children produced the same response pattern on both occasions). Twelve children 
changed from producing the response type on the hypothetical task to a different 
response pattern on the actual task - 8 of these children actually opened the positive 
box first, negative box second and neutral box last, 2 actually opened the neutral, 
negative and then the positive box and the remaining 2 children actually opened the 
negative, positive and then the neutral box. A further 6 children produced the 
response type on the actual task after having produced a different response pattern 
hypothetically. The variability in children’s behaviour was not significant (McNemar 
exact significance, p = .238).
Similarly, the degree of change in children’s response patterns on the hypothetical and 
actual discarding tasks was not significant (McNemar exact significance, p = .077). 
The majority of children either produced the significant response type (negative - 
neutral - positive) on both versions of the task (n = 56) or on neither (n = 18, 12 of 
these children produced the same response pattern on both versions of the task). 
Sixteen children changed their responses - 12 produced the response type 
hypothetically but actually discarded the boxes in a different order - 8 of these children 
actually discarded the neutral box first, negative box second and the positive box last, 
3 discarded the negative, positive and then the neutral box and the last discarded the
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positive, negative and then the neutral box. Four children actually discarded the boxes 
according to the response type after having generated a different pattern on the 
hypothetical task.
Table 4.2: Comparison of children’s response patterns across the hypothetical and 
actual opening tasks (response type: positive - neutral - negative) - figures in brackets 
are for discarding tasks (response type: negative - neutral - positive) (n = 90)
Response Pattern on 
Hypotheticat Task
Actual Task Type Other
Type 41 (56) 6 00
Other 12 (12) 31 (1 ^
Inspection of the frequencies of each response pattern produced on the hypothetical 
opening task according to age group (Table 4.3) revealed that amongst the younger 
children the overall response type was not the most frequently produced pattern. •
Whilst 8 younger children selected the positive, neutral and then the negative box, 10 
selected the positive box, then the negative box and then the neutral box. In both of ,
the other age groups, the response type was the most frequently produced order of |
box selections having been generated by 24 middle children and 21 older children.
Table 4.3: Summaiy of response patterns produced on the hypothetical opening task 
(actual opening task in brackets) presented according to age group (positive = +, 
neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 90)
R E S P O N S E  P A T T E R  
Hypothetical (Actual)
Age + N - + -  N N + - N -  + ■ - N + - + N
Younger 8 (10) 10 (V) 5 (4) 0 (0) , 2 (4) 5 (5)
Middle 24 (20) 2 (3) 0 (1) 2 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2)
Older 21 (17) 2 (6) 3 (2) 2 (I) ' 0 (1) 2 (3)
Total 53 (47): 14 (16) 8 (7) 4 (3) 3 0 )  , 8 (10)
The frequency data for the discarding tasks produced a slightly different pattern of 
results. As can be seen from Table 4.4, the response type was the most frequent
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response pattern in each age group and did not appear to be subject to any 
developmental trends - similar numbers of children produced the response type 
amongst the younger age group (n = 21), as in the middle (n = 24) and older (n = 23) 
age groups. No other age related trends were apparent on either the opening or 
discarding tasks.
Table 4.4: Summary of response patterns produced on the hypothetical discarding 
task (actual discarding task in brackets) presented according to age group (positive = 
+, neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 90)
R E S P O N S E  P A T T E R N
Age + N - + - N N + - N - + - N + - + N
Younger. 2 (1) . 1 (3) 0 (L) 2 0 )  21 0 9 ) 4 (3)
Middle 2 (2) 2 (1) 0 (1) 1 (5) 24 (20) 1 (1)
Older 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 3 (6) 23 (21) 2 (2) '
Total i 4 (3) ! 3 (4) : 2 (3) : 6 (14) i 68 (60): 7 (6) !
To further investigate the consistency in children’s behaviour across the hypothetical 
and actual versions of the tasks and the apparent age related changes in children’s 
behaviour, a series of CFA were performed across the twelve trial response patterns 
generated across all four experimental tasks taken together. The results of these 
analyses, which were performed taking each age group separately, are summarised in 
Table 4.5. The results of these analyses revealed that irrespective of age, the same 
pattern of response emerged as the only significant response type - a significant 
number of children opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral 
box second and negative box last and discarded (hypothetically and actually) the 
negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last. Amongst the younger age 
group this response pattern accounted for the behaviour of 5 children (z = 3.06, p < 
.001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .002). There were a further 5 response 
patterns that were produced by 2 children each (see Table 4.5). The remaining 15 
children each produced unique response patterns. The same significant response type 
was produced by 14 children from the middle age group (z = 8.78, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .003) and 16 children from the older age group (z 
= 8.92, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .004). In each of these age 
groups only 2 other response patterns were generated by more than one child - the
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remaining children produced unique response patterns. There were no other 
significant response types and no significant response anti-types in any of the age 
groups.
Table 4.5: Summary of results of Configurai Frequency Analysis of response patterns 
across all experimental tasks taken together presented according to age group (positive 
= Christmas present, neutral = cup, negative = monster) (n = 90)
Response Pattern
Positive = +; Neutral = N; Negative = - Age Groirp
Opening Discarding Younger , Middle Older
Hypothetical (Actual) f z f z f z
+ N - (+N-> - N + ( -N+) 5 *T 3.06 14 *T 8.78‘ 16 *T 8.92
- + N (- + N) - N + ( - N+) 2 .49!
N + - (+N- ) - N + 0T4+) 2 .491
+ - N (+- N) - N  + ( - N+ ) 2 .49 1 -.73!
-N  + ( -N+) - N + ( - N+) 2 .49
+ N - (+- N) - N  + ( - N+) 2 .49 3 .33
+ N - (+N- ) - N + ( N- +) 2 .00
+ N - (+N- ) + N - ( +N- ) 1 -.37 2 .00 '
+ -N (+-N) N - + 0 4 - + ) 2 .08
N + - (N + -) - + N (- + N) 1 -.37 1 .08
+ N - ( +- N) - N + ( N- +) 1 -.73 1 .08+ -N ( -N+) - N + ( - N+) I -.37 I -.73!
N + - (N + -) - N + ( - N+) 1 -.37! 1 .08
The remaining 11 younger children, 9 middle children and 6 older children each
produced a unique response profile different from each other and the above.
'T significant response type at p < .001
The overall trend that is apparent from the CFA across all four experimental tasks 
taken together is that the response type is produced in approximately equal frequencies 
amongst middle (n = 14) and older (n = 16) children but less frequently amongst the 
younger children (n = 5). This trend is shown clearly in Table 4.6 which shows the 
numbers of children producing the response type according to age group. This 
distribution of frequencies was significant (x^ = 9.63, df = 2, p < .01).
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Table 4.6: Number of children producing the response type across all tasks taken 
together, presented according to age group (n = 90)
Age Group
Response Pattern Younger Middle Older
Type 5 14 16
Other 25 16 14
To establish whether the use of transparent boxes led to a difference in children’s 
performance on the box selection tasks compared to when opaque boxes were used, a 
series of chi-squared analyses were performed. Table 4.7 shows the number of 
children from the younger age group who produced the response type (positive - 
neutral - negative) on the hypothetical opening task in the present experiment and in 
experiment 2 where opaque boxes were used. There was no significant difference 
between the results of the two experiments (x^ = 1.20, df = 1, p = .273), However, it 
is interesting to note that the response type was not the most frequently produced 
response pattern amongst younger children in the transparent box experiment - as 
previously noted, selection of the positive box first, negative box second and neutral 
box last was slightly more prevalent. There were no statistically significant differences 
in the younger children’s performance on the hypothetical discarding task across the 
two experiments (x^ = 1.14, df = 1, p = .284). Thus box transparency did not have a 
statistically significant effect on the behaviour of the four to five year old children.
Table 4.7: Younger children’s response patterns on the hypothetical opening task 
presented according to box type - figures in brackets are for the hypothetical 
discarding task (n = 30)
Response Pattern
Box Type Type Other
Opaque
Transparent
12 (17) 18 (13) ' 
; * 8 (21) : 22 (9)
The response type (+ N -) was not the most frequent response pattern - 10 children 
selected the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box last.
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In contrast, the behaviour of the middle group of children differed across the two 
experiments (Table 4.8). Significantly more children in the transparent boxes 
experiment produced the response type on the hypothetical opening task than had done 
so in the opaque boxes experiment (%- = 7.18, df = 1, p < .01). There were no 
differences in the middle children’s behaviour on the hypothetical discarding tasks 
across the two experiments (%^  = 0.98, df = l ,p  = .754).
Table 4.8: Middle children’s response patterns on the hypothetical opening task 
presented according to box type - figures in brackets are for the hypothetical 
discarding task (n = 30)
Response Pattern
Hex Type___________ Type_________Other
|Opaque 14 (23) 16 (7)
[Transparent : 24 (24) i 6 (6)
The results for the older group of children were non-significant for the hypothetical 
opening task (x^ = .00, df = 1, p = 1.00) but significant for the hypothetical discarding 
task (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .05) since more children discarded the boxes 
according to the response type in the opaque boxes experiment than in the transparent 
boxes experiment (Table 4.9).
Table 4.9: Older children’s response patterns on the hypothetical opening task 
presented according to box type - figures in brackets are for the hypothetical 
discarding task (n = 30)
Response Pattern
IBox Type 1 Type i Other 1
Opaque
Transparent
' 21 (29) ! 
. 21 (23) I
9 (1) :
9  I
Thus the three age groups were differentially influenced by the use of transparent 
boxes in this experiment. This is shown veiy clearly in Figure 4.1 which graphically 
represents the effect of transparency on the number of children in each age group
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producing the response type (positive - neutral - negative) on the hypothetical opening 
task. Given the prevalence of the positive - negative - neutral response pattern 
amongst the younger group of children, these figures have also been included for all 
age groups. The graph highlights how the main effect of transparency was to increase 
the prevalence of the response type amongst all age groups of children, but most 
strikingly so amongst middle children. In addition, the prevalence of the positive - 
negative - neutral response pattern was differentially influenced by box transparency 
according to age. Amongst the younger group of children this response pattern 
appeared more frequently, whereas in the middle age group it was dramatically 
reduced when transparent boxes were used. The prevalence of this response pattern 
was relatively stable amongst older children who rarely produced this order of box 
selections in either experiment.
Figure 4.2 presents the comparison results for the actual opening task. Whilst the 
profile of frequencies for the significant response type by age is similar to that shown 
in Figure 4.1, the differences generated by the use of transparent boxes were much less 
dramatic. Thus it would seem that box transparency was more influential on the 
hypothetical than on the actual version of the opening task.
An analysis of the spontaneous comments that children made throughout the 
experiment revealed that 7 children (8 %) remarked that they would prefer not to open 
or to discard one of the boxes. Three children did not want to discard the positive 
box, 2 did not want to open the negative box and a further 3 neither wanted to discard 
the positive box nor open the negative box. Of these children, 4 had produced the 
response type on the hypothetical opening task, 2 had opened the positive box first, 
negative box second and neutral box last and the remaining child selected the neutral 
box first, positive box second and negative box last.
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Figure 4.1: Numbers of children producing the response type (+ N -) and the positive 
- negative - neutral (+ - N) response pattern on the hypothetical opening task 
according to age and box type (n = 180)
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Figure 4.2: Numbers of children producing the response type (+ N -) and the positive 
- negative - neutral (+ - N) response pattern on the actual opening task according to 
age and box type (n = 180)
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Discussion
The design of this experiment allowed a direct test between the predictions made by 
the availability hypothesis (Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994) and the 
pretence continuation account (Golomb & Galasso, 1995) of children’s behaviour 
towards pretend objects. By confronting cliildren with continual empirical evidence
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that they were making decisions about empty boxes it was possible to measure 
children’s behaviour patterns when potential uncertainty about the reality status of the 
pretend entities was minimised. This experimental manipulation controlled for the 
effects of children treating each box as an independent pretend episode. It was 
predicted that if children’s responses in experiment 2 were generated by the effects of 
availability then the results of this experiment should be different in comparison. 
However, there should be no differences between the two experiments if the children 
were simply continuing their pretence according to the affect it evoked - whether or 
not the children were provided with empirical evidence of the pretence should be 
irrelevant.
In this experiment, the vast majority of children accurately reported that the contents 
of the boxes were pretend, not real. However, as in previous experiments the children 
went on to behave in liighly consistent ways - they tended to open (hypothetically and 
actually) the positive box first and the negative box last and to discard (hypothetically 
and actually) the negative box first and the positive box last. The neutral box 
repeatedly emerged as the children’s second selection. There were no differences 
between the hypothetical and actual versions of the tasks.
The significant response types which emerged in this experiment were identical to 
those which emerged in experiment 2 (the age related differences between the two 
experiments will be discussed separately). This similarity between the present 
experiment and that in which opaque boxes were used might be taken to suggest that 
children’s behaviour was unaffected by empirical evidence of reality and that the 
findings are therefore consistent with the Golomb and Galasso (1995) pretence 
continuation account. That is, in the absence of any confusion or uncertainty about the 
pretend-reality distinction, children behave towards pretend objects in ways which may 
increase their positive affect and decrease their negative affect.
However, in the preceding experiments a sizeable but non-significant group of children 
elected to open the positive box first, then the negative box second rather than leaving 
it until last. This response pattern also emerged frequently in this experiment. Thus 
the Golomb and Galasso (1995) pretence continuation account perhaps needs to be 
modified to include the possibility that although many children may indeed continue 
their pretence by acting in ways that increase their positive affect and decrease their 
negative affect, others may do so by behaving in ways that actually increase their 
negative affect as well as their positive affect. As Harris et al (1991 - experiment 4)
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also observed, some children prefer to approach rather than to avoid negative pretend 
entities.
Importantly, there were clear differences in the emergence of the negative box second 
response pattern across experiment 2 and experiment 3 which seem to represent both 
individual and developmental differences between children. Although it was slightly 
more prevalent amongst the middle group of children, in experiment 2 this pattern of 
box selections was relatively equally distributed across the three age groups. In 
contrast, in the present experiment opting to open the positive, negative and then the 
neutral box was noticeably more frequent amongst cliildren from the younger age 
group. Despite the obvious similarities in the findings from the two experiments, this 
difference suggests that empirical evidence of reality did influence at least some 
children’s behaviour. Further analyses confirmed that this was the case and that the 
magnitude and type of change in the children’s behaviour when transparent boxes were 
used were subject to developmental differences. The evidence for the effects of 
availability and empirical evidence on children’s behaviour will now be discussed 
taking each age group in turn.
A comparison of the behaviour of the four to five year old children (younger age 
group) revealed no statistical differences in the results of the present experiment 
compared to experiment 2. However, the children’s behaviour was not identical in the 
two experiments. When opaque boxes were used (experiment 2) just under half of the 
children selected the positive, neutral and then the negative box on the hypothetical 
opening task. In the present experiment where transparent boxes were used, this 
changed such that just under one third of the children produced this response pattern 
(this difference was not statistically significant). Moreover, when transparent boxes 
were used, the positive - neutral - negative response pattern was not the most frequent 
response pattern - over one third of the younger children selected the positive box 
first, the negative box second and then the neutral box. In experiment 2 this response 
pattern had been the second most frequently produced but had accounted for the 
behaviour of less than one fifth of the children. This change in the children’s behaviour 
is intriguing. Why should more children approach the monster box second when 
transparent boxes were used compared to when opaque boxes were used?
The evidence seems to suggest that four to five year old children are sensitive to the 
effects of increased cognitive availability and that ftirthermore, these children are 
influenced by empirical evidence of reality. When the effects of availability are
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minimised by continual reassurance of the reality status of the pretence, such children 
continue the pretence in one of two ways. As Golomb and Galasso (1995) would 
predict, some children behave in ways that can be interpreted as increasing positive 
affect and decreasing negative affect. Other children behave in a manner which may 
increase their negative affect as well as their positive affect. In contrast, when there is 
potential for uncertainty about the status of the pretence, these children avoid the 
monster - selecting it second may be too ‘risky’ or too frightening for any child who 
had begun to wonder if there really was a monster inside the box. Thus, selecting the 
negative box second was noticeably less fiequent when opaque boxes were used. 
These results strongly suggest that some of the younger children in experiment 2 were 
subject to the effects of increased cognitive availability. However, when the effects of 
availability were constrained by empirical evidence of reality they continued their 
pretence in predictable ways. In other words, the present findings suggest that 
amongst four to five year old children, at least some children experience 
pretend-reality confusion during pretence tasks.
The results for the middle age group of children (five to six years old) also differed 
across the two experiments. However, these differences were not the same as those 
obsei*ved for the younger children. The number of five to six year old children opening 
the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last increased significantly 
in the present experiment compared to experiment 2. Wliilst just under half of the 
children generated this response pattern when opaque boxes were used, over three 
quarters did so when transparent boxes were used. In addition, whilst in experiment 2, 
one third of the children opened the positive, negative and then the neutral box, very 
few (less than 10 %) did so in this experiment. The increase in the number of children 
selecting the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last is of the same 
magnitude as the decrease in the number of children selecting the positive box first, 
negative box second and neutral box last. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest 
that these changes are related.
It would appear that amongst five to six year old children, selection of the negative 
box second and not last reflects some uncertainty about the pretend-reality status of 
the imagined entities. When such uncertainty was minimised by the use of transparent 
boxes, this response pattern was inhibited. It seems therefore that unlike younger 
children, when middle children select the negative box second they do so out of 
wondering about the pretend-reality status of the contents and not out of continuation 
of the pretence. Those middle children who do continue their pretence, do so by
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increasing their positive affect and decreasing their negative affect - this response 
pattern increases in prevalence when possible doubts about the reality status of pretend 
entities are minimised.
Interestingly, with the two box design used by Harris et al (1991 - experiment 3) the
behaviour of the younger and middle children would have looked identical. These
children would have all selected the positive then the negative box irrespective of their 
differing beliefs. Without the inclusion of a third, neutral, pretend object as a repeated 
measure, the relative position of the positive and negative objects would have been 
difficult to interpret. This might help to explain why Harris et al failed to observe 
consistent developmental trends in their experiments.
The behaviour of the older children (six to seven years old) was similar in the present 
experiment compared to experiment 2. The same number of children opened the 
positive, neutral and then the negative box regardless of levels of empirical evidence of 
reality. This supports the idea that these children experience little or no uncertainty 
about the pretend-reality distinction and indeed continue their pretence by increasing 
their positive affect and decreasing their negative affect in the way that Golomb and 
Galasso (1995) have suggested. Furthermore, very few six to seven year old children 
in either experiment responded by opening the negative box second rather than last.
However, to argue that none of the children in any age group who selected the
positive, neutral and then the negative box in experiment 1 and experiment 2 had
wondered about the pretend-reality status of the objects would be premature. In 
experiment 2 this response pattern could well have been generated by some children 
due to genuine uncertainty about the pretend-reality distinction. The same response 
pattern could be differently motivated in this experiment compared to experiment 2, 
and could be differently motivated for different children within that experiment. 
Further empirical work is needed to establish the meaning of the positive, neutral, 
negative response pattern when it emerges under conditions of potentially high 
availability, such as when opaque boxes were used in experiment 2.
To recap, in this experiment children were confronted with continual empirical 
evidence that they were pretending about empty boxes. The potential for the effects of 
availability to lead to pretend-reality confusion were therefore minimal. The 
comparison of the results of the present experiment with experiment 2 where empirical 
evidence of box contents was limited and thus the potential for availability was high.
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suggests that both the availability hypothesis (Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Hanis, 
1994) and the pretence continuation account (Golomb & Galasso, 1995) can explain 
children’s behaviours and that there are also developmental effects as well as individual 
differences in children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction.
Several important findings have emerged from the three experiments conducted to 
date. First, when children pretend about separate boxes these are treated as 
independent pretend episodes and thus the influence of empirical evidence on 
children’s beliefs and behaviour can be minimal. For example, in experiment 1 the 
differential empirical evidence across hypothetical and actual opening tasks was not 
influential but in this experiment, empirical evidence had considerable impact on the 
children’s behaviour since it was continual. Second, the effects of availability do 
influence some children’s beliefs about pretend objects. Children’s sensitivity to these 
effects is age sensitive and thus four to six year old children (younger and middle age 
groups) were more subject to pretend-reality confusion than six to seven year old 
children (older group). This evidence supports the developmental progression 
observed by Johnson and Harris (1994). Third, the effects of availability are 
constrained by empirical evidence of reality when this is provided continually, 
throughout the pretence. Finally, there are age related differences in the ways that 
children continue their pretence. Four to five year old children’s treatment of negative 
affect is rather different to that of five to seven year old children. Overall, these 
findings suggest that there are individual and developmental differences between at 
least two separable groups of children - some who are subject to the effects of 
increased cognitive availability and others who are not, and who instead continue their 
pretence in terms of their reactions to the affect that the pretence evokes. In other 
words, credulous children who experience pretend-reality confusion due to the effects 
of availability exist alongside sceptical children who continue the pretence theme when 
choosing between boxes.
I l l
Chapter 5: Experiment 4a 
The hierarchical organisation of affect in pretence
Introduction
In the preceding experiments, the task design allowed children to simultaneously 
approach positive pretend entities and avoid negative ones. In Golomb and Galasso’s 
(1995) terms, it was possible for children to behave in ways that could both increase 
their positive affect and decrease their negative affect. The most frequently generated 
response patterns across these experiments were indeed those in which children 
appeared to simultaneously approach positive pretend entities and avoid negative ones. 
All issue relating to the influence of affect on children’s pretence which emerges from 
these findings, is whether the children were literally simultaneously approaching 
positive pretend entities and avoiding negative ones, or whether these affective 
concerns were hierarchically organised such that one was prioritised over and above 
the other. Clearly the children were concerned with both types of affect (the neutral 
object was repeatedly placed as the children’s second selection), however it is possible 
that the children were most concerned to reduce negative affect and that the decision 
to increase positive affect was made as a second and separate decision. Alternatively, 
children might have been most concerned to increase positive affect and only decided 
to respond to negative affect after having dealt with their primary concern. With the 
three box serial selection task design used in experiments 1 to 3, it is not possible to 
distinguish between these alternatives.
The present experiment was designed to assess the hierarchical organisation of affect 
in pretence by forcing children to prioritise a response to either positive or negative 
affect. In this experiment the children were asked to pretend that one box contained 
their preferred Christmas present and that a second box contained a scaiy monster. 
The children were then invited to choose to either open both of the boxes or to 
discard both of the boxes. This forced the children to decide between approaching the 
positive entity or avoiding the negative one - they could not do both.
Why might children in this experiment choose to open both of the boxes? There are 
several possibilities. First, this response might indicate that children prioritise their 
approach towards positive pretend entities over and above any motivation that they 
may have to avoid negative ones. This possibility can be sub-divided into two further
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interpretations - that this response is a result of pretence continuation, or that it is a 
result of pretend-reality confusion. Second, some children might open the boxes 
because they want to increase their negative affect. For example, some cliildren in 
Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall and Harmer (1991 - experiment 4) chose to open the 
box that they were pretending contained a monster. Likewise, in the present research 
a sizeable group of children chose to open the negative box second rather than leaving 
it until last. Third, children might simply open the boxes due to task demands - boxes 
are more typically associated with opening than discarding. Finally, children may feel 
self-conscious about discarding a box that they know to be empty and therefore open 
it. There are also several possible explanations for why children might choose to 
discard both boxes. First, children might prioritise the reduction of negative affect. 
Second, children might be truly credulous and discard the boxes out of avoidance of a 
‘real’ monster. Third, children might discard the boxes because they are empty - they 
know there is nothing to be gained by opening them.
To overcome the problems in interpreting children’s behaviour, two additional 
measures were included in the design of this experiment. First, the task was presented 
to some children using opaque boxes and to others using transparent boxes. The use 
of transparent boxes in pretence tasks affords an opportunity to explore children’s 
behaviour when the effects of increased cognitive availability are minimised. The 
continual empirical evidence of box contents that confronts the child throughout the 
pretence should be sufficient to reassure them that the imagined entities are not real. It 
is highly unlikely that any child should wonder about the pretend-reality status of the 
objects. In this experiment the comparison of children’s responses according to box 
type (opaque or transparent) should provide some indication of whether the 
hierarchical organisation of affect differs according to potential levels of availability 
and uncertainty about the pretend-reality distinction.
Second, children were asked to explain the reasons for their decisions. In this 
experiment the children were asked to decide whether to open or discard the boxes 
(hypothetical task) and then to carry out their decision (actual task). Subsequently, the 
children were asked to explain their behaviour. Although previous researchers have 
asked children to justify their behaviour towards pretend objects (Harris et al, 1991; 
Johnson & Harris, 1994) it has not yet been possible to do so in this research. When 
serial box selection tasks are used there is an inherent problem in asking children to 
explain their behaviour. If cliildren are asked to explain their first choice, they might 
become self-conscious about their behaviour and how they can explain it, and thus
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respond differently on subsequent selections. However, if children are asked about 
their behaviour on the last selection they may find the question impossible to respond 
to - the box they have just chosen was the only one available to them. The present 
experiment was therefore designed as a single trial task to allow children to be 
interviewed about their behaviour without risk of influencing their subsequent 
behaviour.
Johnson and Harris (1994 - experiment 3) asked children to justify their behaviours 
towards pretend objects using a closed ended question. This enabled Johnson and 
Harris to categorise children into one of three groups:
- credulous - children who wondered if the objects were inside the boxes
- sceptical - children who were certain that the objects were merely pretend
- unsure - children whose responses indicated both credulity and scepticism.
In the present experiment an open ended question format was used. This allowed the 
credulous-sceptical dichotomy to be generated from the children’s responses but also 
ensured that any subtle differences in the children’s responses according to age, box 
type (opaque or transparent) or task response (opening or discarding the boxes) could 
be detected. For example, unlike the closed ended question, the open ended version 
allowed children to report uncertainty about the status of one pretend object but not 
the other. Analysis of the children’s justifications for their behaviour should therefore 
assist in the interpretation of the children’s motivations for electing to open or discard 
both of the boxes and thus clarify the hierarchical organisation of affect in pretence.
Method
Subjects
Three groups of children (N = 133) were recruited from two predominantly middle 
class schools in Middlesex and Surrey. The younger group were 41 children (21 boys 
and 20 girls) aged between 4 years 4 months and 5 years 5 months (mean age 4 years 
11 months). The middle group consisted of 53 children (21 boys and 32 girls) aged 
between 5 years 5 months and 6 years 6 months (mean age 5 years 11 months). The 
older group were 39 children (18 boys and 21 girls) aged between 6 years 6 months 
and 7 years 7 months (mean age 7 years). The children were allocated to either the 
opaque boxes condition or the transparent boxes condition.
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Procedure
The procedure was identical in the two conditions with the single exception that in the 
opaque boxes condition two identical cardboard boxes (measuring 17 x 24 x 27 cm) 
were used whereas in the transparent boxes condition two identical transparent 
(perspex) boxes (measuring 1 7 x 2 4 x 2 7  cm) were used.
The children were tested individually by the author in a quiet area of their school. 
When the child arrived the boxes were situated in a row on a table. When the child 
had settled she/he was asked to look inside both boxes and to confirm that they were 
empty.
The order of introduction to the pretend objects was counterbalanced. Whilst 
introducing the pretend objects the experimenter used appropriate intonation in her 
voice - enthusiastic for the positive object (Christmas present) and dramatic for the 
negative object (monster). The order of the hypothetical and actual tasks was fixed 
such that the children were always asked to predict their behaviour before actually 
canying it out. The order of mention of the decision options (open or throw away) 
was counterbalanced between children, remaining constant for'each child.
Task introduction. The task and pretend objects were introduced, “It doesn’t matter 
that the boxes are empty because we are going to play a game of pretend. I expect 
you’re good at pretend games aren’t you? . . .  Is there something that you would 
really, really like for Christmas this year? . . . What is it? . . . OK, I want you to 
pretend that the (named object} you want for Christmas is in this box. And, I want 
you to pretend that there is a horrible, mean monster that wants to come out and chase 
you, in this box”. The boxes were indicated left to right.
M enioiy check. The child’s memory for the nature and location of the pretend 
objects was then checked, “OK, now can you tell me what you are pretending is in this 
box?”. This question was repeated for both boxes indicated left to right. If the child 
responded inconectly to either of the memory checks they were reminded of the 
objects to be pretended and the memory checks repeated.
Reality check. The child’s understanding of the pretend-reality status of the entities 
was checked, “Is the (name of object} really in this box or are you pretending?”. This 
question was repeated for each box indicated right to left. Incorrect responses were 
not corrected.
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Hypothetical task. The child was asked, “If you could choose to either open all of 
the boxes or throw away all of the boxes, what would you do, would you open them 
all or throw them all away'i'”.
Actual task. Once the child had made their hypothetical decision they were asked to 
act, “OK, you show me now, you either open all of the boxes or throw all of the boxes 
away”.
Justification question. Children were asked to give the reasons for their decision, 
“Why did you choose to open/throw away all of the boxes?”.
Debrief. Before returning to their classroom the child was asked to check that the 
boxes were empty and thanked for their help.
The children’s decisions were recorded in writing along with any verbal comments that 
were made.
Results
Eight children failed the memory checks and so were not included in the analyses. In 
addition one child refused to participate in the experiment. Of the remaining 124 
children (54 in the opaque boxes condition and 70 in the transparent boxes condition) 
one younger child from each condition failed the reality checks (98 % correct).
Opaque boxes condition
The results from the hypothetical version of the task for the children in the opaque 
boxes condition are presented in Table 5.1. These results show that the majority of 
children (n = 43, 80 %) responded that they would open the boxes rather than discard 
them. The dominance of this opening bias appeared to be unaffected by age, however 
the frequencies were too low to permit statistical analysis.
The same pattern of results was observed in the actual version of the task - the 
majority of children (n = 45, 83 %) opened both boxes. There were very few children 
who changed their response across the two versions of the task (Table 5.2) - 42 
children predicted that they would open both boxes and went on to actually do so and 
8 children opted to discard the boxes both hypothetically and actually. Four children
116
changed their response - 3 said that they would discard the boxes (hypothetical task) 
but actually opened them and the other actually discarded the boxes after saying that 
they would open them. Tliis variability in children’s behaviour was not significant 
(McNemar exact significance, p = .625).
Table 5.1: Children’s responses to the hypothetical task presented according to age 
group - opaque boxes condition (percentages in brackets) (n = 54)
Age Group
Response Younger Middle Older
Opened 15 (79% ) 16 (76%) 12 (86 54)
Discarded 4 (21 %) 5 (24%ü 2 (14% )
Table 5.2: Comparison of children’s responses across hypothetical and actual tasks 
opaque boxes condition (n = 54)
Actual Task -t----------— ----------------- ------- 11 Opened | Discarded |
'Opened 42 ' 3 !
Discarded 1 : 8 1
The children’s verbal responses to the question of why they had opened or discarded 
the boxes were allocated to one of the following mutually exclusive categories;
- object presence
- statements of pretend status of objects or lack of box contents
- uncertainty
- don’t know
- other reasons unrelated to the pretence.
Responses categorised as ‘object presence’ were those in which the child referred to 
one or both of the objects actually being inside the boxes. In the opaque boxes 
condition, such responses were given by 5 younger children, 11 middle children and 5 
older children. Of these 21 children, 16 had opened the boxes - when justifying their 
decision to open the boxes, 6 (38 %) of these children referred to the Christmas 
present only:
“ . . To get the toy out. . .”
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. . S o l  can get my racing car track. .
. . Because Tm so desperate to have the Pocahontas Barbie doll. . .”
“. . . Because there’s presents in them. .
“. . . Because I wanted to get the dolly out. .
“. . . Because my scalectrics was in one of them. .
Five children (31 %) referred to both the Christmas present and the monster:
“. . . It was a very nice thought to have a vegetable patch. I like it very much. 
I thought I could keep the vegetable patch and put up with the monster in case 
it ate up my vegetable patch. . .”
, . Because there’s a monster inside and a baby inside. . .”
“. . . I wanted to see if the monster was still in that one and the Lion King still 
in that one. . .”
, I could get the gun and shoot the monster. . .”
“. . . Because the dragon was in one and the toy was in the other. . .”
Only one of the children giving object presence justifications for opening the boxes (6 
%) referred only to the negative entity when explaining their behaviour:
“. . . A good question. Because I wasn’t afi aid of the monster in that box, . .” 
Several children, 4 (25 %) did not refer specifically to any object:
“. . . Because I’ve seen sometliing in it. . .”
“. . . Because I thought something was really inside it. . .”
“. . . Because I thought that there was something in there. . .”
". . . I thought it was in there. . .”
Thus clearly, those children who opened the boxes and who then referred to the 
presence of objects in the boxes tended not to refer to the monster alone. Instead, 
such children tend to refer either exclusively to the Christmas present, or to both 
pretend objects. In contrast, of the remaining 5 children who gave object presence 
justifications for their behaviour, all of whom discarded the boxes, 4 (80 %) explained 
that their behaviour was due to the presence of the negative pretend entity:
. . Because the monster’s inside one and I didn’t want the monster to come 
out. . .”
“. . . I don’t want to open them because one had an ugly monster in. . .”
“. . . Because there is an ugly monster in one. . .”
“. . . Because I didn’t want the monster to chase me. . .”
One child who discarded the boxes did not specify the object but referred to it being 
the negative one in generic terms:
“. . . I didn’t like something in there. . .”
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Responses categorised as restating the pretence or commenting on the lack of box 
contents accounted for just 2 younger children who both opened the boxes:
. . Because there isn’t anything in it. . .”
“. . . Because I knew I was just pretending. . .”
Children categorised as showing ‘uncertainty’ were those whose responses indicated 
that they were not sure whether the objects were inside the boxes and were checking 
to see if this was the case. Two younger children, 3 middle children and 4 older 
children gave such responses. All 9 of these children had opened the boxes;
Because I didn’t know what was inside. . .”
To see what’s in there. . .”
To see if there was something inside it. . .”
Because I wanted to see what’s in them. . .”
Because there might be something good in there, so it’s best not to throw 
them away, it’s best to open them to see if there’s something little in there. . .” 
“. . . Because you don’t know if there was anything in there. .
“. . . Because there might be a teddy in there. . .”
“. . . To see if there was anything in them. . .”
“. . . Because I wondered what was in there. . .”
A sizeable group of children (n = 22) gave justifications for their behaviour that were 
unrelated to the task. These children included 2 younger children, 1 middle child and 1 
older child who simply said that they didn’t know why they had opened/discarded the 
boxes. However, 8 younger children, 6 middle children and 4 older children gave 
reasons that either related to some literal use or property of the boxes, or claimed that 
they had simply done what they had wanted to do:
“. . . Because they were hon ible. . .”
“. . . Because it’s not veiy nice to throw. . .”
. . Because I like colouring the outside and I could string them up and 
pretend it’s a train and put people in it. . .”
. Because they would be good to hide in. . .”
. Because if I moved house I might need them. . .”
. Because they aren’t much use. . .”
. Because we wouldn’t have another one. . .”
. Because I like to. .
. Because I wanted to. . .” (n = 4)
. Because I like opening boxes. .
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. . Because I like opening presents. . .”
“. . . Because 1 don’t want them. . .”
. . Because I don’t want to throw them away. . .”
“. . . Because I think it’s a better thing than throwing them away. . .”
“. . . I just wanted to open them. . .”
Transparent boxes condition
The results for the children in the transparent boxes condition were similar to those 
obtained in the opaque boxes condition. As can be seen from Table 5.3, the majority 
of children (n = 62, 89 %) responded to the hypothetical version of the task by electing 
to open rather than discard the boxes. Within the younger and middle age groups this 
opening bias was virtually at ceiling - 94 % and 97 % of the children respectively. 
Amongst the older children a somewhat smaller proportion (n = 18, 75 %) elected to
open the boxes. However, given the small cell sizes it was not possible to further
investigate this apparent age related trend.
Table 5.3: Children’s responses to the hypothetical task presented according to age 
group - transparent boxes condition (percentages in brackets) (n = 70)
Age Group
Response Younger Middle Older
Opened 15 (94%) 29 (97%) 18 (75%)
Discarded 1 (6 %) I (3%%, : 6 (25 %)
Table 5.4 shows a comparison of children’s responses across the hypothetical and 
actual versions of the task. The majority of children (n = 60) elected to open the boxes 
hypothetically and actually and 4 discarded the boxes on both versions of the task. Six 
children varied their response - 4 responded that they would discard the boxes 
(hypothetical task) but actually opened them and 2 actually discarded the boxes after 
having said that they would open them. This variability in children’s behaviour was 
not significant (McNemar exact significance, p = .688).
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Table 5.4: Comparison of children’s responses across hypothetical and actual tasks 
transparent boxes condition (n = 70)
Hypothetical Task
Actual Task Opened Discarded
Opened 60 4
Discarded 2 4
A comparison of the number of children electing to open and discard the boxes on the 
hypothetical task according to experimental condition (Table 5.5) revealed no 
significant differences (%2 = 1.88, df = 1, p = .171). Analyses taking each age group 
separately also revealed no significant differences for the younger (Fisher’s exact 
probability, p = .347) and older (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .684) age groups. The 
results for the middle age group were approaching significance (Fisher’s exact 
probability, p = .07).
Table 5.5: Comparison of children’s responses across the opaque and transparent 
boxes conditions (hypothetical task) (n = 124)
Response
Box Type Opened Discarded
Opaque 43 11
Transparent 62 8
In terms of the children’s justifications for their behaviour, object presence responses 
were the most frequent type in the transparent boxes condition (3 younger children, 7 
middle children and 13 older children). Amongst these 23 children, 18 had opened the 
boxes. Of these children, 11 (61 %) explained their behaviour in terms of the 
Christmas present:
. . Because I wanted to get my fly dancer out. . .”
“. . . Because if I threw them both away I wouldn’t get the roller blades - it 
seems as they’re really in the box, they’re so clearly in my mind. . .”
“. . . To get my rabbit out. . .”
. . Because I wanted my Lego. . .”
. . Because it would be really nice to play with Shelley. . .”
“. . . Because if I threw the Nintendo game away I wouldn’t get it. . .”
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. 1 would like the roller skates and didn’t want to throw them away. . .”
. . Because I wanted the rabbit. . .”
. . Because I’ve always wanted a doll. . .”
“. . . Because I want the computer and I don’t have the choice to open one. .
“. . . Because I could get my skateboard. . .”
Two children referred to the positive and negative entities;
“. . . S o l  could get my favourite thing to chop the monster up so it couldn’t 
chase me. . .”
“. . . Because I really wanted to get my sabre tooth and tiger sabre so I took 
the monster and put somewhere so it wouldn’t come out. . .”
Four children did not specify a particular object:
“. . . Because there are things in them. . .”
“. . . S o l  could get it out of there. . .”
“. . . To get it out. . .”
. . Because I wanted to get my things out. . .”
A further child referred only to the negative object:
“. . . Because I want to break that monster up, that’s why. . .”
Of the 5 children who discarded the boxes and then went on to refer to the presence of 
objects in the boxes, 3 referred to the negative entity:
. . Because I don’t want the monster to come out. . .”
“. . . Because there’s a monster in one of them. .
“. . . Because if I opened both of them the monster would just jump out and try 
chase me. . .”
The remaining 2 children referred to the positive and negative entities:
“. . . Because one has the monster in and one has the mouse-trap in. . .”
“. . . Because I didn’t want the monster wrecking my new toy. . .”
Uncertainty was expressed by 8 children (1 younger, 4 middle and 3 older). All of 
these children had opened the boxes;
“. . . Because 1 like to see what’s in there. . .”
“. . . Because it, to see if it worked. . .”
“. . . Because you might get something good in them. . . “
“. . . Because I wanted to see what’s inside them. . .”
“. . . Because that’s the best way to do it, just to see if it’s just pretend or if
there’s something in it or nothing in it. . .”
“. . . To see what was in there. . .”
“. . . Because there might have been something in it. . .”
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. . Because there might be something exciting in them. .
The lack of any objects in the boxes was mentioned by just 2 children, both of whom 
opened the boxes:
“. . . Because I knew there was nothing in it to hurt me. . .”
“. . . Because there’s nothing in there. . .”
Once again, a sizeable group of children (n = 17) responded that they did not know 
why they had opened or discarded the boxes. A further 20 children gave other reasons 
that were unrelated to the pretence:
. . Because we don’t like people throwing things away. . .”
. . Because it would be horrible if you throwed them in the bin and I don’t 
want to be horrible in this school. . .”
“. . . I f  I threw them away then they would have crashed. . .”
“. . . Because if you throw them away they might break. .
“. . . Because then it wouldn’t be a waste of glass or money, . .”
. . Because if 1 put them in the bin they won’t fit in there because the bin’s 
too small. .
. If I threw them away they will smash. . .”
. Because I don’t like throwing things away. . .”
. Because I did. . .”
. Because I wanted to. . .” (n = 3)
. Because I wanted to and I like to. . .”
. Because I don’t want to throw them away. . .” (n = 2)
. Because I like opening boxes. . .”
. Because they could be handy. . .”
. Because I wanted to keep things in them. . .”
. To give them away. . .”
. So they could get fresh air. . .”
Table 5.6 summarises these data according to age group and experimental condition. 
The main age related differences in children’s responses were the decrease in the 
number of children giving reasons not related to the pretence with age, and the 
increase in references to the objects being inside the boxes. Across conditions, the 
main difference is in the greater number of children giving reasons unrelated to the 
pretence for their behaviour in the transparent than in the opaque boxes condition.
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Throughout the experiment, children’s spontaneous comments were recorded. Five 
children (9 %) in the opaque boxes condition and 11 children (16 %) in the transparent 
boxes condition spontaneously commented that they would prefer to treat each box 
independently. That is, these children wanted to open the positive box and discard the 
negative box, rather than opening or discarding both. Thirteen (81 %) of these 
children went on to actually open the boxes, the remaining 3 children discarded the 
boxes.
Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the influence of affect on children’s 
pretence. The preceding experiments demonstrated that children behave in ways 
which are consistent with the motivation to increase positive affect and to decrease 
negative affect. In the present experiment these two motivations were placed in direct 
conflict in order to establish which would be prioritised when children were prevented 
from responding to both. Will children open both boxes, thus increasing their positive 
and their negative affect, or will they instead discard both boxes thus decreasing 
positive as well as negative affect?
The majority of children in each age group and in each experimental condition elected 
to open rather than to discard the boxes. This behaviour could have any one of a 
number of possible underlying causes. However, the children’s justifications for their 
behaviour and the comparison of the opaque and transparent boxes conditions in which 
levels of empirical evidence of reality varied, allowed a ffiller interpretation of the 
children’s behaviour.
First, the children could have opened the boxes because they prioritised positive affect 
over negative affect due to pretend-reality confusion. That is, the children may have 
become uncertain about the pretend-reality status of one or both of the pretend objects 
and consequently decided to seek the positive one, somehow managing to dismiss their 
uncertainty or feelings about the negative object. The children’s justifications suggest 
that this could be the case. Many children explained their decision to open the boxes 
solely in terms of the presence of the Christmas present inside the box. Furthermore, 
those children who did refer to the negative entity often did so in the context of 
explaining how they could evade it, or in terms of dismissing the negative affect that it 
could potentially have evoked. An additional group of children explained their
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decision to open the boxes in terms of their uncertainty about what might have been 
inside them. This relationship between the children’s behaviour and their verbal 
justifications supports the claim that some children were credulous about the possible 
existence of the pretend objects.
Second, the children might have opened both boxes in order to prioritise positive affect 
as part of a continuation of the pretence. In other words, some children, particularly 
those in the transparent boxes condition where the effects of availability were severely 
constrained, may have been entirely sceptical and never questioned the reality status of 
the pretend entities. Instead, these children simply responded in terms of their 
enjoyment of the positive affect evoked by the pretence. Indeed the prevalence of 
comments relating to objects being inside the boxes amongst children in the 
transparent box condition suggests that for at least some children this is the case. 
Even though these children could see that there was nothing inside the boxes, they 
often spoke of their wish to obtain the contents.
Third, children might have opened the boxes due to task demands, i.e. that boxes are 
more frequently associated with opening rather than with discarding. Once again, this 
does seem to be true for some cliildren - a sizeable proportion of the children explained 
their behaviour in terms unrelated to the pretence. For example, some children 
described how the boxes might be useful (or not) in a literal (non-pretence) setting 
such as moving house.
How can the behaviour of those children who elected to discard both of the boxes be 
explained? These children tended to refer to the presence of the monster inside the 
box and often they described their desire to avoid it. Interestingly, somewhat (but not 
statistically significantly) more children in the opaque boxes condition, than in the 
transparent boxes condition, discarded the boxes. There are two possible explanations 
for this finding. First, that discarding is most commonly associated with credulity, or 
uncertainty about the pretend-reality distinction - children are most concerned to avoid 
a scaiy entity when they are uncertain about whether or not it is real. Thus in the 
transparent boxes condition when the effects of availability are reduced, this behaviour 
becomes less frequent. Second, it is possible that this difference between the 
conditions is related to a feature of the experimental design - that children are reticent 
to discard transparent boxes for fear of breaking them. This could be because the 
perspex looked rather like glass. Indeed, several children reported that they could not 
discard the transparent boxes for this reason.
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Overall, even if those children who seem to be responsive to task demands are 
excluded, the fact remains that the children in this experiment were most likely to open 
both boxes and to explain their behaviour in terms of the contents of those boxes, in 
particular, their preferred Christmas present. In contrast, those children who discarded 
the boxes tended to refer to the monster and their wish to avoid it. Overall, it would 
seem that for most children, when they are forced to prioritise positive or negative 
affect, they prioritise positive affect regardless of their age and relatively independent 
of the potential for availability to lead to wondering about the box contents.
One important feature of the design of this experiment was the use of an open-ended 
question for eliciting children’s justifications for their behaviour. This was in contrast 
to the Johnson and Harris (1994) closed ended question which forced cliildren into 
responding credulously (admitting to wondering) or sceptically (claiming to be certain 
the boxes were empty). One drawback of the closed ended question is that it does not 
allow children to express the full possible range of reasons for their behaviour. For 
example, those children who refer to their excitement about one object or how they 
will use the positive pretend object to overcome the negative one, would simply not 
emerge from a closed ended question. Clearly the use of an open ended question 
elicits a greater proportion of ambiguous and don’t know responses and makes the 
credulous-sceptical distinction less easy to identify, but as tliis experiment has shown, a 
straightforward dichotomy between credulous and sceptical children cannot readily 
accommodate all the children’s reported belief states. Furthermore, this variety in 
children’s responses to the open ended question assists in the interpretation of the 
observed behaviours.
Overall, this experiment has demonstrated that affect in pretence is hierarchically 
organised such that positive over-rides negative. The issue of how this relates to 
children’s performance on the serial box selection tasks will be considered in 
experiment 5. In the meantime, experiment 4b returns to the issue of developmental 
effects in children’s response to affect in pretence.
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Experiment 4b 
The hierarchical organisation of affect in pretence: 
A developmental comparison
Introduction
The preceding experiments have shown that whilst some children are sensitive to the 
effects of increased cognitive availability and are therefore subject to pretend-reality 
confusion during pretence tasks, others simply continue the pretence in affectively 
appropriate ways, remaining confident of the pretend-reality distinction. Furthermore, 
these experiments suggest a developmental trend in children’s sensitivity to availability 
whereby four to six year old children (younger and middle age groups) show more 
signs of credulity than six to seven year old children (older age group).
Flowever, there remains an empirical question regarding the prevalence of 
pretend-reality confusion amongst pre-school children. Previous research (Golomb & 
Galasso, 1995; Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Woolley & Phelps, 1994) 
has used participants as young as three years old but due to the differing 
methodologies and research questions across these experiments, no consistent 
developmental trends can be detected. Thus the question remains, is pretend-reality 
confusion more prevalent amongst pre-school children than amongst four to five year 
old children? In addition, possible developmental changes in the way in which children 
hierarchically organise affect during pretence have yet to be investigated.
To address these questions the present experiment was a direct replication of 
experiment 4a using a sample of three and a half to four and a half year old children. 
The forced choice task design was used in preference to the serial box design used in 
experiment 2 and experiment 3 for two main reasons. First, the forced choice design is 
simpler and required less prolonged attention than the twelve trials of the serial box 
selection tasks - pilot work indicated that the attentional and memory demands of the 
serial tasks were too great for pre-school children. Second, the single trial design of 
the forced choice task allowed children to be interviewed about their behaviour. Thus 
like experiment 4a, in this experiment it was possible to relate the children’s behaviour 
in two experimental conditions (opaque boxes and transparent boxes) to their 
expressed beliefs about the pretend-reality distinction.
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Method 
Subjects
Thirty-eight children (23 boys and 15 girls) aged between 3 years 6 months and 4 years 
6 months (mean age 4 years) were recruited from a nurseiy group based in a 
predominantly middle class school in Middlesex. The children were allocated to either 
the opaque boxes or the transparent boxes condition such that there were 20 children 
(12 boys and 8 girls) aged between 3 years 6 months and 4 years 6 months (mean age 
4 years) in the opaque boxes condition and 18 children (11 boys and 7 girls) aged 
between 3 years 7 months and 4 years 5 months (mean age 4 years) in the transparent 
boxes condition.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in experiment 4a (see page 115).
Results
Five children failed the memory checks and so were not included in the analyses. Of 
the remaining 33 children (18 in the opaque boxes condition and 15 in the transparent 
boxes condition) 8 failed the reality checks (76 % correct). Six of these children were 
from the opaque boxes condition and 2 from the transparent boxes condition.
Opaque boxes condition
On the hypothetical version of the task, 11 children (61 %) decided to open the boxes 
and the remaining 7 children (39 %) decided to discard them. This opening bias was 
also evident in the actual version of the task (Table 5.7) since only 2 children changed 
their responses - both of these children said that they would discard the boxes 
(hypothetical task) but actually opened them. This variability in the children’s 
behaviour was not significant (McNemar exact significance, p = .500).
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Table 5,7: Comparison of children’s responses across hypothetical and actual tasks 
opaque boxes condition (n = 18)
Hypothetical Task
Actual Task Opened Discarded
Opened 11 2
Discarded 0 5
Transparent boxes condition
The results from the children in the transparent boxes condition also showed an 
opening bias. On the hypothetical version of the task, 13 children (87 %) decided to 
open the boxes and the remaining 2 children (13 %) decided to discard them. Three 
children changed their responses across the two versions of the task - one child said 
that they would open the boxes (hypothetical task) but actually discarded them and 2 
children opened the boxes after having said they would discard them (Table 5.8). This 
variability in the children’s behaviour was not significant (McNemar exact significance,
p =  1.00).
Table 5.8: Comparison of children’s responses across hypothetical and actual tasks 
transparent boxes condition (n = 15)
Hypothetical Task
Actual Task________ Opened______Discarded
Opened 12 2
Discarded 1 0
Inspection of the results (hypothetical task) suggests that the number of children 
discarding the boxes was higher in the opaque boxes condition (39 %) than in the 
transparent boxes condition (13 %). However, ftirther analyses revealed that this 
difference was not statistically significant (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .134).
Justification Questions
Table 5.9 shows the results of the analysis of children’s responses to being asked why 
they had opened or discarded the boxes. Like experiment 4a, the children’s 
justifications were categorised into five categories;
- object presence
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- statements of the pretend status of the objects of the lack of box contents
- uncertainty
- don’t know
- other reasons unrelated to the pretence.
In the opaque boxes condition, 3 children gave justifications relating to specific objects 
being inside the boxes;
. , Because I like the boomerang and the monster. . .”
. .For  the watch. .
“. . . Because I wanted them, the Cliristmas tree. . .”
Such responses were also given by one child in the transparent boxes condition;
“. . . Because Pocahontas was in. . .”
Uncertainty about whether or not there were objects in the boxes was expressed by 
none of the children in the transparent boxes condition and just one child from the 
opaque boxes condition;
“. . . Because I wanted to see if there was a video inside. . .”
Responses categorised as re-stating the pretence, or referring to the lack of box 
contents were offered by one child fi'om each condition;
“. . . I was pretended. . .”
. . Because there’s things in, I’m pretending there’s a monster in this box and
I’m pretending there’s a tricycle in this box. . .”
All of the remaining responses (13 in each condition) were unrelated to the pretence. 
Four children in the opaque boxes condition and 5 in the transparent boxes condition 
simply said that they did not know why they had opened or discarded the boxes. The 
remaining children gave a variety of other reasons;
. Because. . .”
. I wanted to. . .” (n = 3)
. Because that way you get them out. . .”
. Because I did. . .”
. Because I wanted to play another game. . .”
. Because I wanted to. . .” (n = 5)
. Because when I’m at home, my mummy’s got boxes at home and I open 
mummy’s boxes. . .”
. . I just wanted to. . .”
. . Because I just did. . .”
. . I just did. . .”
. . Because I like that. . .”
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It was not possible to flirther analyse these data in terms of task response (opening 
versus discarding) or experimental condition given that the majority of responses (72 
% in the opaque boxes condition and 86 % in the transparent boxes condition) 
involved reasons not related to the pretence.
Table 5.9: Summary of children’s responses to being asked \^  hy they had opened or 
discarded the boxes presented according to experimental condition (figures in brackets 
are percentages) (n = 33)
Justifications Justifications Unrelated
Related to Pretence to Pretence
Experimental
Condition
Object
Presence
Uncertainty Object
Absence
Don't Know Other
Reasons
Opaque boxes 
Transparent boxes
3 (17%) 
1 (7%%
1 (5.5%) 
0 (0 94)
1 (5.5%) 
1 (7%%
4 (22%)
5 (33 %) :
9 (50%) 
8 (53 94)
Analysis of the children’s spontaneous comments revealed that three children (2 from 
the opaque boxes condition and one from the transparent boxes condition) remarked 
that they would prefer to open the positive box and discard the negative box rather 
than acting on them simultaneously.
Discussion
In this experiment, like experiment 4a, the majority of children elected to open rather 
than to discard the boxes, regardless of whether or not the effects of availability had 
been constrained by empirical evidence. Thus, these pre-school children behaved in 
ways that can be interpreted as suggesting that the motivation to approach the positive 
pretend entity was greater than any motivation that the children may have had to avoid 
the negative pretend entity.
However, there were indications that at least some of the children in this experiment 
were subject to the effects of increased cognitive availability for the pretence and as a 
result had experienced some confusion over the pretend-reality distinction. First, 
nearly a quarter of the children responded incorrectly to the reality check questions. 
This is a dramatic contrast to the preceding experiments in which over 90 % of the
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children correctly labelled the objects as pretend, not real. This finding could be 
interpreted in one of two ways. It is possible that the pre-school children in this 
experiment responded incorrectly due to a failure to understand either or both of the 
terms ‘pretend’ and ‘real’. However, if this was the case then children who failed the 
reality check questions should have been equally divided between the two experimental 
conditions. They were not. Instead, these children were predominantly (over three 
quarters) from the opaque boxes condition. Therefore the alternative interpretation of 
these reality check failures seems more likely. That is, that these children had indeed 
become uncertain about the reality status of the pretend objects even before they had 
been asked to act towards them. This interpretation is consistent with the difference 
between the two experimental conditions - when children were faced with continual 
empirical evidence that the box contents were not real they were reassured of the 
reality status of the objects and therefore responded correctly to the reality check 
questions. This finding is similar to an earlier result obtained by Woolley and Wellman 
(1993) who found that many three year old children verbally reported that an imagined 
entity would be real.
The second finding that is suggestive of some weakening of the pretend-reality 
distinction was the difference in the results for the two experimental conditions. 
Although this difference failed to reach statistical significance it was striking. In the 
opaque boxes condition, over a third of the children elected to discard the boxes. 
However, when children were provided with continual empirical evidence that the 
boxes were empty and the contents only pretend (transparent boxes condition) vei*y 
few children (13 %) discarded the boxes. This suggests that for at least some children, 
discarding the boxes is motivated by uncertainty about the reality status of the pretend 
objects - when such uncertainty is minimised this response is dramatically reduced.
The number of children discarding the boxes was greater in this experiment than in any 
of the age groups sampled in experiment 4a. This suggests that with decreasing age, 
the proportion of children who are sensitive to the effects of increased cognitive 
availability increases. This experiment has therefore demonstrated a continuing 
developmental trend in children’s sensitivity to increased cognitive availability for the 
pretence. However, this experiment has also demonstrated the problems associated 
with studying vei^ y young children’s understanding of pretence. Pre-school children 
are more likely than even the youngest school aged children to fail the memory check 
questions. Furthermore, very few of these young children gave interpretable responses 
when asked to explain their behaviour. Therefore, the remaining experiments in this
13:
thesis focused on school aged children (four to seven years old) who have already been 
demonstrated to be subject to the effects of availability but who experience very few 
difficulties in answering the memory checks and can quite competently provide 
justifications for their behaviours.
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Chapter 6: Experiment 5 
The relationship between beliefs, behaviour and the hierarchical organisation of
affect in pretence
Introduction
The results of experiment 2 showed that the most frequent response patterns were 
those in which children opened the positive box first and discarded it last, and 
discarded the negative box first and opened it last. Thus the children seemed to be 
motivated both to approach the positive pretend entity and to avoid the negative one. 
In experiment 4a, where they were prevented from responding to both of these 
motivations, children tended to prioritise their approach towards the positive pretend 
entity over their avoidance of the negative entity - they opened rather than discarded 
the boxes. Furthermore, whilst some children explained their behaviour in terms 
unrelated to the pretence, others responded in ways that could be interpreted in terms 
of either pretend-reality confusion or pretence continuation.
The aim of the present experiment was to explore the relationship between how 
children hierarchically organise affect in pretence and their beliefs about the 
pretend-reality distinction. This experiment was therefore designed to investigate 
possible associations between children’s behaviour on the serial box selection tasks 
(experiment 2), their behaviour on the forced choice task (experiment 4), and the 
children’s justifications for their behaviours. If the variations in children’s behaviour 
on the tasks used in this research do, as has been assumed, reflect underlying individual 
and developmental differences in children’s understanding of the pretend-reality 
distinction, there should indeed be relationships between the two types of task and the 
justifications that children subsequently offer for their behaviour, when these are 
assessed on a within-subject basis. Evidence of associations between the various 
methodologies used in this research is vital in validating the claim that there are 
identifiable groups of children who differ in terms of their susceptibility to 
pretend-reality confusions. What form might these associations take?
On the serial box selection tasks, some children generated random and perseverative 
response patterns. Similarly, on the forced choice task some children opened the 
boxes and explained their behaviour in terms that were unrelated to the pretence. It is 
possible that these two findings represent the behaviour of comparable children - a
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group of children who are so sceptical that they respond indifferently or in terms of 
task demands during pretence tasks. In contrast, those children who selected the 
boxes according to the most frequent response pattern, whereby positive entities were 
approached whilst negative ones were avoided, may correspond to those children who 
opened the boxes during the forced choice task and explained their behaviour in terms 
of pretence continuation or pretend-reality confusion.
There are a further two particularly interesting groups of children to be considered in 
this experiment. First, during the box selection tasks a sizeable (although 
non-significant) group of children opened the negative box after the positive box, 
rather than leaving it until last. However, amongst five to six year old children (middle 
age group), this response pattern was of considerably reduced prevalence when the 
effects of availability were constrained by the use of transparent boxes (experiment 3). 
It was argued that these children were perhaps those who were uncertain of the 
pretend-reality distinction. If so, how will these children behave on the forced choice 
task - will they continue to approach the monster box earlier than is absolutely 
necessary and therefore open the boxes? Furthermore, will they explain their 
behaviour in terms of their uncertainty about the pretend-reality distinction? Second, 
in experiment 4a some children discarded the boxes when faced with the choice to 
open or discard both of them. Although it was not statistically significant, there was a 
trend towards less children discarding the boxes when these were transparent. It could 
therefore be the case that for some children discarding the boxes is motivated by 
pretend-reality confiision which is reduced by the empirical evidence of reality 
provided by the transparent boxes. How will such children respond on the serial box 
selection task and how will they explain their behaviour?
To explore these issues, the children in this experiment were asked to pretend about 
the contents of opaque boxes and then to predict the order in which they would open 
and discard those boxes (serial box selection tasks). The children were also asked to 
decide to either open all of the boxes or to throw them all away (forced choice task). 
The actual versions of the tasks were omitted to simplify them by reducing the number 
of trials presented to each child. Subsequently, the children were asked to explain why 
they had chosen to open or discard all of the boxes. However, the order of the serial 
and forced choice tasks was counterbalanced - to avoid interference with the serial box 
selection task the justification questions were only addressed to children who 
completed the forced choice task last.
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The justification questions were asked using two formats - the open-ended question 
format used in experiment 4a, and the closed-ended format used by Harris, Brown, 
Marriott, Whittall and Harmer (1991) and Johnson and Harris (1994). Thus the 
children were asked why they had opened or discarded the boxes and then whether 
they had wondered if the objects were inside the boxes or if they knew that the boxes 
were empty. The order of the open and closed ended questions was fixed to avoid the 
children’s responses to the open ended question being influenced by their responses to 
the closed ended version. The match or mismatch between the children’s responses to 
the open and closed ended versions of the question should help to reduce the 
ambiguity in interpreting the beliefs of children who report that they opened or 
discarded the boxes due to the presence of objects inside them. It was possible that 
these cliildren were either reporting genuine uncertainty about the reality status of the 
pretend objects or alternatively that they were reporting the pretend contents of the 
boxes and thus responding in pretend mode. The children were also asked a short 
series of follow up questions assessing their understanding of the generative powers of 
pretence. These questions were based on those used by Harris et al (experiment 4) 
and Johnson and Harris (experiment 3).
Method 
Subjects
Three groups of children (N = 90) were recruited from a predominantly middle class 
school in Hampshire. The younger group were 35 children (16 boys and 19 girls) aged 
between 4 years 7 months and 5 years 5 months (mean age 5 years). The middle 
group were 27 children (13 boys and 14 girls) aged between 5 years 6 months and 6 
years 6 months (mean age 6 years). The older group were 28 children (13 boys and 15 
girls) aged between 6 years 6 months and 7 years 6 months (mean age 7 years).
Procedure
The procedure was based on Experiment 2 and Experiment 4a (see pages 82 and 115 
respectively). The children were tested individually by the author in a quiet area of 
their school. When the child arrived the identical cardboard boxes (measuring 17x24 
X 27 cm) were situated in a row on a table. When the child had settled she/he was 
asked to look inside all the boxes and to confirm that they were empty.
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The order of introduction to the pretend objects was counterbalanced. In addition, 
half the subjects completed the serial opening and discarding tasks first (the order of 
these was counterbalanced), the remainder completed the forced choice task first. At 
the end of the first task (serial or forced choice) the child checked once more that the 
boxes were empty and these were then placed to one side. The experimenter then 
commented “OK, now let’s do something a bit different” and placed an appropriate 
number of boxes for the second task on the table (3 for the serial task or 2 for the 
forced choice task). The second task commenced with the standard task introduction 
with the exception that the Christmas present the child had nominated for the previous 
task was used - the child was not asked to make a second selection. As in all previous 
experiments, whilst introducing the pretend objects the experimenter used appropriate 
intonation in her voice - enthusiastic for the positive object (Christmas present), 
dramatic for the negative object (monster) and normal for the neutral object (cup).
Task introduction (serial tasks). The task and pretend objects were introduced 
using the procedure used in experiment 2, “It doesn’t matter that the boxes are empty 
because we are going to play a game of pretend. I expect you’re good at pretend 
games aren’t you? . . .  Is there something that you would really, really like for 
Christmas this year? . . . Wlrat is it? . . . OK, I want you to pretend that the (named 
object} you want for Christmas is in this box. Now look, this is my coffee cup (child 
shown a plain cup} it’s empty now but that doesn’t matter, I want you to pretend that 
my empty coffee cup is in this box. And, I want you to pretend that there is a horrible, 
mean monster that wants to come out and chase you, in this box”. The boxes were 
indicated left to right.
Memory and reality checks. The wording and procedure for the memory and reality 
checks was identical to that used in previous experiments.
Hypothetical opening task. The child was asked, “If I asked you to open one of the 
boxes, which one of the boxes would you open?”. This was repeated until the three 
boxes had been nominated.
Hypothetical discarding task. The child was asked, “If 1 asked you to throw away 
one of the boxes, which one of the boxes would you throw away?”. This was repeated 
until all three boxes had been nominated.
Task introduction (forced choice task). The task introduction followed the 
procedure used in experiment 4 - “It doesn’t matter that the boxes are empty because 
we are going to play a game of pretend. I expect you’re good at pretend games aren’t 
you? . . .  Is there something that you would really, really like for Christmas this year? .
. . What is it? . . . OK, I want you to pretend that the (named object} you want for 
Christmas is in this box. And, I want you to pretend that there is a horrible, mean 
monster that wants to come out and chase you, in this box”. The boxes were indicated 
left to right.
Memory and reality checks. These were identical to those used in the serial task.
Hypothetical task. The child was asked, “If you could choose to either open all of 
the boxes or throw away all of the boxes, what would you do, would you open them 
all or throw them all away?”.
Justification questions. These questions were only presented to children who 
completed the forced choice task second. Question 1 was identical to the justification 
question used in experiment 4. Questions 2 , 3 , 4  and 5 were based on Harris et al 
(1991 - experiment 4) and Johnson and Harris (1994 - experiment 3).
1) “Why did you choose to (open/throw away} all of the boxes?”
2) “Did you think there would be nothing inside the boxes or did you think to yourself 
T wonder if there’s a (Christmas present} or a monster inside?”’
3a) “How did you think the (Christmas present}/monster would get inside the box?” 
or,
3b) “How did you know the (Christmas present}/monster wouldn’t be inside the 
box?”
4) “What would happen if you pretended vei-y, very hard that there was a (Christmas 
present}/monster in that box there? Would there suddenly be a (Christmas 
present}/monster inside the box if you pretended very hard?”
5a) “Why?” or,
5b) “Why not?”
Debrief. Before returning to their classroom the child was asked to check that the 
boxes were empty and thanked for their help.
Overall, children made 3 box selections on two serial box selection tasks, therefore 
producing a 6 trial response pattern reflecting the order of box opening and discarding.
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In addition, children made a single forced choice decision. All of the children’s 
responses were recorded in writing along with any verbal comments they made.
Results
Five children failed the memory checks and so were not included in the analyses. Of 
the remaining 85 children (31 in the younger age group, 26 in the middle age group 
and 28 in the older age group), 8 failed the reality checks (91 % correct). Two of 
these children were from the younger group, 4 from the middle group and 2 from the 
older group.
Serial tasks
The results of the CFA for the patterns of box selections on the hypothetical opening 
and hypothetical discarding tasks are presented in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Results of Configurai Frequency Analysis on children’s response patterns 
for the hypothetical opening task and the hypothetical discarding task analysed 
separately (positive = Christmas present, neutral = cup, negative = monster) (n = 85)
Positive = + 
Neutral = N 
Negative = -
Hypothetical 
Opening Task
Hypothetical 
Discarding Task
Pattern frequency z frequency z
+ N - 44 *T 8.68 - -
+ - N 17 .83 6 *A-2.98'
N + - 6 -2 38 2 *A -4.07
,N - + 2 *A -3.54 6 * A -2.981
- N + 10 -1.21; 62 *T 12.201
- + N 6 -2.38 9 -2,17'
*T significant response type at p < .001 
*A significant response anti-type at p < .01
On the hypothetical opening task the significant response type was selection of the 
positive box first, neutral box second and the negative box last (z = 8.68, p < ,001,
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BonfeiToni adjustment for p at .05 = .008). This response pattern represented the 
behaviour of 44 children. The remaining 41 children were distributed between one 
significant response anti-type and 4 non-significant response patterns (see Table 6.1).
On the hypothetical discarding task only 5 of the 6 possible response patterns were 
observed - none of the children said that they would discard the positive box first, 
neutral box second and negative box last. The significant response type was selection 
of the negative box first, neutral box second and the positive box last (z = 12.2, p < 
.001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .01). This response pattern accounted for 
the behaviour of 62 children. The remaining 23 children were distributed between 3 
significant response anti-types and one non-significant response pattern (see Table 
6 . 1).
Further analyses were performed to compare the results of the present experiment with 
those obtained in the hypothetical tasks in experiment 2. This was to ensure that the 
methodological differences between the two experiments (addition of the forced choice 
task and omission of the actual tasks) had not caused a change in the children’s 
responses. As can be seen from Table 6.2 the results of the opening task appear to 
replicate those from experiment 2, showing a similar trend of increasing prevalence of 
the response type (positive - neutral - negative) with age. Statistical analyses 
confirmed that there were no significant differences between the numbers of children 
producing the response type in the two experiments for the younger (%2 = .11, df = 1, 
p = .918), middle (%2 = .68, df = 1, p = .41), or older children {%2 ~ .55, df = 1, p = 
.457).
Table 6.2: Summary of response patterns produced on the hypothetical opening task 
presented according to age and experiment (positive = +, neutral = N, negative = -) (n 
= 175)
R E S P O N S E  P A T T E R N  
Experiment 5 (Experiment 2)
Age + N - + - N N + - N - + ■ - N + ' -  + N ' Total
I Younger, 12 (12); 6 (5) 5 (3) 1 2 (2),  4 (5); 2 (3 )i 31 (30) ;Middle 15 (14); 6 (9) 0 (1) 0 (2):  2 (2); 3 (2) 1 26 (30):
'Older 17 (21): 5 (4) : 1 (4) 0 (0) ' 4 (1) ! 1 (0) I 28 (30)’
[Total , 44 (47): 17 (18): 6 (8) : 2 (4)i  10 (8), 6 (5) 1 85 (90)1
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The numbers of children producing each response pattern on the hypothetical 
discarding task for the present experiment and experiment 2 are shown in Table 6.3 
according to age group. The number of children producing the response type 
(negative - neutral - positive) was very similar across these experiments and again 
shows a trend of increasing prevalence with age. Statistical analyses confinned that 
there were no differences in the numbers of children producing the response type 
across the two experiments for the younger (%2 = .02, df = 1, p = .886), middle (%2 = 
.001, df= 1, p = .986), or older (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .344) age groups.
Table 6.3; Summary of response patterns produced on the hypothetical discarding 
task presented according to age and experiment (positive = +, neutral = N, negative = 
-) (11= 175)
E S P O N S E  P A T T E R N  
Experiment 5 (Experiment 2)
Age 1 + N - : + - N N + - N -  + -  N + ' -  + N Total
I Younger 0 (3) i 3 (3) 2 (3) 2 (2) i 17 (17)j 7 (2) 31 (30) j
IMiddle 0 (0) I 2 (1) 0 (0) 2 (3) 20 (23)1 2 (3) 26 (30) j
lOIder ! 0 (0)1 1 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 25 (29)! 0 (0) 28 (30)!
iTotal ! 0 (3) i 6 (4) 2 (3) 0 (6) 62 (69)1 9 (5) 85 (90)1
Forced choice task
Children’s responses to being asked to either open or discard both boxes are presented 
according to age group in Table 6.4. Overall, the majority of children (n = 58, 68 %) 
said that they would open, rather than discard, both boxes. Two younger children 
were unable to decide between the two alternatives, insisting that they would open the 
positive box and discard the negative one. From inspection of these results there 
appears to be an age related trend whereby more children from the younger age group 
(n = 13, 42 %) chose to discard the boxes than did so amongst either the middle (n = 
5, 19 %) or older (n = 7, 25 %) groups of children. This trend approached statistical 
significance (%2 = 4.79, df = 2, p < . 1).
To ensure that there was no effect on children’s responses to the forced choice task 
from having completed the serial task, further analyses were performed in which the 
numbers of children opening and discarding the boxes in this experiment were 
compared with the corresponding age groups from experiment 4a (Table 6.5).
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Statistical analyses revealed no significant differences for the middle (Fisher’s exact 
probability, p = .734) or older (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .692) groups of children. 
The results for the younger age group were approaching significance (%2 = 2.84, df = 
1, p < .1) as a result of more children discarding the boxes in the present experiment (n 
= 13, 42 %) than in experiment 4a (n = 4,21 %).
Table 6,4: Children’s responses to being asked to either open or discard both boxes 
presented according to age group (n = 85)
Age Group^
Response Younger * Middle Older
Open 16 21 21
Discard 13 5 7
* 2 younger children were unable to reach a decision on this task, preferring instead to 
open the positive box and discard the negative box.
Table 6.S: Children’s responses to being asked to either open or discard both boxes 
(hypothetical task) presented according to experiment (percentages in brackets) (n = 
137)
Response Experiment 4a Experiment 5
Open 43 (80 %) 58 (70 %)
Discard 11 (20%) 25 (30 %)
The aim of this experiment was to explore the relationship between children’s 
responses on the serial box selection tasks, their behaviour on the forced choice task, 
and their subsequent justifications for that behaviour. These analyses, which were 
conducted analysing each age group separately, were conducted in two stages. First, 
the relationship between children’s behaviour across the two task types was explored. 
This analysis was conducted taking children’s response patterns across the opening 
task only. The data from the discarding task were not included given that the response 
type was approaching ceiling levels of fi equency amongst the middle and older groups 
of children. Second, the relationship between cliildren’s behaviour and verbal 
justifications were explored for the sub-group for whom these data were available.
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The relationship between the two behavioural tasks for the younger group of children 
are presented in Table 6.6 which shows that the children were relatively equally 
distributed between the observed response patterns on the serial box selection task 
regardless of whether they had elected to open or to discard the boxes on the forced 
choice task. Unfortunately the cell sizes were too small to permit statistical analysis of 
these data.
Table 6.6; Younger children’s responses on the forced choice task presented 
according to their response pattern on the hypothetical opening (serial) task (positive = 
+, neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 31 )
Response pAttern on hypothetical opening task
Forced Choice 
Response
+ N - + - N N + - N - + -N  + - + N
Open 6* 3 2 1 2 2
Discard ; 4 3 3 1 2 0
2 children who produced this response pattern (+ N -) on the serial box selection 
task were unable to reach a decision in the forced choice task
The results for the middle group of children (Table 6.7) suggest a somewhat different 
relationship between children’s responses on the two tasks. Although too few children 
discarded the boxes for statistical analysis, there appears to be a trend such that those 
children who discard the boxes on the forced choice task are most likely to have 
opened the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box last.
Table 6.7: Middle children’s responses on the forced choice task presented according 
to their response pattern on the hypothetical opening (serial) task (positive = +, neutral 
= N, negative = -) (n = 26)
Response pattern on hypothetical opening task
Forced Choice : 
Response
+ N - + -N N + - N - +1 “ N + ' - + N
iOpen 14 3 0 : 2 : 2.
Discard 1 3 0 0 0 1
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Table 6.8 presents the results for the older group of children across the two types of 
task. Once again, the frequencies are too low for full statistical analysis. However, it 
is interesting to note that 6 of the 7 children who discarded the boxes are accounted 
for by just two patterns of box selection - 4 of these children opened the positive box 
first, neutral box second and negative box last and 2 opened the positive box and then 
the negative box, leaving the neutral box until last.
Table 6.8: Older children’s responses on the forced choice task presented according 
to their response pattern on the hypothetical opening (serial) task (positive = +, neutral 
= N, negative = -) (n = 28)
Response pattern on. hypothetical opening task
Forced Choice 
Response
+ N - + - N N + - N - + -N  + - + N
Open 13 3 I 0 4 0 ,'Discard 4 2 0 0 0 1 ;
Justification questions
The children were asked a series of questions designed to elicit their reasons for 
deciding to open or discard the boxes in the forced choice task and to assess their 
beliefs about the pretend objects. These questions were only addressed to children 
who completed the forced choice task after the serial tasks, thus leaving a sub-sample 
of 44 children - 17 from the younger age group (of whom 6 opened and 9 discarded 
the boxes on the forced choice task - the remaining 2 children were unable to reach a 
decision), 13 from the middle age group (of whom 9 opened and 4 discarded the boxes 
on the forced choice task) and 14 from the older age group (of whom 9 opened and 5 
discarded the boxes on the forced choice task).
Question 1. The results from asking children why they had decided to open or discard 
the boxes were classified using the same response categories as were used in 
experiment 4a;
- object presence
- statements of the pretend status of objects or lack of box contents
- uncertainty
- don’t know
- other reasons unrelated to the pretence
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Responses in which references were made to the pretend objects being inside the boxes 
(object presence) were given by 20 children (45 %). Of these children, 4 referred to 
the positive object;
. . Because the power rangers are in one. .
. . Because I want the barbie. . .”
. . Because I was excited it was in there. . .”
“. . . Because I don’t want to throw the scalectrics away. . .”
Ten children referred specifically to the negative object;
. . Because I did, because 1 don’t like the monster. . .”
“. . . Because of the monster coming to chase me. . .”
“. . . So the monster wouldn’t chase after me. . .”
“. . . Because the monster’s in the box. . .”
“. . . Because of the monster. . .”
“. . . I would rather throw both away than get chased because I don’t like 
getting chased, it might make a spell. . .”
. . Because if I keep them the monster will always want me. . .”
“. . . Because I wouldn’t want the monster to chase me. . .”
“. . . Because I wouldn’t like the monster. . .”
“. . . Because the monster might go in the other box. . .”
The remaining 6 children whose responses fell into this category referred to both the 
positive and negative object;
“. . . Because I don’t want to throw the boxes away and waste them because 
that wouldn’t be nice for the mouse, hamster and the monster. . .”
. . Because I could scare the monster and I could play with my Sylvanians. .”
“. . . Because I’ve got a teddy 1 can play with and a monster that can chase me
and I can play a game with it. . .”
. . Because I don’t want to throw the new bike out and I don’t want to 
throw the horrible monster out because I’m not scared of monsters. . .”
. . Because of my action man, I didn’t want to throw that away and the 
monster, I wanted to throw that away, so that way I opened it. . .”
. . Because that one’s the skates and I would have chucked the monster 
away. .”
Explanations indicating uncertainty about whether or not the objects were in the boxes 
were offered by 7 children (16 %);
“. . . To see what’s in them. . .”
. . Because I wanted to see if they are in there. . .”
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. . To see what’s inside. . .”
" . . .  To see if they’re real. .
“. . . To see if there’s anything inside them before I throw them away. . .’
“. . . Because it’s good to open it to see what’s in there. .
. . Because there might be something inside it. . .”
Only one child was classified as referring to the lack of box contents:
. . Because monsters are not really alive. . .”
Sixteen children (36 %) explained their behaviour in terms unrelated to the pretence.
One child said they did not know why they had behaved in the way they had. The
remaining 15 children gave a variety of other reasons:
. Because I wanted to. . .” (n = 3)
. I wanted to, they’re nice boxes. . .”
. Because of magic. . .”
. Because I would like to. . .”
. Because my mum keeps throwing them away. . .”
. I take them outside because they’re muddy. . .”
. Because they are nasty - the boxes. . .”
. I don’t want them. . .”
. Because I want to. . .” (n = 2)
. Because I did want to. . .”
. I wanted to. . .”
. Because it’s my idea. . .”
As can be seen from Table 6.9, the main age related trend in children’s responses to 
this open-ended question was the decrease in the number of reasons unrelated to the 
pretence according to age and the corresponding increase in the number of children 
referring to specific objects.
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Table 6.9: Summary of children’s responses to being asked why they had opened or 
discarded the boxes (forced choice task) presented according to age group - figures in 
brackets are percentages within each age group (n = 44)
Justifications 
Related to Pretence
Justifications Unrelated 
to Pretence
Age Group Object
Presence
Uncertainty Object
Absence
Don't Know Other
Reasons
Younger
Middle
Older
5 (29 %) 
5 (38 %)
10 (71 %)
I (6 94) 
3 (24 %) 
3 (21
0 (0 %) 
0 (0 %) 
1 (8%^
1 (6 %> : 
0 (0 94)
0 (0 94)
10 (59%) 
5 (38 %) 
0 (0 94)
The relationship between the children’s verbal responses and their response to the 
forced choice task was explored. For the purposes of these analyses the ‘don’t know’ 
and ‘other reasons’ categories were combined into a single category of justifications 
unrelated to pretence (see Table 6.10). Amongst younger children, those who opened 
the boxes tended to give reasons unrelated to the pretence for doing so. In contrast, 
those who discarded the boxes were equally divided between describing the presence 
of objects in the boxes and unrelated justifications. Amongst middle and older 
children, those who opened the boxes tended to explain their behaviour in terms of the 
objects they contain or in terms of their uncertainty about the contents. However 
amongst older but not middle children discarding appeared to be related to 
justifications in terms of the presence of objects inside the boxes.
In light of the rather complicated differences according to age and the small numbers 
of children involved in the analyses, these data were also considered taking the sample 
as a whole. Overall, children seem to be almost equally likely to explain opening and 
discarding in terms of the presence of objects inside the boxes. However, uncertainty 
about the possible contents of the boxes was only expressed by children who opened 
the boxes. Justifications unrelated to the pretence were more frequent amongst 
children who discarded the boxes than amongst those who opened them.
The relationship between children’s justifications for their behaviour and their 
responses on the serial box selection tasks was explored. These results are 
summarised in Table 6.11 which presents children’s response patterns on the 
hypothetical opening task according to their response to the open ended justification 
question. From these results, two findings are of particular interest. First, selection of
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the positive, neutral and then the negative box is strongly associated with responses in 
terms of the presence of objects in the boxes - over half (55 %) of the children 
generating this response pattern justified their behaviour in these terms. Second, of the 
7 children who verbally expressed uncertainty about whether or not there were objects 
in the boxes, 5 (71 %) opened the positive, neutral and then the negative box. No 
other trends were readily apparent due to the high prevalence of justifications that 
were unrelated to the pretence.
Table 6,10: Summaiy of children’s responses to being asked why they had opened or 
discarded the boxes in the forced choice task presented according to age group and 
their behavioural response on the forced choice task (n = 42)
Object Presence Uncertainty Object Absence Don’t Know/ 
Other Reasons
Age Group Open (Discard) Open (Discard) Open (Discard) : Open (Discard) ;
Younger
jMiddle
lOlder
1
4
5
(4) 
(1)
(5)
1
1 }  
! 3
(0)
(0) 1 
(0) i
0 (0) , 4 ^ )
0 (0) ! 2 (3)
1 (0) 1 0 (0) 1
Total (n) 
(%)
10
42%
(10) 
(56 %)
i 7 
29%
(0) i 
(0% ) 1
1 (0) j 6 (8) :
4 % (0 %) i 25 % (44 %) i
Table 6.11: Summary of children’s justifications presented according to their
behavioural response on the hypothetical opening (serial) task (positive = +, neutral =
N, negative = -) (n = 44)
Justifications < Justifications^ 
Related to Pretence Unrelated to Pretence
Response Pattern 
on Serial Task
Object Uncertainty 
Presence
Object ' Don’t Know/ 
Absence Other Reasons
+ N - 12 5 0 5
+ - N 3 1 0 7
N + - 1 1 0 2
- N + 3 0 1 1
- + N I 0 0 1
Question 2. The justification question was also asked using a closed ended foimat in 
which children could either report having wondered about the box contents or having
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known that the boxes were empty. The most frequent response to this question was 
that the child thought the objects would not be inside the boxes - this response was 
given by 27 children (61 %) of whom 13 were from the younger, 8 from the middle 
and 6 from the older groups of children. However, 25 % (n = 11) of the children 
admitted that they had wondered if the objects were inside the boxes - 3 of these were 
younger children, 4 middle children and 4 older children, Six children (14 %) gave 
uninterpretable responses or said that they didn’t know.
To explore the relationship between the open and closed ended versions of the 
justification question and the children’s behaviour, further analyses were performed. 
To simplify these analyses, once again, ‘don’t know’ and ‘other reasons’ were 
combined into a single category of reasons unrelated to the pretence. These analyses 
were conducted combining all three age groups due to the small frequencies involved. 
The 6 children who did not give interpretable responses to the closed ended version of 
the justification question and the 2 children who were unable to reach a decision on the 
forced choice task were excluded from these analyses, thus leaving a reduced 
sub-sample of 38 children. The results of these analyses are summarised in Table 6.12.
The 11 children who admitted to wondering if there were objects inside the boxes 
(closed ended question) were not randomly distributed across the possible 
permutations of the four categories of response to the open-ended question and the 
two possible responses on the forced choice task. First, 8 of these children (73 %) 
opened rather than discarded the boxes. Second, 6 children (55 %) had indeed 
previously explained their behaviour in terms of the presence of objects inside the 
boxes. A further 3 of these children (27 %) had expressed some uncertainty about the 
reality status of the box contents. Thus some children do indeed appear to respond 
towards pretend objects whilst uncertain about their reality status. Of the 27 children 
who reported that they were certain the boxes were empty 13 (48 %) had given 
reasons that were unrelated to the pretence when previously asked to explain their 
behaviour. Twelve (44 %) of these children had described the presence of objects in 
the boxes. There were no trends associated with the children’s response on the forced 
choice task. One interesting finding not shown in Table 6.12 is that 2 of the 7 children 
who expressed uncertainty about the box contents on the open ended question were 
unable to give interpretable responses on the forced choice question.
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Table 6.12: A comparison of children’s responses to the forced choice task according 
to their responses on the closed ended (‘wondered’ if there was something inside the
boxes or ‘knew’ the boxes were empty) and open ended foimats of the justification 
question (n = 38)
Justifications Related to Pretence
JustiOcations
Unrelated
Object Presence Uncertainty Object Absence to Pretence
Forced
Choice
Wonder (Knew). Wonder (Knew) Wonder (Knew) ; Wonder (Knew)
'Open
Discard
3 0% 3 (2) 1
3 (6) 0 (0) 0
(0)
(0)
I (6) 
0 0 )
TOTAL 6 0 2 ) 3 0 )  I (0) 1 (13)
The relationship between reporting wondering on the closed ended question and 
response pattern on the serial box selection tasks was also explored (see Table 6.13). 
The 11 children who admitted wondering on the closed ended question were 
distributed between just 2 of the 5 response patterns observed on the hypothetical 
opening task. Eight of these 11 children (73 %) selected the positive box first, neutral 
box second and negative box last. The remaining 3 children (27 %) selected the 
negative, neutral and then the positive box. The 27 children who reported having been 
certain that the boxes were empty were divided across the observed response patterns.
Table 6.13: Children’s responses to the closed ended justification question 
(‘wondered’ if there was something inside the box or ‘knew’ that the boxes were 
empty) according to their response pattern on the hypothetical opening (serial) task 
(positive = +, neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 38)
Respoiise Pattern oa Serial Box Selection 
Task
Closed Ended Justification Question + N -  + - N ! N + - ' - N + ' - + N ;
j Wondered 8 ! - i - 1 3 : - 1Knew 12 8 3 i 2 , 2 ,
Question 3. As a follow-up question, the children were asked to explain either how 
they knew that there would be nothing inside the boxes or how they thought that the
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objects had got inside the boxes. These data were analysed using the categories 
developed by Johnson & Harris (1994 - experiment 3);
- magical explanations - responses referring to the use or possibility of magic
- mental explanations - responses referring to the child’s mental state
- physical explanations - responses referring to the possibility or impossibility 
of an entity entering the box, or in which the child remarked on the previous lack of 
box contents, and
- other explanations.
The results of this analysis (summarised in Table 6.14) showed that the most frequent 
responses (n = 26, 59 %) amongst all three age groups were ‘physical explanations’ in
which the child referred to the possibility or impossibility of the object entering the box
(with or without them noticing) or which referred to the empty state of the box:
“. . . I know, he jumped in the box. . .”
“. . . Using his hands. . .”
“. . . It nibbled through the hole. . .”
“. . . Because there can’t be anything, there’s no such tiling as a monster and
my barbie car wouldn’t fit in the box. . .”
“. . . When someone put them in. .
“. . . Because my mum or my sister or one of my family might have put it in 
there. . .”
“. . . If it was the climbing action man it would get onto the wall, get its 
parachute out and jump down. . .”
“. . . When I weren’t looking. . .”
“. . . Because I remember when 1 looked in there last time the cup couldn’t 
walk and the Sylvanian’s couldn’t walk so there won’t be anything in there. . .” 
Because it was invisible. .
Because he was getting in the box. . .”
Because its got no things in it. . .”
Because there’s no bike and no monster because it’s empty. . .”
Because there’s no toys. . .”
Because there aint nothing in them. . .”
Because I looked. . .”
Because when I first looked at them there was nothing in. .
Because they’re just empty boxes. . .”
. It’s empty, see!. . .” (child opened a box and showed the experimenter 
that it was empty)
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. . Because it weren’t in there. . .”
“. . . Because 1 put my hand in there. . .”
“. . . Because I’ve looked already. . .”
“. . . I had a look before we started the game. . .”
“. . . Because I looked in them. . .”
“. . .Well, in real life if there’s nothing inside, if you close your eyes and there’s 
something inside but when I first looked inside there was nothing in there. . .”
“. . . Because I looked. . .”
Twelve children (27 %) gave one of the ‘other explanations’ - these included don’t 
know and uninterpretable responses:
Because I didn’t. . .”
He wants to chase after me. , .”
My mum told me that long, long ago. . .”
Don’t know. . .” (n = 6)
Because I guessed. . .”
Because evei-ybody would fight over it. . .”
Because I do. . .”
A small number of children gave ‘magical explanations’ (n = 3, 7 %):
“. . . Because I done it with magic. . .”
“. . . Because I was magic. . .”
“. . . It might be his house or he did a spell and he went in there, or he could be 
a ghost. . .”
The remaining 3 children (7 %) gave ‘mental explanations’ in which they referred to 
their mental state or the efficiency (or inefficiency) of that mental state at generating 
the pretend objects:
“. . . Because I’ve been thinking, I was thinking that there was nothing in the 
boxes. . .”
. . Because they’re only pretend. . .”
. . Because they were pretended. . .”
As can been seen from Table 6.14 there were no clear age trends in the nature of 
children’s explanations.
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Table 6.14: Summary of children’s responses to being asked how they knew that the 
object was not inside the box or how they thought the object had got inside the box - 
figures in brackets are percentages of children within each age group (n = 44)
R E S P O N S E C A T E G O R Y
Age Group
Magical
Explanation
Mental
Explanation
Physical
Explanation
Other
Explanation
Y OLinger 1 (6 %) 2 (12%) 8 (47 %) 6 (35 %)
Middle 1 (8%T 1 (8 %) 9 (69 94) 2 (15%)
Older 1 (7 94) 0 (0%^ 9 (64 %) 4 (29 94)
All children 3 (7 94) 3 (7%^ 26 (59 %) 12 (27%)
Question 4 and question 5. The children were asked whether or not pretending very 
hard would ever lead to an object being inside the box and why (or why not) this was 
the case. The majority of children (n = 35, 80 %) denied this possibility. The analysis 
of children’s explanations is summarised in Table 6.15, according to age group.
The most frequent explanations (n = 22, 50 %) were those referring to the physical 
possibility or impossibility of an object entering the boxes or in which the child 
re-stated the empty status of the boxes:
‘. . . I can’t see an action man in the box. . .”
. . .  It would just climb in and I wouldn’t see it go in. . .”
. . . Because monsters don’t be alive any more. . .”
. . . Because the monster can’t fit in the box, . .”
. . . Because if there was one in there, the painted bit would stick out. . .”
. . . Because there’s no such thing as ghosts. . .”
. . . Skateboard’s can’t fit inside the box. . .”
. . . They thought it was a nice thing so they put it in there. . .”
. . . Because you couldn’t fit two presents in one box. . .”
. . .  It was hiding and it clawed in there. . .”
. . . Because there’s not real barbies. . .”
\  . .Because no monsters are real, they’re not alive, that’s only for Halloween, 
for dressing up. . .”
‘. . . Because they died. . .”
. . . People put them in there. . .”
. . . Because there’s nothing in here. . .”
‘. . . Because they’re empty. . .”
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. Because there’s nothing there now. . .”
, Because it’s not true, because they’re just empty boxes. . 
. Because there isn’t a barbie car in school. . .”
. There aint an^^liing in there. .
. Because it aint in there. . .”
. . . Because it’s just an empty box. . .”
‘Mental explanations’ accounted for the responses of 8 children (18 %):
“. . . Because we be just thinking there’s a monster in there but there’s not 
really. , .”
“. . . Because you’re just pretending. , .”
“. . . Because it’s just my imagination. . .”
“. . . Because they’re not real. . .”
“. . . Because they’re not real, they’re only pretend. . .”
. . Because it’s just pretending for toys. . .”
“. . . Because I know something’s not in it. . .”
“. . . Because they were only pretend. . .”
Very few children (n = 3, 7 %) gave ‘magical explanations’;
“. . . Because the Sylvanians aren’t magic. . .”
“. . . Because you have to go to Manchester and get the tickets, you can’t just 
magic it there. . .”
“. . . We had a look inside the boxes first and the boxes aren’t magic. . .”
However a relatively large number of children (n = 11, 25 %) gave ‘other’ 
explanations wliich included don’t know and uninterpretable responses;
. Because there’s no steam. . .”
. Don’t know. . .” (n = 2)
. Because it would nick my bike. . .”
. Because there won’t. . .”
. Because there would. . .”
. Because it’s shiny. . .”
. He wants to eat me up. . .”
. Because when there was my birthday there wasn’t nothing inside the box”
. Because it would. . .”
. Because I do. .
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Frequencies were too low to identify any age trends beyond the obseiwation that the 
younger children appear to be more likely to give an ‘other’ explanation and less likely 
to give a physical explanation than either of the other two age groups (see Table 6.15).
Table 6.15: Summary of children’s responses to being asked whether pretending very 
hard would ever lead to an object really being inside the box - figures in brackets are 
percentages of children within each age group (n = 44)
__________________________ R E S P O N S E  C A T E G O R Y ______________
Magical Mental Physical Other
Age Group Explanation Explanation Explanation Explanation
Younger 0 (0 %) 4 (24% ) . 5 (29 94) 8 (47%%
Middle 1 (8 %) 2 (15%% 8 (62 94) 2 (15%%
'Older 2 (14%) 2 (14%) 9 (64 94) 1 (8%%
All children 3 (7 94) . 8 (18% ), 22 (50 94) 11 (25%%
Throughout the experimental procedure children’s spontaneous comments were 
recorded. Fourteen (16 %) children commented that they would prefer not to open or 
to discard one or more of the boxes during the serial task. Of these children 12 
produced the response type (positive - neutral - negative) on the opening task. Ten 
(12 %) children remarked that they would prefer to open the positive box and discard 
the negative box rather than opening or discarding both on the forced choice task. 
Four of these children went on to open the boxes, 4 discarded them and the remaining 
2 (younger) children remained unable to reach a decision.
Summary of results
The results of this experiment can be summarised in terms of six main findings. First, 
the results obtained here were directly comparable to those obtained in previous 
experiments. As in experiment 2, the children in this experiment tended to open the 
positive box first, the neutral box second and the negative box last, and tended to 
discard the negative box first, neutral box second and the positive box last. When 
faced with the choice of either opening or discarding the boxes, the children in this 
experiment, like those in experiment 4a, tended to choose to open them. These 
systematic behaviours emerged after the vast majority of children had labelled the box 
contents as pretend and not real.
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Second, the cliildren’s behaviour on the forced choice task was associated with 
particular patterns of response on the serial box selection task. Furthermore, this 
relationship differed in terms of the children’s age. Amongst four to five year old 
children (younger age group) there was no clear relationship between the two 
behaviours. In contrast, amongst five to seven year old children (middle and older age 
groups) discarding the boxes appeared to be associated with electing to open the 
positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last. Amongst six to seven year 
old children (older age group), discarding the boxes also appeared to be associated 
with opening the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box last.
Third, the children’s behaviours on the forced choice task were related to their 
differing responses to the open ended question in which they were asked why they had 
opened or discarded the boxes. Amongst four to five year old children, those who 
opened the boxes were most likely to give reasons unrelated to the pretence when 
explaining their behaviour. In contrast, the children in this younger age group who 
discarded the boxes tended to either discuss the presence of objects inside the boxes or 
to give reasons unrelated to the pretence when explaining their decision. Amongst five 
to seven year old children (middle and older age groups), opening the boxes was 
associated with object presence responses as well as those reflecting uncertainty about 
the box contents. Discarding the boxes was associated with comments about the 
objects being inside the boxes amongst the six to seven year old (older) children.
Fourth, the comparison of children’s responses to the open ended justification question 
and their response patterns on the serial box selection task showed that uncertainty 
was most likely to be expressed by those children who opened the positive, neutral and 
then the negative box. In addition, selecting the positive, neutral and then the negative 
box was also associated with justifications referring to the objects being inside the 
boxes.
Fifth, when asked directly whether they had wondered if the objects had really been 
inside the boxes, a quarter of the children admitted having done so. These children 
tended to have either opened the positive, neutral and then the negative box, or the 
positive, negative and then the neutral box on the serial box selection task, to have 
elected to open both boxes on the forced choice task and to have explained this 
decision in terms of their uncertainty about the box contents or in terms of the 
presence of objects inside the boxes.
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Finally, the majority of children denied that it was possible for pretend entities to 
become real and explained this in terms of physical reasons why the objects would not 
or could not appear inside the boxes.
Discussion
The results obtained in the present experiment were very similar to those found in 
previous experiments. As before, although the majority of children correctly labelled 
the objects as pretend and not real, they behaved systematically towards them. These 
children tended to open the positive box first and the negative box last and to discard 
the negative box first and the positive box last. The neutral box repeatedly emerged as 
the children’s second selection. When positive and negative affect were placed in 
direct conflict such that children could not simultaneously approach the positive entity 
and avoid the negative one, they tended to open both of the boxes. In addition, the 
children tended to justify their behaviour in terms of the presence of objects inside the 
boxes. Although this type of response could indicate pretence continuation, some of 
the cliildren’s comments were very clearly suggestive of a breakdown in their 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. For example, it is highly unlikely that 
those children who expressed uncertainty about whether or not there were objects 
inside the boxes were responding as a continuation or re-statement of the pretence 
theme. Overall, the present experiment obtained three separate types of evidence 
relating to children’s understanding of pretence - their behaviour in serial box selection 
tasks, their behaviour in a forced choice task, and the cliildren’s subsequent 
explanations for their behaviour. The aim of this experiment was to explore the 
relationships between each of these aspects of children’s beliefs and behaviour.
The relationship between the serial and forced choice tasks suggested some 
developmental and individual differences in children’s responses towards pretend 
objects. Amongst four to five year old (younger) children there were no direct 
relationships between the two tasks - each of the observed response patterns on the 
serial box selection task was equally represented by children who opened or discarded 
the boxes when confronted with the forced choice task. However, given that there are 
a plethora of reasons why children might open or discard both boxes in the forced 
choice task (see experiment 4a, page 112, for a full discussion of these reasons), the 
failure to find a straightforward relationship between this task and the serial box 
selection task was not entirely surprising.
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In contrast, amongst five to seven year old (middle and older) children there were clear 
relationships between the two types of task but these relationships differed across the 
two age groups. Those middle children who opened both of the boxes (forced choice 
task) were most likely to have selected the positive box first, neutral box second and 
the negative box last on the hypothetical opening (serial) task. In contrast, although 
there were rather few children who did so, those middle children who discarded both 
boxes (forced choice task) tended to have selected the positive box first, negative box 
second and the neutral box last on the hypothetical opening (serial) task. Taken 
together these findings are highly suggestive of individual differences between children 
within this single age group. Some of these five to six year old children approached 
the positive entities and avoided the negative ones, organising affect in pretence such 
that approaching the positive pretend entity was prioritised. However, other children 
of the same age approached negative entities sooner than was absolutely necessary and 
yet prioritised the avoidance of the negative pretend entity.
Those children within the middle age group who approach negative entities second 
rather than last in serial box selection tasks have previously been identified as an 
intriguing sub-group. Where opaque boxes have been used (experiment 1 and 
experiment 2) these children have emerged in relatively large (but not significant) 
numbers. However, when the potential for availability to lead children to wonder 
about the possible box contents was minimised by the use of transparent boxes 
(experiment 3), a comparably sized group of children did not emerge. Thus it was 
assumed that within this age group at least, selecting the negative box earlier than is 
absolutely necessary is perhaps motivated by pretend-reality confusion. A similar 
argument was developed with regards to those children who elected to discard both 
boxes in the forced choice task (experiment 4a) - in each age group more children did 
so in the opaque boxes condition than in the transparent boxes condition. The 
co-occurence of these two types of behaviour on a repeated measures basis supports 
the suggestion that they are similarly motivated and furthermore, supports the 
argument that there are stable groups of children who are susceptible to pretend-reality 
confiision during pretence tasks.
Within the older group of children (six to seven years old) there were also observable 
relationships between children’s responses on the serial and forced choice tasks. 
Specifically, children who discarded both boxes (forced choice task) either opened the 
positive box first, neutral box second and the negative box last, or the positive box 
first, negative box second and the neutral box last on the hypothetical opening (serial)
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task. Thus there seems to be two groups of differently motivated children within this 
age group - both groups hierarchically organise affect such that the avoidance of the 
negative entity is prioritised, but these groups differ in terms of their treatment of 
negative affect during the serial task such that whilst some children avoid it, others 
deal with it sooner than is absolutely necessary. These two groups of children are not 
identical to those observed amongst middle children. Whilst the association between 
discarding both boxes and opening the negative box second rather than last is common 
to both age groups, the organisation of affect amongst children who select the positive, 
neutral and then the negative box differs. Amongst five to six year old (middle) 
children approaching the positive pretend entity is prioritised whereas amongst six to 
seven year old (older) children, avoiding the negative entity is prioritised. However, 
given the small numbers of children involved, this developmental difference should be 
interpreted cautiously.
To summarise, despite the ambiguity in interpreting children’s motivations when 
responding to the forced choice task, some clear relationships between this task and 
the serial tasks emerged. These relationships differed according to the age group 
considered and between children witliin each age group. Therefore there seem to be 
both developmental and individual differences in children’s behavioural responses 
towards pretend objects and in the way in which children prioritise differing forms of 
affect in pretence. A key question addressed in this experiment was the extent to 
which these differing groups of children verbally reported uncertainty about the reality 
status of the pretend entities. This issue was explored by inteiwiewing the children 
about their beliefs and their understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. Interview 
data is available for only a sub-sample of the children who participated in this 
experiment due to the problems associated with interviewing children about their 
behaviour on serial tasks - only those children who completed the forced choice task 
after the serial box selection tasks were asked to discuss their beliefs about the 
pretend-reality distinction.
Children’s responses to being asked why they had opened or discarded both boxes 
were categorised into two broad response types - reasons unrelated to the pretence 
(don’t know and ambiguous comments) and reasons related to the pretence (object 
presence, uncertainty and object absence). Those children who described the contents 
of the boxes (object presence) in their answers were equally divided between opening 
and discarding both boxes (forced choice task). However, object presence responses 
were most frequent amongst children who had opted to open the positive box first.
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neutral box second and negative box last (serial task). Uncertainty about whether or 
not there were objects inside the boxes was only expressed by children who had 
elected to open both boxes and was most frequently associated with opening the 
positive box, neutral box and then the negative box. Thus it would seem that 
children’s behaviour on the serial box selection task is highly predictive of their 
justifications for their behaviour. Children’s verbal expressions of uncertainty about 
the pretend entities corresponds veiy closely with behaviours which can be interpreted 
as reflecting pretend-reality confusion. However, as noted previously, object presence 
responses could be interpreted as either reflecting genuine pretend-reality confusion or 
pretence continuation - these children could mention box contents because they believe 
these may have become real, or they may be simply restating the pretence whilst 
certain that the boxes are empty. The credulous-sceptical dichotomy is not readily 
derived fi'om comments about the objects being inside the boxes. Therefore the 
children were asked directly whether they had wondered whether the objects were 
inside the boxes or whether they had been certain that the boxes were empty.
In their experiments, Harris et al (1991 - experiment 4) and Johnson and Harris (1994 
- experiment 3) found that approximately half of the children interviewed reported that 
they had wondered whether the pretend objects were inside the boxes. In contrast, 
only a quarter of the children in this experiment responded similarly. Why should these 
results differ? One possibility relates to a methodological difference between the 
experiments. In the present experiment children were asked about their behaviour in a 
task which is subject to a strong task demand (opening the boxes because of the 
association between boxes, containment of objects and box opening). In contrast, 
Harris et al and Johnson and Han is interviewed children about their spontaneous 
behaviours in the experimenter’s absence. Perhaps the task demands in the present 
experiment lead children to respond in literal mode rather than in terms of their beliefs 
about the pretend objects. In addition, the closed-ended question in this experiment 
followed an open-ended question. It is also possible that children became more certain 
of the pretend-reality distinction, or more self-conscious about reporting 
pretend-reality confusion, as the questioning continued.
Nevertheless, a quarter of the children in this experiment reported that they had 
wondered about the reality status of the box contents. Interestingly, the behaviour of 
these children on the behavioural tasks and their responses to the open-ended 
justification question supported the earlier suggestions that certain behaviours and 
comments reflected uncertainty about the pretend-reality distinction. First, nearly
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three quarters of these children opened the boxes on the forced choice task. Second, 
over half of them had reported that they opened the boxes due to the objects being 
inside them (open-ended question). Thus for at least some children, object presence 
comments are not a continuation of the pretence theme. Third, nearly one third of 
these children reported uncertainty about the box contents on the open-ended 
justification question. Finally, nearly three quarters of these children had selected the 
positive, neutral and then the negative box on the hypothetical opening (serial) task. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that children’s behaviour on the forced choice 
and serial tasks and justifications in terms of object presence and uncertainty indicate 
genuine uncertainty about the pretend-reality distinction.
The children in this experiment were also asked some general questions about their 
understanding of pretence. Initially they were asked either how they had known the 
boxes were empty or how they thought that the objects had got inside the boxes. 
Children’s responses were categorised into the response types developed by Johnson 
and Harris (1994 - experiment 3). Like the children in Johnson and Harris, over half of 
the children in this experiment responded in terms of the physical possibility or 
impossibility of an object entering the boxes or re-stated the empty status of the boxes. 
In this research it has been argued repeatedly that empirical evidence of the 
non-existence of pretend entities constrains the effects of availability. Indeed, these 
children seem to be describing the way that they use their knowledge of reality to 
reassure themselves of the pretend-reality distinction. For example, having not seen a 
monster enter the box seemed to be sufficient to confinn the pretend status of that 
imagined entity for some children. Interestingly, fewer children in this experiment 
explicitly mentioned magic in their explanations than in Johnson and Harris, whereas a 
similarly small number of children mentioned the generative power of their mental 
states. As in Johnson and Harris, there were no clear age trends in the children’s 
responses to this question.
Following the procedure developed by Harris et al (1991 - experiment 4) the children 
were also asked whether pretending could ever lead to an object appearing inside the 
box and why (or, why not). Over three quarters of the cliildren denied this possibility. 
This is comparable to the number of children in Hanis et al who responded similarly. 
Again, the children tended to appeal to physical explanations to account for this. In 
addition, some children referred to the impossibility of such mental (imaginative) or 
magical feats, but in general the children tended to discuss the generative powers of 
their imagination in terms of direct empirical evidence that pretending does not cause
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objects to become real. In other words, many children report that they know that 
pretending does not cause imagined entities to become real based on the evidence that 
they have never seen it happen. This finding provides direct evidence against the 
transmigration hypothesis (Harris et al) since it demonstrates that children are not 
unduly uncertain of the generative powers of the imagination.
Taken together, the results obtained in this experiment support the findings obtained in 
previous experiments, confirming that there are individual and developmental 
differences in children’s behaviour towards pretend entities, in the way in which they 
organise affect during pretence and in terms of their beliefs about the pretend-reality 
distinction. Furthermore, the evidence obtained in this experiment suggests that to 
confidently interpret their behaviour, children’s explanations for that behaviour should 
be obtained. In addition, this experiment has gathered independent evidence from 
children’s responses to interview questions, that empirical evidence of reality is a vital 
factor in constraining the effects of increased cognitive availability. Overall, this 
experiment has flirther demonstrated the existence of three separable groups of 
children:
- credulous children who experience pretend-reality confusion
- sceptical children who continue the pretence in tenns of the affect it evokes
- other children who respond indifferently or in terms of task demands.
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Chapter 7: Experiment 6 
Evidence of pretend-reality confusion:
Children’s spontaneous behaviour in the absence of the experimenter
Introduction
To date, this program of research has relied on the analysis and interpretation of 
children’s behaviour within pretence tasks during which the experimenter has 
prompted the child to act towards pretend entities. The observed similarities and 
differences in children’s behaviours within and between experiments have been 
interpreted as indicating both individual and developmental differences in children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. Thus whilst some children behave 
systematically towards pretend entities as a continuation of the pretence theme 
(Golomb & Galasso, 1995), others do so because they have become uncertain about 
the reality status of the pretence due to the effects of increased cognitive availability 
(Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall & Harmer, 1991; Johnson & Hams, 1994).
However, it could be argued that children’s behaviours in pretence tasks are perhaps 
not completely dependent on the pretence and thus might not be particularly 
infonnative about children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. One 
possibility is that children disregard the instruction to pretend and then simply respond 
in terms of task demands when asked to behave towards the pretend entities. For 
example, children might respond in terms of some form of elaborate collusion with the 
experimenter whereby they act as if they believe that there are objects inside the boxes. 
Alternatively, the children could perhaps respond by approaching the positive entity 
and avoiding the negative one merely as a response to the affect that is associated with 
the label attributed to the box contents, independent of their own affective states and 
without ever engaging in the pretence or considering the pretend-reality distinction. 
Yet, even if it is assumed that children engage in pretence when instmcted to do so, 
there remains the possibility that all of the children’s responses are in pretend mode. 
That is, given that there is no break in the pretence before the children are asked to 
make their selections of boxes to open and discard, it could be that the children 
respond in terms of the hypothetical (pretend) situation that they have created with the 
experimenter, without any contemplation of the reality status of that situation. In 
other words, the failure to end the pretence might lead children to respond entirely as a
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continuation of the pretending game (Golomb & Galasso, 1995). There are several 
findings from the present research which mitigate against each of these possibilities.
First, the various knowing smiles and giggles that were evident during the task 
introduction suggest that at least some of the children engaged in the pretence when 
they were asked to do so. Second, a number of the children in these experiments 
spontaneously commented that they would prefer not to discard the box they were 
pretending contained their preferred Christmas present or that they would prefer not to 
open the box they were pretending contained a scary monster. These comments are 
difficult to reconcile with the idea of the children responding entirely in terms of task 
demands and indeed, one of Harris et al’s (1991) reasons for arguing against collusion 
with the experimenter as a possible explanation of their results was the nature of the 
children’s spontaneous comments about the pretend entities. Third, experiment 5 
demonstrated that there were relationships between children’s behaviours on the 
pretence tasks and their justifications for those behaviours in terms of their beliefs 
about the pretence. For example, children who verbally expressed uncertainty about 
the pretend-reality distinction tended to open both boxes (forced choice task) and to 
select to open the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last (serial 
box selection task). Thus children’s behaviours on the pretence tasks do not appear to 
be completely independent of their verbally expressed beliefs about the reality status of 
what has been pretended. Fourth, there is no good reason to suppose that the manner 
in which children respond to task demands, or that the manner in which children 
continue the pretence, should vai'y according to empirical evidence of box contents. 
However, the findings from experiments 3, 4a and 4b suggest that the use of 
transparent boxes which provide continual visual confirmation that the boxes are 
empty and the contents only pretend, influenced some children’s behaviour. Finally, 
the developmental trends which have been observed in this research are easier to 
reconcile with the idea that children’s susceptibility to the effects of availability and 
their response to affect during pretence undergo age related changes, than with the 
idea that the manner in which children respond to task demands varies according to the 
child’s age.
Taken together these findings suggest that children’s behaviour in pretence tasks is not 
totally independent of the pretence, nor merely a response to task demands. Instead, 
children’s behaviour does seem to reflect their beliefs about the pretence. However, 
there remains a more direct manner of validating the use of pretence tasks as a way of 
investigating children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction - a comparison
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of children’s behaviour on the pretence tasks with their spontaneous behaviours 
towards pretend objects.
Harris et al (1991 - experiment 4) and Johnson and Harris (1994 - experiment 3) 
argued that observing children’s spontaneous behaviour towards boxes containing 
pretend objects, in the absence of the experimenter, rules out the possibility that 
children are merely colluding with the experimenter. With the experimenter no longer 
in the room there is no need for children to continue to act as if the boxes contain real 
objects. However, even without an adult prompting them to act, Harris et al and 
Johnson and Harris observed that around half (45 % and 63 % respectively) of the 
children opened one or both of the boxes during the two minute period that they were 
left alone. These researchers argued that the increased cognitive availability for the 
objects being in the boxes that was caused by the pretence had lead the children to 
wonder about the reality status of the imagined contents of the boxes. As a result of 
this uncertainty about the pretend-reality distinction, the children opened the boxes.
However, Golomb and Galasso (1995) were veiy critical of this methodology and 
argue that there are at least two features of the Harris et al (1991 - experiment 4) 
design that might have led children to open the boxes in the experimenter’s absence 
despite having a flill appreciation of the pretend status of the contents. First, Golomb 
and Galasso argue that Harris et al did not explicitly end the pretence. Instead, the 
children were asked to pretend about the box contents and then the experimenter made 
an excuse to leave the room. Golomb and Galasso argue that the children believed 
that the pretending game was to be continued, and indeed that the children do so, 
whilst the experimenter is out of the room. Second, these authors argue that the 
failure to offer children alternative play activities is an important factor. In other 
words, Golomb and Galasso argue that the children’s spontaneous behaviours were a 
result of boredom and merely represent a continuation of the pretence theme which 
had not been concluded.
In support of their claims, Golomb and Galasso (1995 - experiment 1) offer evidence 
from an experiment in which children were allocated to one of two conditions - either 
the pretence was explicitly concluded and a box of toys conspicuously placed in the 
room (terminated pretence - toys condition), or the pretence was not concluded and no 
toys were provided (non-terminated pretence - no toys condition, as Harris et al, 
1991). The children’s behaviour was observed by the experimenter who, rather than 
leaving the room as in Harris et al, simply moved to a corner of the room to do some
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work and no longer interacted with the child. The results showed that very few 
children in either condition approached the boxes during the period following the 
pretence.
However, there are aspects of the Golomb and Galasso (1995) methodology that make 
the differences between their findings and those obtained by Harris et al (1991) and 
Johnson and Harris (1994) impossible to interpret. First, termination of the pretence 
and the provision of alternative play activities were confounded. It is not possible to 
determine wliicli of these factors influenced the children’s beliaviour without 
experimental conditions in which the pretence was ended and there were no toys 
(terminated pretence - no toys condition) and in which the pretence was not ended but 
toys were provided (non-terminated pretence - toys condition). Second, and arguably 
most important, the experimenter in Golomb and Galasso’s study remained in the 
room with the child throughout the experiment rather than leaving the room as she had 
done in the Harris et al experiment (Woolley, 1997a). Although Golomb and Galasso 
dismiss this possibility, it seems likely that children would be reticent to explore the 
boxes due to concern about being ‘naughty’ when they were being watched, albeit 
surreptitiously, by an adult. Independent of the children’s beliefs, their possible 
exploratory behaviour towards the boxes might have been suppressed by the 
experimenter’s continual presence. For these reasons, Golomb and Galasso’s 
non-replication of Hams et al’s results does not provide compelling evidence against 
the study of children’s spontaneous behaviours towards pretend objects as a way of 
investigating children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction.
The aim of the present experiment was to validate the claim that children’s behaviour 
on pretence tasks reflects individual and developmental differences in children’s 
understanding of pretence. To this end, the relationship between children’s 
spontaneous behaviour in the experimenter’s absence and their patterns of response on 
the serial box selection tasks used in the preceding experiments was explored. If both 
of these measures assess children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction, 
then there should be associations between certain response patterns on the pretence 
tasks and the children’s subsequent behaviour towards the boxes in the experimenter’s 
absence.
The children in this experiment were therefore asked to pretend about the contents of 
three opaque boxes and then to make hypothetical and actual selections of the order in 
which they wanted to open and discard the boxes. In this respect, the experiment
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followed the design used in experiment 2. However, the particular entities to be 
pretended were different to those used in the preceding experiments. In previous 
experiments the experimenter determined the neutral (cup) and negative (monster) 
entities to be pretended, whereas the positive entity was of the child’s own choosing 
(their preferred Christmas present). Thus the child’s involvement in selecting the 
objects was not held constant across differing forms of affect. In the present 
experiment the child was asked to select all three entities. In addition, the animacy of 
the pretended entities and whether they were of supernatural origins was also held 
constant by asking the children to choose the entities to be pretended fi'om a selection 
of pictures of familiar animals. The children selected the animal that they liked the 
most (positive entity), the one that they liked the least (negative entity) and the one 
which they neither liked nor disliked (neutral entity). The possibility that in previous 
experiments the children had been responding to the assumed preferences of the 
experimenter was also eliminated in this experiment since the affective loading of the 
experimenter’s voice remained neutral whilst the children made their animal selections. 
Previous research suggests that it is unlikely that children’s beliefs are influenced by 
features of imagined entities such as their animacy, supernatural or everyday origins 
(for example, Harris et al, 1991 - experiments 1 and 2) and adult versus cliild selection 
(for example, Golomb & Galasso, 1995). However, the design of this experiment held 
these factors constant across all types of affect to rule out this possibility.
Another key feature of the design of this experiment was that the pretence task was 
compared with a non-pretence control task which followed the same design but with 
one major modification. The children were not asked to engage in any pretence but 
instead the pictures of the selected animals were attached to the lids of the boxes. 
According to Johnson and Harris’ (1994) account of the availability hypothesis, 
pretence is just one of many possible mechanisms which can potentially lead to 
increased cognitive availability. However, the precise nature of these availability 
increasing cues remains relatively untested at present. Research by Subbotskii (1985; 
Subbotsky, 1994) suggests that hearing a fairy story can increase the cognitive 
availability of certain magical outcomes. Another possibility is that placing a picture of 
an object on the lid of a box might lead cliildren to think about the possibility of the 
depicted object being in the box. This could cause an increase in cognitive availability 
and ultimately result in the child wondering if the object is indeed really inside the box. 
This possibility is tested by the design of the non-pretence condition. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of a non-pretence control task also allowed an investigation of whether 
children’s behaviour when they are pretending differs bmdamentally to their behaviour
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when it is not in pretend mode and is instead being generated by the mere labelling of 
the boxes.
The children’s spontaneous behaviour towards the boxes was observed. To rule out 
the possibility that the children’s behaviour was merely a continuation of the pretence 
theme, the pretence (and non-pretence) task was explicitly terminated prior to the 
experimenter’s departure. In addition, like Golomb and Galasso (1995), the design of 
this experiment provided children with a range of alternative play activities. However, 
rather than conspicuously placing a box of toys in the room (as in Golomb & Galasso), 
the present experiment was conducted in the school librai-y. Thus the cliildren were 
given a range of available alternative activities which they had implicit permission to 
engage in and which formed an intrinsic part of the setting. Therefore any 
spontaneous behaviour towards the boxes could not be interpreted as simply being due 
to boredom. The children were left alone after completion of the box selection tasks 
for two minutes and their behaviour video recorded (as Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & 
Harris, 1994). On the experimenter’s return the children were asked what they had 
done during the period they were left alone. Those children who admitted opening one 
or more of the boxes were asked to explain why they had done so.
An important feature of the design of this experiment is the fact that the children were 
left alone with positive, neutral and negative entities. In previous experiments (Harris 
et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994) children were left alone with two boxes, one 
which they had pretended about, and one which was the empty control box - aftect 
was varied on a between subjects basis. Thus this experiment affords the first 
opportunity to consider the selectivity in children’s spontaneous behaviour when 
positive, neutral and negative affect have been evoked by the pretence on a within 
subject basis. The availability hypothesis as it stands does not allow any clear 
predictions to be made pertaining to this issue.
How might children behave in the experimenter’s absence? Golomb and Galasso 
(1995) attribute their results to the termination of the pretence and the provision of 
alternative play activities rather than the continued presence of the experimenter. If 
this is correct, in this experiment where the pretence is ended and alternative activities 
offered, but where the experimenter leaves the room, there should also be very few 
children who spontaneously open the boxes. In contrast, if as is suspected, it was the 
continued presence of the experimenter that suppressed children’s behaviour towards 
the boxes, then in this experiment the rates of spontaneous box opening should be
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comparable to those observed by Harris et al (1991) and Johnson and Harris (1994). 
In addition, if the children’s spontaneous behaviour is merely a continuation of the 
pretence, more children should approach the boxes after the pretence tasks than the 
non-pretence tasks since in the latter there is no pretence to be continued. In contrast, 
the availability hypothesis might predict similar rates of spontaneous box opening 
across the experimental conditions if the pictures, like the pretence, serve to increase 
the cognitive availability of the idea of the objects being inside the boxes.
Overall, the design of this experiment allows a direct test of the predictions made by 
the availability hypothesis and by the pretence continuation account of children’s 
spontaneous behaviours towards pretend entities. By comparing children’s behaviours 
during the pretence tasks and when subsequently left alone with the empty boxes, this 
study offers an opportunity to validate the claim that children’s behaviour towards 
pretend objects in the experimenter’s presence reflects pretend-reality confusion. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of a non-pretence control task enabled an investigation of 
the differing sorts of prompts that might lead to an increase in cognitive availability 
and whether mode (pretence or not) influences the effect this increase in availability 
has on the children’s behaviour.
Method
Subjects
Twenty-six younger children (16 boys and 10 girls) aged between 4 years 10 months 
and 5 years 8 months (mean age 5 years 3 months) and 19 middle children (8 boys and 
11 girls) aged between 5 years 9 months and 6 years 7 months (mean age 6 years 2 
months) were recruited from a predominantly middle class school in Surrey (N == 45).
Design
This experiment followed the basic design used in experiment 2, incorporating two 
additional experimental manipulations. First, children were allocated to either the 
pretence condition or the non-pretence condition. The procedure used in these 
conditions was identical with one exception - whereas the children in the pretence 
condition were asked to pretend about the contents of the boxes, children in the 
non-pretence condition did not. Instead, these children opened and discarded boxes 
that had been labelled with pictures. Second, the children were left alone with the 
boxes for 2 minutes after they had completed the opening and discarding tasks. A
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concealed video camera recorded the children’s behaviour during the experimenter’s 
absence - children were not informed that they were being filmed.
Materials
The same materials were used in both experimental conditions. The three identical 
cardboard boxes measured 17 x 24 x 27 cm. The pictures used in the object selection 
procedure (both conditions) and for labelling the boxes (non-pretence condition) were 
12 black and white line drawings of familiar animals - shown in Appendix 1. The 
animals represented were: a budgerigar (referred to as a budgie), cat, dog, guinea pig, 
ladybird, mouse, rabbit, scorpion, snake, tarantula, toad and tortoise. Appendix 2 
shows the picture given to children at the end of the experiment.
Procedure
As in previous experiments, the order of introduction to the pretend objects and the 
order of the opening and discarding tasks was counterbalanced. Before moving on to 
the second pair of tasks children were reminded of the nature and location of the 
pretend entities (pretence condition) or box labels (non-pretence condition). The order 
of the hypothetical and actual tasks was fixed such that children were always asked to 
predict their behaviour before actually carrying it out. Whilst introducing the pretend 
objects and attaching the pictures to the box lids, the experimenter used appropriate 
intonation in her voice - enthusiastic for the positive object (the animal that the child 
would most like to hold), dramatic for the negative object (the animal that the child 
would least like to hold) and nonnal for the neutral object (the animal that the child 
would not mind holding). However, the experimenter’s voice remained neutral 
throughout the object selection procedure.
The cliildren were tested individually by the author in their school libraiy. Wlien the 
child arrived the boxes were situated in a row on a table. When the cliild had settled 
she/he was asked to look inside all three boxes and to confirm that they were empty.
Task introduction and object selection (pretence condition). The task and pretend 
objects were introduced, “It doesn’t matter that the boxes are empty because we are 
going to play a game of pretend. I expect you’re good at pretend games aren’t you? . . 
. Here are some pictures of animals. I would like you to sort these cards into three 
piles - one for animals that you would like to hold and one for animals that you would 
not like to hold and one for animals that you would not mind if you held them or not”. 
The pictures were then presented in random order - “So here’s a {name animal).
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Would you like to hold a [name animal}, would you not like to hold a (name animal) 
or would you not mind if you held a [name animal) or not?”. This question was 
repeated for all 12 pictures.
Once the child had produced 3 piles of cards, the positive and negative animals were 
ranked (this was counterbalanced). The pictures were spread out in front of the child 
who was asked to select which of the animals shown they would most (positive object) 
or least (negative object) like to hold. This was repeated until all the pictures had been 
selected. The neutral object was selected randomly by shuffling the neutral cards and 
spreading them out face down in front of the child - “OK, let’s just pick any one of 
these animals, any one will do as you don’t mind about these ones”. A minority of 
children failed to produce a selection of neutral animals therefore the least positive 
animal was selected and re-labelled by the experimenter as one that the child would not 
mind holding. The pictures were then placed out of sight.
The pretending task was then introduced, “OK, I want you to pretend that the (name 
of animal) that you would really, really like to hold is in this box. And I want you to 
pretend that the [name of animal) that you would really, really not like to hold is in 
this box. And 1 want you to pretend that the [name of animal) that you would not 
mind if you hold it or not is in this box”. The boxes were indicated left to right.
Memoiy and reality checks. The wording and procedure for the memory and reality 
checks was identical to that used in previous experiments.
The task introduction and object selection in the non-pretence condition differed only 
in that the pretend game was referred to only as a ‘game’ and the pretence instructions 
were replaced - “OK, I’m going to put the picture of the [name of animal) that you 
would really, really like to hold on this box. And I’m going to put the picture of the 
[name of animal) that you would really, really not like to hold on this box. And I’m 
going to put the picture of the [name of animal) that you would not mind if you hold it 
or not on this box”. The pictures were attached to the lids of the boxes, working from 
left to right. There were no memory or reality checks in the non-pretence condition.
Opening tasks. (1) Hypothetical opening. The child was asked, “If I asked you to 
open one of the boxes, which one of the boxes would you open?”.
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(2) Actual opening. Once the child had nominated all three boxes they were asked to 
act, “OK, you show me now, you open one of the boxes now”. This was repeated 
until the three boxes had been opened.
Discarding tasks. (1) Hypothetical discarding. The child was asked, “If I asked 
you to throw away one of the boxes, which one of the boxes would you throw away?”. 
This was repeated until all three boxes had been nominated.
(2) Actual discarding. The child was then asked to actually discard the boxes, “OK, 
you show me now, you throw away one of the boxes now”. This was repeated until 
the three boxes had been discarded.
Experimenter’s departure. The child was then left alone with the boxes for 2 
minutes after the experimenter remarked - “Oh aren’t I silly. I’ve just realised that I 
was going to give you a picture to thank you for your help but I’ve forgotten to bring 
it. I’ll just go and get it. You wait here for me until I get back”.
Interview after experimenter’s return. The child was asked a series of questions 
(based on Harris et al, 1991 - experiment 4) about their behaviour when left alone:
1) “OK, what did you do while I was gone? Did you look inside any of the boxes?”. 
If the child denied looking inside any of the boxes subsequent questions were omitted 
and the child debriefed.
2) “Which box did you look inside? . . . Aiy others?”
3) “And what did you think when you went to open the box? . . . Did you think there 
was nothing inside the box or did you thinlc to yourself I wonder if there’s a (name of 
animal) inside?” This question was repeated for each box the child had opened.
Debrief. Before returning to their classroom the child was asked to check that the 
boxes were empty, thanked for their help and given the picture to colour in at home.
Children’s rank ordering of the animals, responses to the memory and reality checks 
and the orders of box selection were recorded in writing during the experiment. 
Children’s behaviour during the experimenter’s absence, verbal comments and 
responses to the interview questions were transcribed from the video recordings.
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Results
Animal Selections
All of the children happily selected liked and disliked animals and the majority (n = 34, 
76 %) generated a selection of animals that they would not mind holding. The median 
rankings for each animal were calculated - the most liked animal for each child was 
given a ranking of 1 and the least liked animal a ranking of 12. The neutral selection 
of animals were given a tied ranking where appropriate. These median rankings and 
the frequency with which each animal was selected as the positive, neutral and 
negative entities are presented in Table 7.1. Inspection of the median rankings for the 
animals revealed that the median rankings were spread across the full continuum - the 
highest ranking was 3 and the lowest was 11. The animals most frequently selected as 
the positive, neutral and negative entities were the rabbit (n = 13, 29 %), tortoise (n = 
14, 31 %) the tarantula (n = 16,36 %) respectively.
Table 7.1: Median rankings of animals (1 represents the most positive ranking and 12 
represents the most negative ranking) and frequency of selection as the positive, 
negative and neutral entities (n = 45)
Number of children selecting as target object
Animal Median Ranking Positive Neutral Negative
Rabbit 3 13 3 0
Dog 4 9 3 2
Cat 4 8 4 4
Guinea pig 4 6 1 1
Ladybird 4.5 5 3 1
Mouse 6 2 5 1
Budgie 6 0 6
Tortoise 7 0 14
Toad 9 0 5 2
Snake 9 1 1 6
Scorpion 11 0 0 10
Tarantula 11 1 0 16
Memoiy and reality checks
All of the children in the pretence condition responded correctly to the memory and 
reality checks (children in the non-pretence condition were not asked these questions).
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Box selection tasks
The children’s response patterns across each of the experimental tasks were subjected 
to CFA. The results of these analyses are summarised in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Results of Configurai Frequency Aialysis on children’s response patterns 
for each of the experimental tasks analysed separately (positive = animal the child 
would most like to hold, neutral = animal the child would not mind holding, negative = 
animal the child would least like to hold) (n = 45)
Positive = + 
Neutral = N 
Negative = -
Opening Tasks 
Hypothetical (Actual)
Discarding Tasks 
Hypothetical (Actual)
Pattern frequency z frequency z
+ N - 31 (23) *T 8.20 (*T4.05) - (1) - (*A -2.60)
+ - N 7 0 4 ) -0.75 (.95) - (2) - (-2.20)
N + - 3 (4) -2.24 (*A -2.50)1 - (1) - (*A-2.60>
N -  + 3 (4) -2.24 (*A -2.50)1 4 (8) *A-3.48 (.20)
1- N -t- - (-) (-) ! 37 (29) *T6.96 (*T 8.60)
I- + N 1 (-) ’^ A -2.98 (-) ! 4 (4) * A -3.48 (-1.40)
*T significant response type at p < .001 
*A significant response anti-type at p < .01
On the hypothetical opening task only 5 of the 6 possible response patterns were 
observed - none of the children nominated the negative box first, neutral box second 
and positive box last. Of the 5 observed response patterns, one emerged as a 
significant response type and one as a significant response anti-type (see Table 7.2). 
The significant response type was selection of the positive box first, neutral box 
second and negative box last (z = 8.2, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = 
.01). This response pattern accounted for the behaviour of 31 children. The results 
for the actual opening task were similar to those obtained in the hypothetical version. 
The same response pattern emerged as the significant response type (z = 4.05, p < 
.001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .013) although it represented the behaviour 
of fewer children (n = 23). Of the remaining 5 possible response patterns, 2 were not 
observed, 2 emerged as significant response types and there was one non-significant 
response pattern (see Table 7.2).
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The results for the hypothetical discarding task were very clear. Only 3 of the 6 
possible response patterns were obseiwed. The significant response type was the order 
negative box first, neutral second and positive last (z = 6.96, p < .001, Bonferroni 
adjustment for p at .05 = .017) and this accounted for the behaviour of 37 children. 
The remaining 8 children were equally distributed between 2 significant response 
anti-types (see Table 7.2). The significant response type for the actual discarding task 
was to discard the negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last (z = 
8.60, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .008). This response pattern 
accounted for the behaviour of 29 children. The remaining 16 children were 
distributed between 2 significant response anti-types and 3 non-significant response 
patterns (see Table 7.2).
The results of these CFA suggested that there were fewer children generating the 
response type on the actual than on the hypothetical versions of the tasks. To establish 
whether these apparent differences were statistically significant, further analyses were 
conducted. A comparison of children’s responses across the hypothetical and actual 
opening tasks (Table 7.3) revealed that whilst 21 children produced the response type 
on both occasions and 12 children did so on neither task, 12 children changed their 
responses. Ten children produced the response type on the hypothetical task but went 
on to actually open the boxes in a different order and 2 children actually opened the 
boxes according to the response type after having said that they would open them in a 
different order. This variability in children’s behaviour was statistically significant 
(McNemar exact significance, p = .039).
Table 7.3: Comparison of children’s responses across hypothetical and actual opening 
tasks (response type: positive - neutral - negative) - figures in brackets are for 
discarding tasks (response type: negative - neutral - positive) (n = 45)
Response Pattern on 
Hypothetical Task
Actual Task Type Other
Type 21 (29) ! 2 (0) ;
Other : 10 (8) , 12 (8)
To explore the nature of the change in children’s behaviour, the response patterns that 
children changed to and fi'om across the two versions of the opening task were
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considered (Table 7,4). These analyses revealed that 9 of the 10 children who changed 
from the response type (hypothetical task) to a different response pattern, actually 
opened the positive, then the negative and then the neutral box. The remaining child 
actually opened the neutral, negative and then the positive box. There were 2 children 
who actually opened the boxes according to the response type after having 
hypothetically selected the boxes in a different order - both of these children had 
selected the positive, negative and then the neutral box on the hypothetical opening 
task. Of the 12 children who produced one of the other response patterns on both 
versions of the task, 4 selected the positive, negative and then the neutral box on both 
occasions, 2 selected the neutral, positive and then negative boxes and 2 selected the 
neutral, negative and then positive boxes on both occasions. The remaining 4 children 
produced different response patterns on each version of the task.
Table 7.4: Comparison of children’s response patterns across hypothetical and actual 
opening tasks - figures in brackets are for discarding tasks (positive = +, neutral = N, 
negative = -) (n = 45)
Hypothetical Opening Task (Hypathetical Diseardiiiig Task)
; Actual Task + N - + - N 1 N + - N - + - N + 1 - + N i
+ N - 21 (-) ; 2 (-) ^ - (-) ' - (-) t - (1) ! - (-) '
+ - N 9 (-) ; 4 (-) . - (-) - (-) ; - 0 )  ; 1 (1)
N + - - (-) 1 (-) 2 (-) I (-) - (1) - (“)
N - + 1 (-) - (-) 1 (-) 2 (4) - (4) ' - (-)
- N + - (-) - (-) - (-) - (-) : - (29) - (-)
- + N - (-) - (-) - (-) - (-) - (1) - (3)
Returning now to the data presented in Table 7.3, 29 children produced the response 
type on both the hypothetical and actual versions of the discarding task and 8 children 
did so on neither. Eight children changed their responses across the 2 versions of the 
task - all of them produced the response type on the hypothetical task but actually 
discarded the boxes in a different order. This variability in the children’s behaviour 
was statistically significant (McNemar exact significance, p = .008). The changes in 
children’s behaviour were more fully analysed - Table 7.4. These results revealed that 
of the 8 children who produced the response type on the hypothetical but not the 
actual task, 4 actually discarded the neutral box first, negative box second and then the 
positive box. The remaining 4 children each actually discarded the boxes in a different 
order. Of the 8 children who did not produce the response type on either version of
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the task, 4 discarded the neutral box first, negative box second and positive box last on 
both versions of the task and 3 discarded the negative box first, the positive box and 
then the neutral box hypothetically and actually. The remaining child hypothetically 
discarded the negative box first, positive box second and neutral box last but went on 
to actually discard the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box last.
Due to the significant differences between the hypothetical and actual versions of the 
opening and discarding tasks, a comparison of the results from the pretence and 
non-pretence conditions was peiTormed considering the four experimental tasks 
individually. The aim of these analyses was to establish whether children’s behaviour 
on the box selection tasks differed according to experimental condition.
The fi'equencies for each response pattern obseiwed on the opening tasks are presented 
according to experimental condition in Table 7.5. On the hypothetical opening task a 
similar number of children from the pretence condition (n = 17, 71 %) as from the 
non-pretence condition (n = 14, 67 %) responded according to the response type 
(positive - neutral - negative). Aialyses comparing the frequencies of the response 
type and all other response patterns taken together confirmed that there was no 
statistically significant difference between the two conditions (%^  = .09, df = 1, p = 
.763). However, slightly more children responded by nominating the positive, negative 
and then the neutral box in the pretence condition (n = 5, 21 %) than in the 
non-pretence condition (n = 2, 10 %). A similar pattern of results was obtained for the 
actual opening task (figures in brackets in Table 7.5) - a similar number of children 
generated the response type in the pretence condition (n = 13, 54 %) as in the 
non-pretence condition (n = 10, 48 %). Statistical analysis confirmed that there was 
no significant difference in the number of children generating the response type 
according to condition (%^  = .19, df = 1, p == .661). However, once again somewhat 
more children from the pretence condition (n = 9, 38 %) than from the non-pretence 
condition (n = 5, 24 %) opened the positive box first, negative box second and neutral 
box last.
The frequencies for each response pattern generated on the discarding tasks are 
presented according to condition in Table 7.6. Slightly more children from the 
pretence condition (n = 22, 92 %) than from the non-pretence condition (n = 15, 71 
%) generated the response type (negative - neutral - positive) on the hypothetical 
discarding task. However, statistical analyses comparing the frequencies of the 
response type with those for all other response patterns taken together revealed that
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this difference did not reach statistical significance (Fisher’s exact probability, p = 
.121). A similar discrepancy in the numbers of children producing the response type 
was obseiwed on the actual discarding task. Whilst 17 children (71 %) from the 
pretence condition produced the response type, only 12 children (57 %) from the 
non-pretence condition did so. This difference was also not statistically significant (%^  
= .92, df = 1, p = .338).
Table 7.5: Summary of response patterns generated on the hypothetical opening task 
(actual opening task in brackets) presented according to experimental condition 
(positive = +, neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 45)
R E S P O N S E  P A T T E R N  
Hypothetical (Actual)
Condition + N - + - N N + - N -  + - N + -  + N
Pretence 17 (13) 5 (9) 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Non-Pretence i 14 (10) i 2 (5) : 2 (3) : 2 (3) 0 (0) : 1 (0)
Total 31 (23): 7 (14), 3 (4) : 3 (4) I 0 (0) i 1 (0) :
Table 7.6: Summary of response patterns generated on the hypothetical discarding 
task (actual discarding task in brackets) presented according experimental condition 
(positive = +, neutral == N, negative = -) (n = 45)
R E S P O N S E  P A T T E R N  
Hypothetical (Actual)
Condition + N - + - N N + - N -  + - N + - + N
Pretence 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (0) 2 (4) 22 (17) 0 (1)
Non-Pretence 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (1) 2 (4) 15 (12): 4 (3)
Total 0 (1) 0 (2) 0 (1) 4 (8) 37 (29)1 4 (4)
The response patterns produced over the twelve trials across the four experimental 
tasks taken together were subjected to CFA. The results of this analysis are 
summarised in Table 7.7 which reveals that overall there were two significant response 
types. First, a significant number of children (n = 17) responded by opening 
(hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral box second and negative 
box last and by discarding (hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, neutral 
box second and positive box last (z = 10.7, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at
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.05 = .002). The second significant response type was generated by the 7 children who 
said that they would open the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box 
last (hypothetical task) but actually opened the positive box, then the negative box and 
then the neutral box. These children discarded (hypothetically and actually) the 
negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last (z = 3.55, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .002). Two children opened (hypothetically and 
actually) the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box last and discarded 
(hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, neutral box second and positive 
box last. The remaining 19 children each produced unique response patterns. There 
were no significant response anti-types.
Table 7.7: Summary of results of Configurai Frequency Analysis of response patterns 
across all experimental tasks taken together (positive = animal the child would most 
like to hold, neutral = animal the child would not mind holding, negative = animal the 
child would least like to hold) (n = 45)
Response Pattern 
Positive = +; Neutral = N; Negative = -
+ N - (+ N -) - N + (- N +) 17+ N - (+ - N) - N + (- N +) 7+ - N (+ - N) - N + (- N +) 2
Opening Tasks | Discarding Tasks | j i
Hypothetical (Actual) i Hypothetical (Actual) ! Fregneney I zl
*T 10.70, 
*T3.55 
- .03
The remaining 19 children each produced a unique 1 - .75
response profile different from each other and the above.
*T significant response type at p < .001
To establish whether this new, second significant response type was specific to one or 
other of the experimental conditions, further analyses were conducted. CFA w e^re 
again performed on the twelve trial response patterns but on this occasion the data 
from the pretence and non-pretence conditions were analysed separately. The results 
of these analyses are summarised in Table 7.8 which shows that only one response type 
emerged in each condition.
In the pretence condition, 9 children opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive 
box first, neutral box second and negative box last and discarded (hypothetically and
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actually) the negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last (z = 4.49, p < 
.001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .005). Six children said that they would 
open the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last but actually 
opened the positive, then the negative and then the neutral box and discarded 
(hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral box second and positive box 
last. This response pattern, which had reached statistical significance with the 
experimental conditions combined, just failed to reach statistical significance (z = 2.25, 
p = .007, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .005). Two children opened 
(hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, negative box second and neutral 
box last and discarded (hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, neutral box 
second and positive box last. There were no significant response anti-types and the 
remaining 7 children each produced unique response patterns.
In the non-pretence condition the significant response type was generated by 8 children 
and reflected opening (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral box 
second and negative box last and discarding (hypothetically and actually) the negative 
box first, neutral box second and positive box last (z = 5.51, p < .001, Bonferroni 
adjustment for p at .05 = .004). The remaining 13 children each produced unique, 
non-significant response patterns.
Table 7.8; Summary of results of Configurai Frequency Analysis of response patterns 
across all experimental tasks taken together presented according to experimental 
condition (positive = animal the child would most like to hold, neutral = animal the 
child would not mind holding, negative = animal the child would least like to hold) (n
= 45)
Response Pattern
Positive = +; Neutral = N; Negative = -_________Experimental Condition_______
 Opening  Discarding_________Pretence  Non-Pretence
_______ Hypotbetical (Actual)_______f z. . f  z
+ N-~ (+N- )  - N +  ( - N+)  9 *T 4.49i 8 *T5.5h
• + N  - (+ - N)  - N +  ( - N+)  6 2.25; I ‘ -.42
+ - N (+ - N) - N + (- N +) ' 2 - .27;
The remaining 7 children in the pretence condition and 12 children in the non-pretence, 
condition each produced a unique response pattern different from eachr other and the
above.
*T significant response type at p < .001
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The results of the CFA, presented in Table 7.8, suggest a subtle difference in children’s 
behaviour across the two experimental conditions. Although in each condition the 
same, single significant response type emerged and was produced by the same 
proportion of children in the pretence condition (n = 9, 38 %) as in the non-pretence 
condition (n = 8, 38 %) (%- = .002, df = 1, p = .967), the behaviour of the remaining 
children does appear to vary. When the experimental conditions were combined a 
second significant response type emerged - a significant number of children (n = 7, 16 
%) said that they would open the positive, neutral and then the negative box but 
actually opened the positive, negative and then the neutral box. These children 
hypothetically and actually discarded the negative box first, neutral box second and 
positive box last. Six of the children responding in this manner were from the pretence 
condition and just one came from the non-pretence condition. Statistical analysis was 
performed comparing these frequencies with those of the children producing all other 
response patterns combined (Table 7.9) - a 3 by 2 chi-square comparing the 
frequencies of the 2 response types and other response patterns was not possible due 
to small expected frequencies. The distribution of frequencies shown in Table 7.9 
failed to reach significance for a 2-tailed test (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .101) but 
was approaching significance for a 1-tailed test (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .07) 
which was conducted under the hypothesis that this response pattern would be 
produced by more children from the pretence, than from the non-pretence condition.
Table 7.9: Children’s responses across all tasks (hypothetical and actual opening then 
hypothetical and actual discarding) presented according to experimental condition 
(positive = +, neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 45)
Response Pattern
Condition + N - (+ - N) - N + (- N +) . Other
Pretence 6 18
Non-Pretence 1 20
Children’s behaviour during the experimenter’s absence
Due to an equipment failure the video data for 4 cliildren were lost, thus leaving the 
data for 41 children (21 in the pretence condition and 20 in the non-pretence 
condition). The data from the video recordings were analysed such that children were 
classified into 1 of 3 mutually exclusive activity categories:
- did nothing (including sitting or standing still, fidgeting and nose picking)
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- other activity (including walking around the room and reading books)
- opened box(es).
The numbers of children engaging in each of these activities are presented according to 
experimental condition in Table 7.10. Inspection of these frequencies shows that the 
children were approximately equally distributed across each category of activity 
apparently independently of experimental condition.
Table 7.10: Summary of children’s behaviour during experimenter’s absence 
presented according to experimental condition (n = 41)
Behavioural Category
Condition Opened box(es) Did nothing Other Activity
Pretence 6 7 8
Non-Pretence . 7 5 8
The behaviour that was of particular interest in this experiment was box opening 
behaviour during the experimenter’s absence. Inspection of Table 7.11 revealed that, 
overall, 13 children (32 %) opened one or more of the boxes. The rates of box 
opening did not differ according to experimental condition - whilst 6 children (29 %) 
from the pretence condition opened one of more of the boxes, 7 children (35 %) from 
the non-pretence condition did so (%^  = .2, df = ft p = .658). In the pretence 
condition, of the 6 children who opened the boxes during the experimenter’s absence, 
3 children opened just one box, 2 children opened all 3 boxes and 1 child opened 2 
boxes. In the non-pretence condition, 4 children opened 1 box and the other 3 
children opened all 3 boxes. Interestingly, all 7 children who opened just one box 
opened the positive box. The child who opened 2 boxes opened the neutral and then
the negative box. There were 6 possible orders in which children could have opened
all 3 boxes, however, only 2 of these were observed;
- positive - negative - neutral (n = 3)
- neutral - positive - negative (n = 2).
Aialyses were conducted to explore the relationship between children’s response 
patterns on the experimental tasks and whether or not they opened the boxes during 
the experimenter’s absence (Table 7.12). These analyses were conducted taking the 
children’s 6 trial response patterns across the hypothetical and actual opening tasks. 
This was to ensure that the two significant response types that emerged overall were
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reflected but without setting unduly strict criteria for children’s inclusion into these 
groups - any variability across the discarding tasks was ignored.
Of the 13 children who opened the boxes in the experimenter’s absence, the majority 
(n = 9, 69 %) had both hypothetically and actually elected to open the positive box 
first, neutral box second and negative box last. However, the children producing this 
response pattern were equally split between opening (n = 9, 47 %) and not opening (n 
= 10, 53 %) the boxes during the experimenter’s absence. Of the 8 children who 
hypothetically selected the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last 
but who actually opened the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box 
last, 6 (75 %) did not open the boxes during the experimenter’s absence. All other 
combinations of response pattern were categorised together as other response 
patterns, the majority of these children (n = 12, 86 %) did not approach the boxes 
during the experimenter’s absence. Given that there were no obvious differences 
between the two experimental conditions, the frequencies were combined to give a 2 
by 2 chi-square comparing the number of children generating the response type with 
those producing all other response patterns combined -  4.011, df = l , p <  .05).
Table 7.11: Number of children opening the boxes during the experimenter’s absence 
presented according to experimental condition (n = 41)
Condition Opened box(es) Did not open box(es)
Pretence 6 15
Non-Pretence 7 13
Table 7.12: Numbers of children opening the boxes during the experimenter’s absence 
presented according to response pattern across hypothetical and actual opening tasks - 
pretence condition (figures in brackets are for non-pretence condition) (n = 41 )
Response Pattern
Opened Box(es) + N - / + N - ' All o ther i*esponse patterns
Yes 4 (5) 2 (2)
No 6 (4) 9
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To establish whether these patterns of relationship between box opening and response 
patterns on the experimental task was sensitive to age, flirther analyses were 
conducted. There were no significant differences between the pretence and 
non-pretence conditions on the numbers of cliildren opening the boxes for either the 
younger (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .586) or middle children (Fisher’s exact 
probability, p = .179). Therefore the results for the two experimental conditions were 
combined. As can be seen from the frequencies presented in Table 7.13, more children 
from the middle (n = 9, 47 %) age group, than from the younger (n = 4, 18 %) age 
group, opened one or more boxes. This difference was statistically significant (%2 = 
4.01, df = 1, p < .05). The relationship between the children’s response patterns from 
the experimental tasks and box opening behaviour during the experimenter’s absence is 
summarised in Table 7.14. These results show that amongst the younger children, all 4 
children who opened the boxes in the experimenter’s absence had opened the positive, 
neutral and then the negative box on the (hypothetical and actual) opening tasks. This 
was also true of 5 of the 9 children (56 %) from the middle age group who had opened 
one or more of the boxes during the experimenter’s absence. Of the remaining 4 
children, 2 selected the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last on 
the hypothetical opening task but actually opened the positive box first, negative box 
second and neutral box last and the remaining 2 children produced other response 
patterns on both tasks.
Table 7.13: Number of children opening the boxes during the experimenter’s absence 
presented according to age group (n = 41 )
Age Group Opened box(es) Did not open hox(es)
Younger 4 18
Middle 9 10
Table 7.14: Numbers of children opening the boxes during the experimenter’s absence 
presented according to response pattern across hypothetical and actual opening tasks - 
younger age group (figures in brackets are for middle age group) (positive = +, neutral 
= N, negative = -) (n = 41)
Response Pattern
Opened Box(es) + N ■- / + N - All other response patterns <
'Yes 4 (5) 0 (4)
No 5 (5) 13 (5) i
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Intei*view after experimenter’s return
Following to the experimenter’s return the children were asked whether they had 
opened any of the boxes whilst the experimenter was out of the room, which one(s) 
and why. These responses were then compared with the evidence from the video 
recordings. Of the 13 children who opened the boxes, 8 (62 %) admitted to having 
done so. Three children who did not open any of the boxes said that they had done so. 
The remaining 25 children accurately denied having looked inside the boxes. Given 
that so few (n = 8) children accurately reported having looked inside the boxes, the 
data from the justification questions were not analysed fully. However, for 
information the comments of those children who accurately described their behaviour 
are listed below. The children in the pretence condition commented:
“. . . I think there was a tarantula, the dog - the dog turned into a tarantula. 
You know, when you are dead you turn into a skeleton. . .”
“. . . Don’t know. . .”
“. . . There was nothing inside them. . .”
The children in the non-pretence condition made similar comments:
. . I thought one of them were in there. . .”
. . Nothing. . .”
“. . . Nothing in them so I might as well sit down. .
". . . I thought I’d like this one here - the rabbit one. . .”
“. . . There was a mouse in it - the picture - not a real one. . .”
Discussion
The children in this experiment, whether in the pretence or non-pretence condition, 
behaved in a highly systematic manner towards the empty boxes when the 
experimenter prompted them to open and discard those boxes. Like those in previous 
experiments, these children tended to open the positive box first and discard it last, and 
to discard the negative box first and open it last. However, unlike previous 
experiments, in this experiment statistically significant differences emerged in the 
children’s behaviour across the hypothetical and actual versions of the opening and 
discarding tasks. There are two alternative explanations for these differences.
First, it is possible that the empirical evidence of box contents obtained on actually 
opening the first box influenced children’s beliefs about, and consequently their 
behaviour towards, the remaining boxes. However, these hypothetical versus actual
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differences emerged on the discarding tasks as well as the opening tasks. When 
discarding the boxes, neither the hypothetical nor the actual task affords visual 
confirmation of the box contents. Therefore it is not possible for empirical evidence to 
be the causal mechanism for the differences between the discarding tasks. The second 
possible intei-pretation of these hypothetical versus actual differences is that they 
represent an order effect - a consequence of repeated presentation of what is 
essentially the same task.
However, across the two versions of the opening task a large proportion of the 
variability in children’s behaviour was accounted for by changes between just two 
responses patterns - positive box first, neutral box second, negative box last and 
positive box first, negative box second, neutral box last. A simple effect of task order 
would not have caused such systematic variability but would instead have led to 
changes between all of the observed response patterns - the effects of task order 
should be random. An alternative explanation for these hypothetical versus actual task 
differences is that whilst some of the variability may well be accounted for by a task 
order effect (including the variability on the discarding tasks), some might be due to 
the effects of empirical evidence of box contents on the children’s beliefs about the 
pretence. Thus for some children opening the positive box first and finding it to be 
empty seems to change their beliefs about the remaining entities such that their 
behaviour towards them alters relative to the hypothetical task.
When the four experimental tasks were analysed separately, the results fiom the 
pretence and non-pretence conditions were very similar - the same significant response 
types emerged with comparable prevalence in each condition. However, evidence of 
differences between the experimental conditions did emerge when children’s patterns 
of response across all experimental tasks taken together were analysed. As in previous 
experiments the most frequent response pattern was to open (hypothetically and 
actually) the positive box first and negative box last and to discard (hypothetically and 
actually) the negative box first and open it last. The neutral box was repeatedly placed 
as the children’s second selection. This response pattern emerged with almost 
identical frequency in the pretence and non-pretence conditions. However, unlike 
previous experiments a second statistically significant response pattern emerged. A 
significant number of children said that they would open the positive, neutral and then 
the negative box (hypothetical task) but actually opened the positive box and then the 
negative box, leaving the neutral box until last. These children discarded 
(hypothetically and actually) the negative, neutral and then the positive box. This
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second significant response pattern reflects the systematic nature of the variability in 
cliildren’s behaviour across the hypothetical and actual opening tasks that was 
discussed earlier.
Amongst some children in the previous experiments, selecting the negative box second 
rather than last was shown to reflect uncertainty about the pretend-reality distinction 
(experiments 2 and 3). It is therefore feasible that the second significant response type 
observed in this experiment, similarly represents the behaviour of cliildren who wonder 
about the possible existence of the pretend objects. It is possible that due to 
pretend-reality confusion these children say that they will approach the positive 
pretend entity and avoid the negative pretend entity when making their hypothetical 
decisions, but after actually opening the positive box and finding it empty, elect to 
open the negative box second rather than leaving it until last since they have been 
reassured of the pretend status of the box contents. In other words, the significant 
differences between the hypothetical and actual opening tasks might be attributable to 
the influence of empirical evidence of box contents on this group of credulous children. 
If this new significant response type is representative of the behaviour of children who 
are uncertain of the pretend-reality distinction, why has this response pattern not 
emerged significantly in other experiments? Furthermore, given the assumption that 
the pictures and pretence both prompt an increase in cognitive availability, why was 
this response pattern generated by six children fiom the pretence condition but only 
one child from the non-pretence condition?
There are several possible explanations that relate to the differences in the design of 
this experiment compared to previous ones. First, in previous experiments whilst the 
positive and neutral entities have been everyday objects (Christmas presents and cups), 
the negative object was of supernatural origin - a monster. Perhaps children’s 
certainty about the pretend-reality distinction is influenced by the supernatural status of 
the pretence. However, evidence obtained by Harris et al (1991 - experiments 1 and
2) demonstrates that this is not likely to be the case. Second, unlike previous 
experiments where the children were only involved in selecting the positive entity 
(their preferred Christmas present), in this experiment children were asked to choose 
all three objects from a pre-detennined selection of alternatives. However, the 
possibility that children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction varies 
according to whether the pretend objects are child or adult selected seems unlikely 
given the evidence obtained by Golomb & Galasso (1995). Therefore, although these 
two possibilities cannot be ruled out, a third possibility seems more likely.
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In both conditions in this experiment, the animal pictures were used in the object 
selection procedure. In the non-pretence condition the selected pictures were then 
used to label the boxes. Importantly, these pictures were the only cue that could 
directly increase the cognitive availability for the idea of the animals being inside the 
boxes. In the pretence condition the pictures were only used in the object selection 
procedure. Availability for the animals should therefore only have been increased by 
the act of pretending that they were in the boxes. However, perhaps the pictures 
themselves made the pretence easier since the child has already been provided with an 
example of what the animals would look like. This might make the animal even easier 
to bring to mind and to pretend about. Consequently there might have been a greater 
increase in cognitive availability in the pretence condition than in the non-pretence 
condition and therefore, perhaps the number of children who became uncertain of the 
reality status of the box contents was greater in the pretence condition. Similarly, 
availability levels might be higher here than in the pretence tasks used in previous 
experiments in which the children have had to conjure up for themselves what the 
entities would look like. This interpretation of the differential role of the pictures 
across conditions is consistent with the availability hypothesis and would predict the 
different results across the experimental conditions in this experiment and between this 
experiment and previous ones using a similar design (experiments 1, 2 and 5). 
However, further empirical work would be required to empirically test between these 
alternative explanations for the emergence of this new second significant response type 
and the related differences between the hypothetical and actual tasks.
A key aspect of this experiment was analysis of children’s spontaneous behaviours in 
the experimenter’s absence. After they had completed the pretence or non-pretence 
tasks the children were left alone for two minutes. During this time approximately 
equal numbers of children sat and did nothing, opened one or more of the boxes, and 
engaged in other activities (such as picldng their nose, singing, jumping up and down 
and looking at books). Overall, a similar number of children in this experiment as in 
Harris et al (1991) and Johnson and Harris (1994) approached the boxes when left 
alone, even though the pretence had been terminated by the experimenter and there 
were alternative activities in which the children could, and indeed did, engage. These 
findings suggest that Golomb and Galasso’s (1995) failure to replicate the Harris et al 
findings was simply a consequence of the experimenter remaining in the room with the 
children and not of explicitly concluding the pretence or providing alternative play 
activities. Furthermore, contrary to Golomb and Galasso’s claims, when the children 
in this experiment opened the boxes in the experimenter’s absence this did not seem to
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be through pretence continuation - not only had the pretence been terminated, but also 
equal numbers of children approached the boxes in the two experimental conditions 
even though there was no pretence to be continued in the non-pretence condition. 
Thus Golomb and Galasso’s critique of this method of assessing children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction has been shown to be incorrect and 
based on inadequate evidence from an experiment in which key variables were 
confounded.
The results obtained in this experiment support the Harris et al (1991) and Johnson 
and Harris (1994) claims that children open boxes containing pretend objects during 
the experimenter’s absence due to uncertainty about the possible contents of the 
boxes. The results are also consistent with the idea that the pretence and non-pretence 
tasks increased the cognitive availability of the animals being inside the boxes - this led 
some children to become uncertain about the taie contents of the boxes and 
consequently, to check out their possible contents by opening one or more of them. 
However, these findings do not simply replicate those obtained by Harris et al and 
Johnson and Harris, but have extended them. In Han is et al and Johnson and Harris, 
the affect evoked by the box contents was varied on a between subjects basis - whilst 
some cliildren pretended about frightening creatures (monsters), others had pretended 
about desirable or innocuous entities (rabbits, ice-cream or fairies). In contrast, in the 
present experiment evei-y child pretended about or labelled the boxes with positive, 
neutral and negative affect evoking animals - affect was varied on a within subjects 
basis. This experimental manipulation lead to some intriguing findings. Although 
cognitive availability was presumably equivalent across all three entities, over half of 
the children who approached the boxes in the experimenter’s absence opened just one 
box - all of these children opened the positive box.
This finding is suggestive of an interaction between the effects of increased cognitive 
availability and affect. Under conditions of equivalent levels of availability, these 
children prioritised a response to their positive affect over and above any response to 
neutral or negative affect. In other words, these children may well have been uncertain 
about the reality status of all three entities, but their behaviour was focused on 
checking out the possible existence of the object associated with positive affect. This 
finding is compatible with the results of experiments 4a and 4b in which children 
appeared to prioritise positive affect by opening the boxes despite the consequences 
this behaviour might have had on their levels of negative affect. Children seem to be 
highly sensitive to the differential types of affect evoked by their pretence and respond
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in a highly selective manner even when they are not being prompted to behave towards 
the boxes by an adult experimenter - they appear to continue to seek positive entities. 
Of course, that so few children opened the negative box could be taken as suggesting 
that the children were somehow able to dismiss their negative affect and prioritise 
positive (as suggested by the results of experiments 4a and 4b) or alternatively, that the 
children were continuing to avoid the negative entity. The data do not permit 
differentiation between these possibilities.
An intriguing finding obtained here was the evidence of a developmental trend in 
children’s spontaneous behaviour - significantly more middle children than younger 
children approached the boxes in the experimenter’s absence. This age effect was not 
mediated by any effects of experimental condition nor the number of boxes opened. 
This developmental difference might be taken to suggest that more five to six year old 
than four to five year old children are credulous, or alternatively, that their credulity is 
equivalent but emerges differently in behavioural terms. That is, whilst younger 
children do not check out the possible box contents, middle children do so, despite 
equivalent levels of uncertainty. This interpretation is consistent with the results of 
experiments 2 and 5 which also demonstrated age related differences in children’s 
responses to the pretend entities under conditions of potential pretend-reality 
uncertainty.
The results of this experiment support Harris et al’s (1991) and Johnson and Harris’ 
(1994) argument that children’s spontaneous behaviour in the absence of the 
experimenter can be interpreted as being a result of their uncertainty about the reality 
status of certain objects. Furthermore, the nature of this uncertainty about objects that 
have been suggested by either acts of the imagination or by pictures seems to be 
consistent with the operation of the effects of increased cognitive availability. 
Therefore, it is meaningful to move on to the main aim of this experiment - to validate 
the use of pretence tasks by exploring the relationship between children’s spontaneous 
behaviours and their response patterns on the box selection tasks. This analysis 
revealed clear associations between the two measures of children’s behaviour. All of 
the younger children who spontaneously opened the boxes when left alone had 
(hypothetically and actually) opened the positive box first, neutral box second and 
negative box last. Likewise, just over half of the middle children who spontaneously 
opened the boxes had also opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, 
neutral box second and negative box last. The significant response type whereby 
children said they would open the neutral box second but actually open it last, and
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instead open the negative box second was produced by a quarter of the middle children 
who opened the boxes in the experimenter’s absence.
The association between opening the positive, neutral and then the negative box and 
the children’s spontaneous box opening is consistent with the claims made at the end 
of experiment 5. Although some children might select the boxes in this order on the 
pretence tasks out of pretence continuation, some children’s verbal comments, and 
indeed their spontaneous behaviour, are suggestive of pretend-reality confusion. In 
other words, selecting the boxes such as to seek positive entities and avoid negative 
entities seems to be generated by two separable and differently motivated groups of 
children - those who engage in pretence continuation and those who suffer 
pretend-reality confusion. This finding supports the argument that children’s 
behaviour on the pretence task is motivated by their beliefs about the reality status of 
the pretend entities. Thus it seems that pretence tasks are a valid indicator of 
children’s beliefs about the pretend-reality distinction and that they are indeed a usefiil 
methodology for assessing developmental and individual differences therein.
However, given that it has been argued that the pretence condition might actually elicit 
higher levels of availability than the non-pretence condition, it is striking that there 
were no differences in the children’s spontaneous behaviour across the two conditions. 
Furthermore, if selecting the positive, negative and then the neutral box is indicative of 
pretend-reality conflision, it is interesting that so few of these children spontaneously 
open the boxes when left alone with them. This raises the possibility that the 
children’s spontaneous behaviours are not ftilly dependent on the effects of availability. 
Perhaps the children who open the boxes in the experimenter’s absence do so simply as 
a response to the affect evoked by the pretence and those children who are truly 
uncertain of the pretend status of the entities (and who perhaps therefore open the 
positive, negative and then the neutral box) do not open them. The possibility that 
there may be alternative explanations for children’s spontaneous behaviours during the 
experimenter’s absence is investigated in experiment 7.
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Chapter 8: Experiment 7 
Exploring children’s behaviour in the experimenter’s absence
Introduction
In experiment 6 equal numbers of children from the pretence and non-pretence 
conditions spontaneously opened one or more of the boxes during the experimenter’s 
absence. This similarity between the two experimental conditions was interpreted as 
supporting the prediction that both the act of pretending about the box contents and 
the labelling of the boxes with pictures could lead to an increase in cognitive 
availability. As a consequence, some of the children in each condition became 
uncertain about the reality status of the box contents and looked inside the boxes when 
left alone with them. The findings from experiment 6 therefore broadly replicated 
those obtained by Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall and Harmer (1991 - experiment 4) 
and Johnson and Harris (1994 - experiment 3) and furthermore, clarified the reasons 
underlying the rather different results obtained by Golomb and Galasso (1995 - 
experiment 1).
However, within the serial box selection tasks the children’s behaviour seemed to vary 
according to whether they had been asked to pretend about the box contents, or to 
label the boxes with pictures. Although equal numbers of children in each condition 
opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral box second and the 
negative box last and discarded (hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, 
neutral box second and positive box last, a second significant response type emerged 
which was sensitive to experimental condition. More children from the pretence than 
from the non-pretence condition said that they would open the positive box first, 
neutral box second and negative box last (hypothetical task) but actually opened the 
positive box first and then the negative box, leaving the neutral box until last. This 
difference between the two experimental conditions led to the claim that the pretence 
might have caused a greater increase in cognitive availability than the pictures. It was 
argued that this second significant response pattern perhaps reflected pretend-reality 
confusion and that the change in the children’s behaviour across the hypothetical and 
actual opening tasks reflected the influence of empirical evidence of reality on the 
children’s beliefs about the box contents. If this interpretation of the difference in the 
results of the two experimental conditions is correct, the children’s behaviour in the 
experimenter’s absence should also have been sensitive to the different levels of
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availability for the box contents across conditions. In other words, if spontaneous box 
opening is a result of the effects of increased cognitive availability, and if the pretence 
leads to a higher increase in cognitive availability than box labelling, the number of 
children opening the boxes in the experimenter’s absence should have been higher in 
the pretence condition than in the non-pretence condition. This was not the case.
One possible explanation for the similarity in the children’s spontaneous behaviours 
across the two experimental conditions is that the box opening in the experimenter’s 
absence was not totally dependent on the effects of availability on the children’s beliefs 
about the box contents. That is, perhaps neither the pictures nor the pretence were 
instrumental in children’s decision to open the boxes when the experimenter was out of 
the room and instead some other factor was causal. For example, there might simply 
be a baseline number of children who open boxes when left alone with them, due to 
general curiosity, or due to suspicions about the experimenter’s intentions. Total 
independence of the children’s spontaneous behaviours from the effects of availability 
seems unlikely for two main reasons. First, the observed relationship between 
children’s spontaneous behaviours and their response patterns on the box selection 
tasks would not be expected if the cause of children’s spontaneous behaviours was 
entirely separate from their beliefs about the box contents. Second, the fact that so 
many children only opened the positive box when they had been left alone with 
positive, neutral and negative entities, seems to be a very clear indication that the 
suggested box contents had influenced the children’s behaviour. However, the 
possibility that at least some children’s spontaneous behaviours were motivated by 
factors other than the effects of availability cannot be completely ruled out. The aim of 
the present experiment was to test this possibility.
This experiment followed the design and procedure used in experiment 6 but with a 
single modification. In experiment 6 the experimenter’s departure came after the box 
selection tasks had been completed and after the pretence (or pictures game) had been 
explicitly terminated (post-task). In the present experiment the children were left alone 
with the boxes on two occasions. The children were left alone for the first time 
immediately after they had checked that the boxes were empty, before any mention 
had been made of animals or other possible box contents (pre-task). That is, the 
children entered the experimental setting, were asked to confirm that the boxes were 
empty and then the experimenter immediately made an excuse to leave the room. If 
the children’s spontaneous behaviour in experiment 6 was a result of the effects of 
availability, then during this pre-task experimenter’s absence very few children should
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open the boxes since there are no specific box contents for which cognitive availability 
can be increased. However, if children’s spontaneous behaviour towards the boxes 
was differently motivated, rates of box opening may be comparable to those observed 
in experiment 6. The experimenter’s second departure came after the box selection 
tasks and after explicit termination of the pretence (or pictures game). This post-task 
departure was identical to the single departure in experiment 6. If the effects of 
availability are causal, then children should open the boxes here in approximately the 
same numbers as they had done in experiment 6, irrespective of the results from the 
first departure (pre-task). As in experiment 6 the children were asked what they had 
done during the experimenter’s absence and where appropriate, to explain why they 
had looked inside the boxes. To avoid interference with their subsequent behaviour, 
children were only interviewed about their behaviour following the post-task 
departure.
By obtaining a baseline measure of children’s behaviour in the experimenter’s absence 
independent of any suggested box contents, the design of tliis experiment allowed a 
test of the extent to which the children’s spontaneous behaviours in experiment 6 had 
been a result of the effects of the increased cognitive availability for the possible box 
contents, or a result of other factors that were not related to availability.
Method
Subjects
Twenty-five younger children (13 boys and 12 girls) aged between 4 years 9 months 
and 5 years 8 months (mean age 5 years 3 months) and 21 middle children (II boys 
and 10 girls) aged between 5 years 9 months and 6 years 8 months (mean age 6 years 1 
month) were recruited from a predominantly middle class school in Surrey (N = 46). 
The children were allocated to either the pretence or the non-pretence condition.
Procedure
The design and materials used were identical to experiment 6 (see page 171) and the 
procedure varied only in that the children were left alone twice. The additional, 
pre-task departure came immediately after the child had checked the boxes were empty 
and before any mention of animals was made. The experimenter commented, “Oh 
dear, we can’t start yet because I’ve forgotten my paper. I’ll just go and get it. You
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wait here for me until I get back”. After 2 minutes the experimenter returned and 
began the task introduction and object selection.
Results
Animal selections
All of the children readily selected liked and disliked animals and the majority (n = 36, 
78 %) generated a selection of neutral animals. The median rankings for each animal 
and the frequency with which each animal was selected as the positive, neutral and 
negative entities are presented in Table 8,1. The median rankings show a very similar 
distribution and rank ordering of the animals compared to those observed in 
experiment 6 and the same animals were the most frequent positive, neutral and 
negative entities - rabbit (n = 13, 28 %), tortoise (n = 8, 17 %) and tarantula (n = 16, 
35 %) respectively.
Table 8.1: Median rankings of animals (1 represents the most positive ranking and 12 
represents the most negative ranking) and ftequency of selection as the positive, 
negative and neutral entities (n = 46)
Number of children selecting a» target object
Animal Median Ranking Positive Neutral Negative
Rabbit 3 13 4 1
Dog 3 12 1 4
Cat 4 7 3 0
Guinea pig 5 6 6 1
Mouse 5 2 6 0 ;
Ladybird 5 1 1 3
Budgie 6.75 0 7 1
Tortoise 7 2 8 4
Toad 9 0 4 3
Snake 9 2 5 7
Scorpion 10 0 1 ; 6
Tarantula 11 1 0 16
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Memory and reality checks
All of the children in the pretence condition responded correctly to the memory checks 
and just one failed the reality checks (96 % correct). The children in the non-pretence 
condition were not asked these questions.
Box selection tasks
The orders of box selections across each of the four experimental tasks were subjected 
to CFA - the results of these analyses are shown in Table 8,2.
Table 8.2: Results of Configurai Frequency Analysis on children’s response patterns 
for each of the experimental tasks analysed separately (positive = animal the child 
would most like to hold, neutral = animal the child would not mind holding, negative = 
animal the child would least like to hold) (n = 46)
iPositive == + : Opening Tasks Discarding Tasks
'Neutral = N 
(Negative = - Hypothetical (Actual) | Hypothetical (Actual)
jPattern frequency z frequency z
!+ N - 30 (22) *T7.67 (=^ 'T 5.67) - (-) ! - (-)
;+-N 9 (12) -0.07 (1.71) - (1) ! - (*A -3.02)
N + - 4 ( 0 -1.92 (-0.66) - (1) ' - (*A -3.02)
N - + 1 (3) *A-3.02 (-1.85) 6 (8) *A-2.92 (-0.44)
■-N + 2 (% *A -2.65 (-2.24) 38 (31) *T 7.09 (*T 8.04)
- + N - ( 1) - (*A -2.64) 2 (5) *A-4.17 (-1.55)
*T significant response type at p < .001 
*A significant response anti-type at p < .01
On the hypothetical opening task only 5 of the 6 possible response patterns were 
observed - none of the children selected the negative box first, positive box second and 
neutral box last. One significant response type emerged - 30 children selected the 
positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last (z = 7.67, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .01). The remaining 16 children were distributed 
between 2 significant response anti-types and 2 non-significant response patterns (see 
Table 8.2). On the actual opening task all 6 possible response patterns were observed 
- one emerged as a significant response type and one as a significant response anti-type
197
(see Table 8.2). The significant response type was selection of the positive box first, 
neutral box second and negative box last (z = 5.67, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment 
for p at .05 = .008). This response type accounted for the behaviour of 22 children.
On the hypothetical discarding task only 3 of the 6 possible response patterns were 
observed and there were 2 significant response anti-types (see Table 8.2). The 
behaviour of 38 children was represented by the one significant response type which 
emerged - these children nominated the negative box first, neutral box second and 
positive box last (z = 7.09, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .017). On 
the actual discarding task none of the children discarded the positive box first, neutral 
box second and negative box last. The significant response type was the order 
negative, neutral and then positive (z = 8.04, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 
.05 = .01) - this response pattern accounted for the behaviour of 31 children. The 
remaining 15 children were distributed between 2 significant response anti-types and 2 
non-significant response patterns (see Table 8.2).
A comparison of children’s performance across the hypothetical and actual versions of 
the tasks is shown in Table 8.3. On the opening task, 21 children generated the 
response type (positive - neutral - negative) on both versions and 15 did so on neither. 
There were 10 cliildren who changed their responses - 9 children nominated the boxes 
according to the response type (hypothetical task) but actually opened the boxes in a 
different order and one child actually opened the boxes according to the response type 
after having said that they would open them in a different order. This variability in the
children’s behaviour was statistically significant (McNemar exact significance, p =
.021). Further analyses were conducted to establish the nature of the variability in 
children’s behaviour (Table 8.4). The 9 children who produced the response type on 
the hypothetical task but not the actual task, were distributed across the following 
response patterns on the actual opening task:
- neutral - positive - negative (n = 4)
- positive - negative - neutral (n = 3)
- neutral - negative - positive (n = 1)
- negative - neutral - positive (n = 1 )
Of the 15 children who produced other response patterns on both versions of the task, 
8 selected the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box last on both 
occasions and 2 children selected the neutral box first, positive box second and 
negative box last on both occasions. The remaining 5 children produced different 
response patterns on each occasion.
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Table 8.3: Comparison of children’s responses across hypothetical and actual opening 
tasks (response type: positive - neutral - negative) - figures in brackets are for 
discarding tasks (response type: negative - neutral - positive) (n = 46)
Response Pattern on 
Hypothetical Task
Actual Task Type Other
Type 21 (30) 1 (1)
Other 9 (8) U (7)
Table 8.4: Comparison of children’s response patterns across hypothetical and actual 
opening tasks - figures in brackets are for discarding tasks (positive = +, neutral = N, 
negative = -) (n = 46)
Hypothetical Opening Task (Hypothetical Discarding Task)
Actual Task + .V - : + - N N + - N - + _ N + - + N
+ N - 21 (-) - (-) : 1 (-) ' - (-) - (-) (")
+ - N 1 3 (-) ; 8 (-) 1 1 (-) ! - (-) 1 - (1) 1 - (-)N + - 1 4 (-) 1 - (-) 1 2 (-) ! - (-) 1 - (-) 1 - (1)
' N - +  1 1 (-) 1 I (-) - (-) ! - (5) 1 (3) ! (-) i; -N +  ! I (-) ! - (-) i - (-) i 1 (1) 1 - (30)! - (-)
- + N - (-) : - (-) - (-) - (-) . I (4) : - (1)
The comparison of children’s behaviours across the hypothetical and actual discarding 
tasks (figures in brackets in Table 8.3) showed that whilst 30 children produced the 
response type (negative - neutral - positive) on both versions of the task, 7 did so on 
neither. Eight children generated the response type on the hypothetical task but 
actually discarded the boxes in a different order and one child produced the response 
type on the actual task after nominating the boxes in a different order on the 
hypothetical task. This variability in the children’s behaviour was statistically 
significant (McNemar exact significance, p = .039). To examine the nature of the 
variations in children’s responses across the discarding tasks, further analyses were 
performed (figures in brackets in Table 8.4). The 8 children who generated the 
response type on the hypothetical but not the actual task were distributed between the 
following response patterns on the actual discarding task:
- negative - positive - neutral (n = 4)
- neutral - negative - positive (n = 3)
- positive - negative - neutral (n = 1)
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The child who produced the response type on the actual but not the hypothetical task 
had nominated the neutral box first, negative box second and positive box last. Five 
children hypothetically and actually discarded the neutral, negative and then the 
positive box and one child selected the negative, positive and then the neutral box on 
both versions of the task. The remaining child produced a different response pattern 
on each version of the task.
Given that there were significant differences between the hypothetical and actual 
versions of the opening and discarding tasks, analyses to compare the pretence and 
non-pretence conditions were conducted taking each task separately. Table 8.5 
presents the frequencies for each response pattern generated on the opening tasks 
according to experimental condition. On the hypothetical opening task, 17 children 
(74 %) from the pretence condition generated the response type (positive - neutral - 
negative). Slightly less children (n = 13, 57 %) from the non-pretence condition did 
so. However, the number of children producing the response type compared to all 
other response patterns combined showed no significant difference according to 
experimental condition (%^  = 1.53, df = 1, p = ,216). All of the other response 
patterns also showed very similar frequencies across the two experimental conditions. 
On the actual opening task a very similar number of children from the pretence 
condition (n = 10, 43 %) as from the non-pretence condition (n = 12, 52 %) produced 
the response type. Statistical analysis confirmed that there was no significant 
difference in the number of children generating the response type compared to all other 
response patterns combined on the actual opening task according to condition, (x^ = 
.35, df = 1, p = .555). Once again, none of the other response patterns showed any 
clear differences according to experimental condition.
Table 8.5: Summary of response patterns generated on the hypothetical opening task 
(actual opening task in brackets) presented according to experimental condition 
(positive = +, neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 46)
R E S P O N S E  P A T T E R N  
Hypothetical (Actual)
Condition + N - + - N : N + - : N -  + - N + : -  + N :
Pretence 17 (10) 5 (6) 1 (4) : 0 (2) ; 0 (1) ; 0 (0) ,
iNon-Pretence- i 13 (12) 4 (6) : 3 (2) ‘ 1 (1) • 2 (1) 1 0 (1) :
Total 30 (22): 9 (12); 4 (6) i 1 (3) ! 2 (2) ! 0 (1) :
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Table 8.6 presents the frequencies of each of the response patterns generated on the 
discarding tasks according to experimental condition. A very similar number of 
children from the pretence condition (n = 20, 87 %) as from the non-pretence 
condition (n = 18, 78 %) hypothetically discarded the negative box first, neutral box 
second and positive box last. Statistical analyses confirmed that there was no 
difference in the number of children producing this response pattern according to 
experimental condition (Fisher’s exact probability, p = .699). Similarly there was no 
significant difference in the number of children who generated the response type in the 
pretence condition (n = 17, 74 %) and non-pretence condition (n = 14, 61 %) on the 
actual discarding task (%^  = .89, df = 1, p = .345). There were no clear differences 
according to experimental condition in the frequencies of any of the other response 
patterns on either the hypothetical or actual discarding tasks.
Table 8.6; Summaiy of response patterns generated on the hypothetical discarding 
task (actual discarding task in brackets) presented according experimental condition (n 
= 46)
R E S P O N S E
Hypothetical
P A T T E R N
(Actual)
'Condition + M - + - N N + - N - + - N + -  + N
(Pretence 0 0% , 0 (0) 0 (U I 2 CO 20 (17) 1 (2)
Non-Pretence 0 (0): 0 (1) 0 0% 4 CO 18 (14) 1 (3)
Total 0 0% ! 0 (1) 0 (1) ' 6 CO 38 (31) 2 (5)
To establish whether the experimenter’s pre-task absence influenced children’s 
behaviour on the subsequent opening and discarding tasks, further analyses were 
performed. Statistical analyses were conducted comparing the numbers of children 
generating the response type for each task in experiment 6, where there was no 
pre-task absence, with the present experiment. In these analyses the pretence and 
non-pretence conditions were combined as there had been no statistically significant 
differences found between them in previous analyses for either experiment. These
analyses revealed no significant differences between the two experiments for any of the
tasks;
- hypothetical opening task: = .14,.df = l ,p  = .139
- actual opening task: = .1, df = 1, p = .754
- hypothetical discarding task: = .002, df = 1, p = .961
201
- actual discarding task; %- = .09, df = I, p = .767
The twelve trial response patterns that were produced over the series of four 
experimental tasks were subjected to CFA (Table 8.7). This analysis generated one 
significant response type - 18 children opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive 
box first, neutral box second and negative box last and discarded (hypothetically and 
actually) the negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last (z = 11.26, p 
< .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .002). Five children opened 
(hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, negative box second and neutral 
box last and discarded (hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, neutral box 
second and positive box last. There were a further 3 response patterns produced by 2 
cliildren each (see Table 8.7) and the remaining 17 children produced unique response 
patterns. Thus unlike experiment 6 where there were 2 significant response types, only 
one emerged in this experiment. There were no significant response anti-types.
Table 8.7: Summary of results of Configurai Frequency Analysis of response patterns 
across all experimental tasks taken together (positive = animal the child would most 
like to hold, neutral = animal the child would not mind holding, negative = animal the 
child would least like to hold) (n = 46)
Response Pattern
Positive = +; Neutral = N; Negative =
Opening Tasks 
Hypothetical (Actual)
Discarding Tasks 
Hypothetical (Actual) ! Frequency
+ N - (+ N -) - N + (- N +) 18
+ - N (+ - N) - N + (- N +) • 5
+ N - (+ - N) 1 - N + (- N +) 1 2+ N - (+ N -) N - + (N - +) 1 2+ - N ' (+ - N) N - + (N - +) 2
The remaining 17 children each produced a unique 
response pattern different from each other and the above.
=^T 11.26 
2.06‘ 
- .o d  
-.06 
-06 
-.77
‘T significant response type at p < .001
Further analyses were performed to establish whether any of the response patterns 
observed over the twelve trials were specific to either of the experimental conditions. 
In these CFA the data for the two conditions were analysed separately. The results.
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summarised in Table 8.8, revealed that 9 children from each condition generated the 
same single significant response type. Significant numbers of children in the pretence 
(z = 5.96, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .004) and non-pretence 
condition (z = 5.34, p < .001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at .05 = .004) hypothetically 
and actually opened the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last 
and hypothetically and actually discarded the negative box first, neutral box second 
and positive box last. Two children from the pretence condition opened 
(hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, negative box second and neutral 
box last and discarded the negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last 
(hypothetically and actually). The remaining 12 children in the pretence condition each 
produced unique response patterns. Three children from the non-pretence condition 
opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, negative box second and 
neutral box last and discarded the negative, neutral and then the positive box, and 2 
children opened (hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral and then the 
negative box and discarded the neutral, negative and then positive box (hypothetically 
and actually). The remaining 9 children from the pretence condition produced unique 
response patterns. There were no additional significant response types nor any 
significant response anti-types in either condition.
Table 8.8; Summary of results of Configurai Frequency Analysis of response patterns 
across all experimental tasks presented according to experimental condition (positive = 
animal the child would most like to hold, neutral = animal the child would not mind 
holding, negative = animal the child would least like to hold) (n = 46)
Response Pattern 
Positive = +; Neutral = N; Negative = - j
Experimental
Condition
Opening Discarding Pretence Non-Pretence
Hypothetical (Actual) i f i ^ f z+ N - ( +N- )  i - N + ( - N+)  I 9 j *T 5.96 9 *T5.34
+ -N ( +- N)  : - N + ( - N+)  1 2 1 -29 3 .82
+ N - (+N- )  i N - + ( N -+ )  1 i 2 .06,+ - N (+- N)  ; N - + Q S - + ) : 1 : -.52 1 -.70
+ N - (+ - N)  ' - N + ( - N+)  1 1 I -.52 1 -.70
The remaining 10 children in the pretence condition and 7 children in the 
non-pretence condition each produced a unique response pattern different from
each other and the above.
*T significant response type at p < .001
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Although when the four experimental tasks were treated separately the results from 
this experiment were very similar to those from experiment 6, when the twelve trial 
response patterns across the four tasks were considered together, the results appeared 
to differ. Whilst in experiment 6 there were two significant response types, there was 
only one in the present experiment. Statistical analysis confirmed that the number of 
children generating the response type in this experiment compared with experiment 6 
was not significantly different for eitlier tlie pretence condition = .013, d f=  1, p = 
.908) or the non-pretence condition {y} = .005, df = I, p = .944). In addition, whilst 
the behaviour of the remaining children differed according to condition in experiment 6 
(a second significant response type emerged having been generated almost exclusively 
by children in the pretence condition), it did not appear to do so in the present 
experiment.
Children’s behaviour during the experimenter’s absence: Pre-task
Due to an equipment failure the video data for 2 children were lost, thus leaving the 
data for 44 cliildren (22 in the pretence condition and 22 in the non-pretence 
condition). The data from the video recordings were analysed such that the children 
were classified into one of the 3 mutually exclusive behaviour categories developed in 
experiment 6:
- did nothing
- other activity
- opened box(es)
At the point of the experimenter’s pre-task departure the two groups of children were 
equivalent, therefore the data for the conditions were combined. Eight children (18 %) 
did nothing for the entire period that they were left alone and 17 children (39 %) 
engaged in some other activity. The behaviour of particular interest in this experiment 
was looking inside the boxes - 19 children (43 %) did so (10 from the pretence 
condition and 9 from the non-pretence condition). Of these 19 children, 15 (79 %) 
opened all 3 boxes, 2 (10.5 %) opened 2 boxes and the remaining 2 children (10.5 %) 
opened one box each.
Analyses were conducted to explore whether box opening was related to the child’s 
age. Of the 25 younger children, 9 (36 %) opened one or more of the boxes in the 
experimenter’s. Similarly, of the 21 middle children 10 (48 %) did so. This 
distribution of opening the boxes according to age was not significant (%^  = .64, df = 
l ,p  = .425).
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To explore the possible relationship between box opening during the experimenter’s 
pre-task absence and children’s subsequent response patterns on the box selection 
tasks, further analyses were conducted. In these analyses the children’s response 
patterns across the hypothetical and actual opening tasks were considered and the 
comparison taken between children who produced the response type (positive - neutral 
- negative) across both of these tasks with those children who produced any other 
combination of response patterns. As can be seen fi'om Table 8.9, the 19 children who 
opened the boxes during the experimenter’s absence were relatively equally 
represented by children who opened the positive box first, neutral box second and 
negative box last (n = 8, 42 %) and those children who produced other combinations 
of response patterns (n = 11, 58 %). Statistical analysis confirmed that this 
distribution of frequencies was not significant (x^ = .15, df= 1, p = .697).
Table 8.9; Numbers of children opening the boxes during the experimenter’s pre-task 
absence presented according to response pattern across the hypothetical and actual 
opening tasks (positive = +, neutral = N, negative = -) (n = 44)
Response Pattern
+ N - / + N - Other
Opened box(es) 8 11
Did not open 12 13
Children’s behaviour during the experimenter’s absence: Post-task
The children’s behaviour during the two minutes that they were left alone following 
completion of the pretence or non-pretence tasks were categorised into the 3 
behavioural categories used previously. The results of this analysis are presented 
according to experimental condition in Table 8.10. These results showed that 
irrespective of experimental condition, the majority of children either did nothing for 
the entire period that the experimenter was absent (n = 18, 41 %) or engaged in some 
other activity (n = 23, 52 %). Only 3 children opened one or more of the boxes - 2 
from the non-pretence condition and one from the pretence condition.
Comparison of the children’s behaviours across the two separate periods (pre- and 
post-task) during which they were left alone (Table 8.11) revealed that only one child 
opened one or more of the boxes on both occasions and only 2 children opened the 
boxes during the post-task absence but not the pre-task absence. The majority of
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children opened the boxes on neither occasion (n = 23, 52 %) or on the first but not 
the second occasion (n = 18, 41 %) that they were left alone. This variability in the 
children’s behaviour was statistically significant (McNemar exact significance, p = 
.000).
Table 8.10: Summary of children’s behaviour during experimenter’s post-task absence 
presented according to experimental condition (n = 44)
Behavioitral Category
Condition Opened box(es) Did nothing Other activity
(Pretence 1 10 11
Non-Pretence . 2 8 12
Table 8.11: Comparison of children’s behaviours during the experimenter’s pre-task 
absence and post-task absence (n = 44)
Behaviour during pre-task absence
Behaviour during post-task absence Opened box(es) Did not open box(es)
Opened box(es)
Did not open box(es)
I
18
2
23
Further analyses were conducted to consider children’s behaviour on the first occasion 
that they were left alone with the boxes. In experiment 6 the cliildren’s first (and only) 
experience of being left alone came after the opening and discarding tasks and in the 
present experiment it came before the same tasks. Thus these analyses allowed an 
exploration of the influence of suggesting possible box contents and of the opening and 
discarding tasks on children’s behaviour when they were left alone with the boxes. As 
can be seen from Table 8.12, 13 children (32 %) opened the boxes when left alone 
after the tasks and a similar number (n = 19, 43 %) did so when left alone before the 
tasks. The distribution of frequencies shown in Table 8.12 was not statistically 
significant (x^ = .01, df = 1, p = .914).
Table 8.13 shows the number of boxes that children opened ivhen they were left alone 
for the first time. In the pre-task departure (experiment 7) the majority of those 
children (n = 15, 79 %) who opened any of the boxes, opened all three. The remaining 
4 children either opened one (n = 2, 10.5 %) or two (n = 2, 10.5 %) boxes. In
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contrast, in the post-task departure (experiment 6) the children were relatively equally 
divided between opening just one box (n = 7, 54 %) and all 3 boxes (n = 5, 38 %). 
For the purposes of statistical analysis, the frequencies shown in Table 8.13 were 
re-categorised to give the 2 x 2  contingency table shown in Table 8.14, in which the 
comparison is made between children who open one box and those who open two or 
more. This distribution of frequencies was statistically significant (Fisher’s exact 
probability, p = .015).
Table 8.12; Comparison of numbers of cliildren opening the boxes during the first 
occasion they are left alone according to experiment (post-task departure from 
experiment 6 and pre-task departure from experiment 7) (n = 85)
Behaviour during experimenter’s absence
Opened box(es) Did not open box(es)
Post-task departure (Experiment 6) ; 13 28
:Pre-task departure (Experiment 7) i_________ 19_________ i ^
Table 8.13: Number of boxes opened during the first occasion children were left alone 
for the first time, according to experiment (post-task departure from experiment 6 and 
pre-task departure from experiment 7) (n = 85)
Number of buses opened
0 1 2
Post-task departure (Experiment 6) 28 7 1 5
Pre-Task, departure (Experiment 7) 25 2 2 ; 15
Table 8.14: Comparison of the number of boxes that children opened during the 
experimenter’s pre-task absence and post-task absence (n = 32)
Number of Boxes Opened
Period of Experimenter's Absence 1 2 or 3
(Pre-Task (Experiment 7) | 2 17
Post-Task (Experiment 6) | 7 : 6
207
Interview after experimenter’s return
Subsequent to the post-task departure the children were asked whether they had 
opened any of the boxes during the experimenter’s absence, which ones and why. Of 
the 3 children who opened one or more of the boxes, one admitted doing so but 2 
denied having done so. These results were not analysed further given that so few 
children were given the opportunity to discuss their behaviour.
Discussion
The results from this experiment showed that children in both the pretence and 
non-pretence conditions tended to open (hypothetically and actually) the positive box 
first, neutral box second and negative box last and to discard (hypothetically and 
actually) the negative box first, neutral box second and positive box last. However, 
given that a number of children nominated the boxes according to the response type 
but went on to act on them in a different order, there were statistically significant 
differences between the hypothetical and actual versions of both the opening and 
discarding tasks. These differences are most likely to be attributable to the fixed order 
of presentation of the two versions of the tasks and are unlikely to reflect the impact of 
empirical evidence of boxes contents on the effects of availability given that unlike the 
opening tasks, neither version of the discarding task afforded visual confirmation of the 
box contents. Thus in terms of the analysis of children’s behaviour on the four 
separate tasks, the findings obtained in the present experiment were directly 
comparable to those obtained in experiment 6. However, the results from analysing all 
four experimental tasks together suggest important differences between the two 
experiments.
In experiment 6 when the children’s response patterns across all four experimental 
tasks taken together were considered, two significant response types emerged. First, 
equal numbers of children in the pretence and non-pretence conditions opened 
(hypothetically and actually) the positive box first, neutral box second and negative 
box last and discarded (hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, neutral box 
second and positive box last. This response pattern also emerged as statistically 
significant in this experiment, having been generated by similar numbers of children in 
each condition and by a similar number of children as in experiment 6. Second, in 
experiment 6 a significant number of children said that they would open the positive 
box first, neutral box second and negative box last (hypothetical task) but actually
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opened the positive box first and then the negative box, leaving the neutral box until 
last. These children discarded (hypothetically and actually) the negative box first, 
neutral box second and positive box last. Interestingly, this second significant 
response type was sensitive to experimental condition since all but one of the children 
who generated this response pattern were from the pretence condition. In contrast, in 
the present experiment just one child from each experimental condition generated this 
response pattern and hence it did not emerge as statistically significant. Why should 
the results of the box selection tasks differ in this experiment compared to experiment
The only methodological difference between the present experiment and experiment 6 
was the introduction of the pre-task period in which the children were left alone with 
the boxes. The implication must surely be that this experimental manipulation 
somehow caused the difference in the children’s behaviour on the box selection tasks. 
It is possible that the mere experience of being left alone with the boxes led to this 
change. However, it is also possible that the children whose behaviour was affected 
were those who looked inside the boxes during experimenter’s absence. This latter 
possibility seems rather more likely than the former given that the pre-task period of 
experimenter’s absence does not appear to have had an equivalent influence on all 
cliildren. The prevalence of the response pattern whereby the positive box was opened 
first and discarded last and the negative box was discarded first and opened last 
remained unchanged in the present experiment relative to experiment 6. This suggests 
that the only children who were affected by the experimenter’s pre-task absence were 
those who would otherwise have nominated the positive, neutral and then the negative 
box on the hypothetical opening task but who actually opened the negative box 
second, leaving the neutral box until last. The reduction in the prevalence of this 
response pattern was the only systematic change in the children’s behaviour across the 
two experiments. It was argued (experiment 6) that the children who generated this 
second significant response type were reassured of the reality status of the box 
contents on actually opening the first box and finding it to be empty, hence the change 
in their behaviour on the actual task relative to the hypothetical one. It is possible that 
in the present experiment a comparable group of children looked inside the boxes 
during the experimenter’s pre-task absence, found no objects inside them and no 
obvious means of generating box contents through trickeiy. This empirical evidence 
might then have reassured them that nothing untoward would happen in the 
experiment and thus their behaviour changed such that they produced one of the other 
response patterns on the box selection tasks. However, one problem with this
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interpretation of the data is the fact that in experiment 6 when the experimenter’s 
departure came after the task, the children producing this second significant response 
pattern did not look inside the boxes when left alone. One possible explanation for this 
is that the empirical evidence obtained on actually opening the boxes during the box 
selection tasks was sufficient to completely reassure these children and to stop them 
wondering about the boxes contents. In other words, this might be a group of children 
who are highly sensitive to the constraining influence of empirical evidence of reality 
on the effects of increased cognitive availability.
The main aim of tliis experiment was to test between two competing explanations for 
the behaviour of those children in experiment 6 who, whilst the experimenter was out 
of the room, spontaneously opened one or more of the boxes that had previously been 
used in the box selection tasks. It was possible that these children had opened the 
boxes because they had become uncertain about the reality status of their contents 
(availability hypothesis) or that they had done so for reasons that were unrelated to the 
effects of availability and the suggestion of possible box contents. The results from the 
analysis of children’s behaviour during the two periods that they were left alone were 
striking and quite unexpected.
In the pre-task period the children were left alone before any possible box contents 
were mentioned. Therefore there were no specific objects for which cognitive 
availability could increase and about which the cliildren could start to wonder. 
Furthermore, no child should have been uncertain about what was inside the boxes 
since immediately prior to the experimenter’s departure the children had looked inside 
all three boxes and confirmed that they were empty. Nevertheless, just under half of 
the children opened one or more of the boxes and the majority of these children 
opened all three. There were no age related differences in the number of children 
opening the boxes and there were no clear relationships between the children’s 
spontaneous behaviours and their subsequent response patterns on the box selection 
tasks. Those children who did not look inside the boxes were approximately equally 
divided between doing nothing for the entire period that they were left alone and 
engaging in alternative activities such as reading library books.
The children in this experiment were also left alone after explicit termination of the 
pretence or non-pretence tasks (post-task - as in experiment 6). On this occasion very 
few children opened any of the boxes. Instead, the vast majority of children (93 %) 
were content to do nothing or to othei*wise occupy themselves during the
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experimenter’s absence. Thus there was a dramatic change in the children’s behaviour 
across the two periods during which they were left alone with the boxes such that just 
one child looked inside the boxes on both occasions, and those children who opened 
the boxes did so during the pre- but not the post-task period.
To explore the influence of the suggestion of possible box contents on children’s 
spontaneous behaviours, the results from the pre-task departure in this experiment 
were compared with those from the post-task departure in experiment 6. The only 
difference in the circumstances surrounding these two departures was whether or not 
possible box contents had been suggested and the box selection tasks completed - in 
both instances this was the child’s first experience of being left alone. The differences 
in the children’s behaviours on these two occasions were striking. Although a very 
similar number of children looked inside the boxes on each occasion, in the pre-task 
period they tended to look inside all three of the boxes whilst in the post-task period 
the children were divided between looking inside just one box (always the positive 
box) and all three. Furthermore, the developmental differences observed in the 
post-task period did not emerge in the pre-task period and the clear relationship 
observed between children’s spontaneous behaviours and their response patterns in the 
box selection tasks in the post-task period also did not emerge from the pre-task 
period.
How can these results be explained? There are several possible explanations for the 
high prevalence of spontaneous box opening during the experimenter’s pre-task 
absence. It could be argued that the children open the boxes out of a rather 
generalised curiosity or interest in the boxes and/or their contents. However, the fact 
that immediately prior to the experimenter’s departure the children had looked inside 
the boxes and found them to be empty should have satisfied the children’s general 
curiosity about the boxes and their contents. This point was also made by Harris et al 
(1991) when dismissing this explanation of their data. An alternative possibility is that 
the children became suspicious about the experimenter’s motives for leaving the room, 
perhaps wondering if she had left in order to surreptitiously populate the boxes with 
some unspecified entities. This also seems unlikely - there were no overt signs of 
disbelief of the experimenter’s excuse for leaving the room, even at the second point of 
departure. Furthermore, a small minority of cliildren offered to help the experimenter 
to find her forgotten note-paper. Although this suggests that the children believed the 
experimenter’s reason for leaving the room to be genuine, the possibility that the
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children had become suspicious about the adult’s intentions cannot be completely ruled 
out.
A related, but separable possibility is that the ambiguity of the role of the boxes was an 
important factor. At the point of the pre-task departure whilst the children might have 
inferred that the empty boxes were relevant to the forthcoming proceedings, the 
precise nature of their function remained ambiguous. The children might have infeixed 
that the boxes were to be used to contain some objects. Perhaps therefore, the 
children looked inside the boxes in the experimenter’s absence in an attempt to work 
out what the boxes were to be used for. In other words, the children’s spontaneous 
behaviours could have been an attempt to make sense of the experimental situation. 
This interpretation is entirely consistent with the finding that the children looked inside 
all three boxes - failing to discover the function of the boxes from looking inside the 
first one, would presumably not preclude the possibility that this information could be 
gained fi'om looking inside the remaining boxes. This possible role of the ambiguity of 
the function of the boxes is also consistent with the failure to find developmental 
differences and relationships with the children’s response patterns on the box selection 
tasks - there is no reason to suppose that particular types of children (in terms of their 
susceptibility to availability or in terms of their age) should be more or less likely to try 
to work out what is about to happen in a slightly unusual and ambiguous situation.
Overall, it seems most likely that the high rates of box opening during the pre-task 
period of experimenter’s absence are attributable to some factor other than the effects 
of availability on the children’s beliefs about the contents of the boxes. However, 
further empirical work will be required before firm conclusions can be drawn about the 
precise nature of the causal factor here. For the purposes of the present research, it is 
however, important to detennine whether this means that the spontaneous behaviours 
observed in experiment 6 (post-task departure) were also a result of some factor 
unrelated to the effects of availability.
A comparison of the children’s behaviours on the first occasion that they were left 
alone with the boxes (pre-task in experiment 6 and post-task in experiment 7) suggests 
that it is unlikely that the two sets of behaviours were motivated by the same factors. 
Prior to the suggestion of the possible box contents (pre-task) the children 
predominantly looked inside all three boxes. In contrast, subsequent to the 
introduction of possible box contents (post-task) the children were divided between 
looking in one or in all of the boxes. Furthermore, those children who looked inside
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just one box, all looked inside the positive box. Thus there were fundamental 
differences in the children’s spontaneous behaviours before and after the box contents 
had been suggested. Therefore, whilst it could perhaps be argued that those children 
who, during the post-task period look inside all three boxes, do so due to some factor 
unrelated to the effects of availability, it seems highly unlikely that this could also be 
true of those children who simply looked inside the positive box. This latter behaviour 
seems instead to be related to the effects of increased cognitive availability for the 
suggested box contents. The present experiment therefore seems to have very clearly 
demonstrated that children’s spontaneous behaviours in the experimenter’s absence are 
not totally independent of the effects of availability. When the effects of availability for 
specific objects are ruled out, the children’s spontaneous behaviours are veiy different 
compared to when availability for specific objects could potentially be quite high.
An intriguing and somewhat inexplicable finding from this experiment was the 
dramatic reduction in the number of children looking inside the boxes in the 
experimenter’s post-task absence relative to the number of children who did so in the 
equivalent period in experiment 6. If children’s pre-task box opening is a result of 
spurious factors and their post-task box opening is due to the effects of availability, 
why should so few children have looked inside the boxes during the post-task 
departure when this arose as the second occasion when they were left alone? In other 
words, if children’s pre- and post-task spontaneous behaviours are differently 
motivated why should one have influenced the other? The only logically possible 
explanation is that the experience of being left alone with the boxes prior to the task 
changed the children’s behaviour, perhaps by changing their understanding of the task 
such that the effects of availability no longer led children to open the boxes when they 
were left alone for the second time. Whether it is the case that availability no longer 
leads children to wonder about the box contents, or that children still become uncertain 
but no longer act on that uncertainty, requires further investigation.
Overall, the results of this experiment confirm that whilst some children’s spontaneous 
behaviours in the experimenter’s absence might be attributable to factors unrelated to 
the effects of availability, this is certainly not tme of all children’s behaviours. It might 
therefore be preferable not to interpret the behaviour of children who open all three 
boxes in the experimenter’s absence in terms of the effects of availability whether this 
occurs pre- or post-task. However, the post-task spontaneous behaviours of those 
children who are somewhat more selective in their box opening, for example, they only 
open one box, should perhaps be interpreted in terms of the children’s beliefs about the
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box contents. Thus this experiment has validated the use of obsemng children’s 
spontaneous behaviours as a means of assessing their susceptibility to the effects of 
availability. However, quite how the behaviour of children who do not spontaneously 
open boxes in the experimenter’s absence should be interpreted is a separate issue - it 
remains possible that these children are sufficiently uncertain of the reality status of the 
box contents that they avoid these objects and that therefore this behavioural silence 
could in itself be indicative of pretend-reality confusion.
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Chapter 9: General Discussion
Overview
The aim of this final chapter is to summarise the results obtained in the experiments 
reported here and to then discuss how these findings relate to the issues raised in the 
introduction. Specifically, this chapter will discuss how the present findings contribute 
to our understanding of the influence of empirical evidence of reality on children’s 
understanding of pretence, of the differential influence of varying forms of affect on 
children’s behaviour during pretence, and most importantly, how the present findings 
contribute to our understanding of developmental and individual differences these 
domains. A further aim of this chapter is to go beyond a description of children’s 
behaviours and to offer a theoretical account of the developmental and individual 
differences that have been observed. Finally, this chapter will offer some directions for 
future research.
Summary of results
Experiment 1 was designed to explore two main issues. First, whether empirical 
evidence, or visual confirmation of reality, could constrain the effects of increased 
cognitive availability such that children would be reassured of the pretend-reality status 
of imagined objects. Second, the nature of the influence of different forms of affect on 
children’s behaviour was assessed. These issues were investigated by asking five to six 
year old children to pretend that one empty box contained a positive entity, that the 
second contained a negative entity and that the third box contained a neutral entity. 
The children’s orders of box selections were then observed across a series of 
hypothetical and actual box opening and discarding tasks within a context whereby 
there would be no real life, practical consequences of engaging in magical thinking. 
Importantly, the level of empirical evidence of box contents was greater on the actual 
than the hypothetical opening task and thus it was expected that children’s behaviour 
would vary across these tasks.
The results did not reveal any dramatic changes in the children’s behaviour according 
to empirical evidence of box contents. This could be interpreted as suggesting that the 
effects of availability did not cause pretend-reality confiision. Flowever, the
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spontaneous comments made by some children suggested that they had become 
uncertain about the reality status of the box contents. In terms of affect, the results 
were broadly consistent with the Golomb and Galasso (1995) claim that children 
behave in ways which increase their experience of positive affect and decrease their 
experience of negative affect - the children opened the positive box first and discarded 
it last and opened the negative box last and discarded it first. The neutral box was 
repeatedly selected second by these children. However, there was a sizeable group of 
children whose behaviour did not fit this pattern - some children opened the negative 
box second rather than leaving it until last.
The second experiment followed the design of experiment 1 but included a sample of 
children aged four to seven years old in order to investigate the nature of any 
developmental trends in children’s responses, Overall, the results obtained replicated 
those from experiment 1. However, the children’s behaviour did differ 
developmentally in two main ways. First, the tendency to consistently approach the 
positive pretend entity and avoid the negative one increased with age. Second, the 
number of cliildren who did not avoid the negative pretend entity by opening that box 
last, but who instead opened the negative box second, peaked at around five to six 
years of age.
The aim of experiment 3 was to directly assess the impact of empirical evidence of 
reality on children’s behaviour. To this end, the experiment followed the procedures 
used in experiment 2 but using transparent boxes - the children were continually 
provided with visual confirmation that the boxes were empty. This experimental 
manipulation thus allowed a direct test between the predictions made by the availability 
hypothesis (Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall & Harmer, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 
1994) and the pretence continuation account (Golomb & Galasso, 1995). The way in 
which children continued the pretence should have been unaffected by the sight of the 
empty box, however, children who had begun to wonder about the reality status of the 
box contents should have been reassured by this sight and perhaps have responded 
differently compared to experiment 2.
Overall, the results from experiment 3 were veiy similar to those obtained in 
experiment 2 - the most frequent response patterns were those in which children 
selected the positive box first and the negative box last on the opening tasks, and 
selected the negative box first and the positive box last on the discarding tasks. 
However, there were marked differences in the results of the two experiments which
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indicated that for at least some children, the effects of increased cognitive availability 
for the pretence had been constrained by the empirical evidence of reality provided by 
the continual sight of the empty box. The changed behaviour of the four to five year 
old children in experiment 3 relative to experiment 2 suggested that when the possible 
effects of availability were minimised by empirical evidence of reality, these cliildren 
continued their pretence by responding to affect in one of two ways. These children 
tended to approach the positive pretend entity and whilst some of them avoided the 
negative pretend entity, others approached it sooner than was absolutely necessary by 
opening that box second rather than leaving it until last. In contrast, when the effects 
of increased cognitive availability were not constrained, four to five year old children 
tended to approach the positive entity and avoid the negative one. The behaviour of 
the five to six year old children also changed in experiment 3 relative to experiment 2 - 
a marked increase in the number of children opening the positive box first and the 
negative box last was matched by a decrease in the number of children who 
approached the negative pretend entity by opening that box second rather than leaving 
it until last. Thus in this middle age group, like the younger group, there were clear 
signs that some children were sensitive to empirical evidence of reality during pretence. 
A slightly different pattern of results emerged amongst the six to seven year old 
children - there were no clear systematic differences in their behaviours across the two 
experiments.
Experiment 4 changed focus slightly to address a particular issue about the influence of 
affect on children’s behaviour during pretence. Specifically, the hierarchical 
organisation of the motivations to approach the positive entity and to avoid the 
negative entity was assessed by placing these motivations in direct conflict. The 
children in this experiment could respond to one or the other of these motivations, but 
not both since they were asked to either open or to discard two boxes when they had 
pretended that one contained a positive entity and the other, a negative entity. To 
assist in the interpretation of children’s decisions, and in order to explore the 
relationship between the hierarchical organisation of affect and the children’s beliefs 
about the reality status of the pretend entities, children’s responses were compared 
according to different levels of empirical evidence (opaque and transparent box 
conditions) and the children were interviewed about their behaviour.
Overall, the children tended to open rather than discard both boxes, thus prioritising 
their approach to the positive pretend entity over their avoidance of the negative one. 
This tendency to open both boxes was greatest when the children were provided with
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continual evidence of box contents. This finding suggests that for at least some 
children, prioritising avoidance of the negative entity was associated with uncertainty 
about its pretend-reality status. The children tended to explain their behaviour in terms 
of the box contents, for example, by describing how they had wanted the positive 
entity or how they had discarded the boxes in order to avoid the monster. Other 
children explained their behaviour in terms of their uncertainty about the reality status 
of the box contents.
Experiment 5 turned directly to the issue of developmental and individual differences 
in children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction by exploring the 
relationship between children’s behaviours on the pretence tasks and their verbally 
expressed beliefs about the reality status of the imagined objects. Thus in this 
experiment, children’s behaviour on the serial box selection tasks, their behaviour on 
the forced choice task and the children’s justifications for their behaviours were 
examined on a repeated measures basis. Amongst four to five year old children there 
were no clear relationships between the cliildren’s behaviours on the two pretence 
tasks. However, amongst five to seven year old children, opening both boxes on the 
forced choice task was associated with opening the positive box first and the negative 
box last on the serial box selection task. Furthermore, discarding both boxes on the 
forced choice task was associated with opening the positive box first and then the 
negative box second (neutral box last). In addition, amongst six to seven year old 
children, discarding both boxes was associated with opening the positive box first and 
the negative box last on the serial box selection task. There were also relationships 
between children’s behaviours and their verbal justifications for those behaviours. 
Amongst five to seven year old children, those who opened both boxes tended to 
explain their decision in terms of the presence of objects in the boxes or their 
uncertainty about the reality status of those objects. In contrast, those four to five year 
old children who opened both boxes tended to give explanations that were not related 
to the pretence. The minority of children who discarded both boxes tended to explain 
this in terms unrelated to the pretence (four to five year old children), or in terms of 
the contents of the boxes (four to five year old and six to seven year old children). In 
terms of their behaviour on the serial box selection task, those cliildren who selected 
the positive box first and negative box last tended to explain their subsequent 
behaviours in terms of the box contents or their uncertainty about the box contents.
The two final experiments turned to measures of children’s spontaneous behaviours 
towards pretend entities as a way of validating the use of pretence tasks to assess
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children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. To this end, experiment 6 
investigated the relationship between children’s behaviours on the serial box selection 
tasks and their subsequent spontaneous behaviour towards the boxes whilst the 
experimenter was out of the room. Importantly, the design of this experiment afforded 
an opportunity to assess children’s spontaneous behaviours towards positive, negative 
and neutral pretend entities. Furthermore, the design included a control task to 
explore the impact of a non-pretence based cue for increasing cognitive availability on 
children’s beliefs and behaviour.
In terms of the children’s behaviour on the box selection tasks, children in the pretence 
condition and in the non-pretence condition tended to open the positive box first and 
discard it last, and open the negative box last and discard it first. However, a number 
of children h orn the pretence condition, but not the non-pretence condition, nominated 
the neutral box second on the hypothetical opening task but actually opened it last, 
instead opening the negative box second. In terms of the children’s spontaneous 
behaviours, the same number of children from the pretence condition as from the 
non-pretence condition opened one or more of the boxes during the period they were 
left alone with them. Intriguingly, half of these children opened just one of the boxes, 
all of these children choosing to open the positive box but not the neutral box or the 
negative box. Those children who looked inside the boxes tended to have selected the 
positive, neutral and then the negative box on the hypothetical and actual opening 
tasks, and were more likely to be aged five to six years old than four to five years old. 
Thus the increased cognitive availability for the box contents caused by the pictures 
(non-pretence condition) and the pretence appeared to have caused a particular 
sub-group of children to become uncertain about the reality status of the box contents 
and therefore to open the boxes in the experimenter’s absence.
Experiment 7 followed on from these results by testing the possibility that the 
spontaneous behaviours observed in experiment 6 were caused by factors unrelated to 
the effects of availability. In this final experiment children were left alone with the 
boxes before there had been any suggestion of any specific box contents (pre-task) and 
then for a second time, affer the completion of the box selection tasks (post-task) as in 
experiment 6. A similar number of children looked inside the boxes when they were 
left alone pre-task as had done so post-task in experiment 6. However, these 
behaviours appeared to be differently motivated - whereas after the suggestion of box 
contents (experiment 6) the children tended to look inside the positive box, prior to the 
suggestion of box contents (experiment 7) the children tended to look inside all three
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boxes. Furthermore, the developmental differences and the association with the 
children’s response patterns on the box selection tasks found in experiment 6, were not 
replicated in experiment 7. These results were interpreted as demonstrating that the 
spontaneous behaviours observed in experiment 6 were related to the effects of 
increased cognitive availability but that those observed in experiment 7 were not. The 
finding that in experiment 6 but not experiment 1, there was a relationship between 
children’s spontaneous behaviours and their earlier behaviours on the box selection 
tasks was interpreted as validating the use of box selection tasks as a way of assessing 
children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction.
Taken together the results from the experiments conducted in this research provide 
compelling evidence that both the availability hypothesis (Harris et al 1991; Johnson & 
Harris, 1994) and the pretence continuation account (Golomb & Galasso, 1995) are 
required to explain children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction and their 
behaviour towards pretend entities. Both accounts are required since the evidence 
suggests that there are individual and developmental differences in this domain. That 
is, within each of the age groups studied some (credulous) children experience 
confusion about the pretend-reality distinction whilst other (sceptical) cliildren simply 
continue the pretence and respond in terms of the affect it evokes. Furthermore there 
are differences according to the child’s age in the way in which these differences in the 
children’s beliefs are displayed behaviourally. These differences relate to variations in 
the children’s responses to the affect evoked by the pretence. Before giving a detailed 
account of these developmental and individual differences in children’s beliefs and 
behaviour, an account of the contribution that these findings have made to our 
understanding of the influence of empirical evidence of reality and to our 
understanding of the influence of affect on children’s behaviour will be given.
The influence of empirical evidence on children’s understanding of pretence
In the introduction it was argued that one of the main problems with the availability 
hypothesis (Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994) is that it predicts considerably 
more instances of pretend-reality confusion than are actually observed. Although 
potentially any act of pretence can lead to an increase in cognitive availability that is 
sufficient to cause children to wonder about the reality status of what has been 
imagined, such confusions are actually very rare. It was therefore argued that there 
must be some mechanisms which constrain the effects of availability. Empirical
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evidence of reality, or visual confirmation of the outcome of the pretence (Woolley, 
1997a), is one possible limiting mechanism - being able to see that something is only 
pretend should minimise the possibility that any child could wonder about the reality 
status of that entity.
In the present research, the influence of empirical evidence of reality on children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction was assessed in two ways. First, 
children’s behaviour across hypothetical and actual opening tasks was compared 
(experiments 1 , 2 , 6  and 7). During the hypothetical task, children made their box 
selections without any empirical evidence of the reality status of the box contents. In 
contrast, when they actually opened the first box, children obtained visual confirmation 
that the box was empty. It was anticipated that children’s behaviour across the 
hypothetical and actual opening tasks might differ if empirical evidence constrained the 
effects of increased cognitive availability. Second, children’s behaviours under 
conditions of continual visual confirmation of box contents were assessed by asking 
children to pretend about the contents of transparent boxes (experiments 3, 4a and 4b).
The results from comparing children’s performance across the hypothetical and actual 
opening tasks were inconclusive. In experiments 1 and 2 no clear differences between 
the tasks were observed. However, in experiments 6 and 7 there were differences 
between the tasks and furthermore, these differences seemed quite systematic. The 
change in children’s behaviour tended to be that whereas on the hypothetical task 
children selected the positive box, the neutral box and then negative box, actually 
opening the positive box and finding it to be empty was followed by opening the 
negative box and then the neutral box. It seems that finding the positive box to be 
empty may have reassured children that the others would also be empty and this then 
led to a change in their strategy when choosing between the negative and neutral 
boxes. It is not clear why empirical evidence should have influenced children’s 
behaviour in experiments 6 and 7, but not in experiments 1 and 2 - one possibility is 
that this relates to the different pretend entities used in each experiment. However, 
this inconsistency in the results makes the findings difficult to interpret.
In contrast, the results from continually confronting children with empirical evidence 
of reality were much clearer - subject to individual and developmental differences, 
there were children whose behaviour was influenced by the use of transparent boxes. 
These findings were subsequently inteipreted as demonstrating that some children are 
sensitive to the effects of increased cognitive availability and therefore become
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uncertain about the pretend-reality distinction unless they are provided with visual 
confirmation of the outcome of the pretence.
Some corroborating evidence for the importance of empirical evidence in children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction was obtained in experiment 5 when 
children were asked to explain how they knew that the pretence had or had not led to 
an imagined object becoming real. The children’s replies often referred to empirical 
evidence of what had and had not happened. For example, several children reported 
the fact that they had previously seen that the boxes were empty, or the fact that they 
had not seen the imagined entity enter the box. These children appear to be giving 
verbal reports of how they use empirical evidence of reality to guide their judgements 
about the pretend-reality distinction.
Taken together, the results obtained in this research suggest that empirical evidence of 
reality does influence some children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. 
The nature of this influence is that the effects of increased cognitive availability are 
constrained amongst those children who might otherwise become uncertain about the 
pretend-reality distinction. What has this added to our understanding of the nature of 
pretend-reality conftisions?
This knowledge of the influence of empirical evidence of reality allows a clear 
explanation of the relative rarity of pretend-reality conftisions and enables some quite 
specific predictions to be made about the circumstances in which such confusions are 
more or less likely to occur. Furthermore, the paradoxical literature relating to 
children’s competence at distinguishing fantasy from reality and their experience of 
pretend-reality conftisions can also be explained in terms of the effects of empirical 
evidence of reality on availability. Basically, whenever visual confirmation of the 
outcome of the pretence is readily available, pretend-reality conftisions should be, and 
indeed are, rare. For example, pretend-reality confusions should be highly unlikely 
during object substitution pretence. This is because children can see that the banana 
they are using as a telephone, is really only a banana, or that the block they are 
pretending is a car is only a block. This argument is consistent with the considerable 
amount of research evidence which demonstrates that children can clearly differentiate 
the pretend and real identities of objects used in object substitution pretence (for 
example, Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1987; Hams, Kavanaugh & Meredith, 1994; Lillard 
& Flavell, 1992; Woolley, 1993b; Woolley & Wellman, 1990). Similarly, the fact that 
children do not become uncertain about the existence of their imaginary friends
222
(Taylor, Cartwright & Carlson, 1993) is consistent with the fact that they are reassured 
of the status of the friend by their inability to see him or her. Likewise, in imaginary 
object pretence the child can see, for example, that the tea that has been poured does 
not really exist and is therefore only imaginary tea. Thus it seems that children’s 
competence in maintaining a distinction between pretence and reality is interpretable in 
terms of the influence of empirical evidence of reality on children’s beliefs.
Evidence relating to when pretend-reality confusions do occur can also be discussed in 
tenns of the operation of empirical evidence as a constraint on the effects of increased 
cognitive availability. The studies by Harris et al (1991), Johnson and Harris (1994) 
and Woolley and Phelps (1994) all required children to make judgements about the 
reality status of imagined objects when they were unable to see whether the objects 
were real or not. That is, asking children to pretend about the contents of opaque 
boxes denies them the opportunity to see the outcome of the pretence. Thus the 
effects of increased cognitive availability are not constrained and as a consequence, 
some children experience pretend-reality conflision.
The evidence relating to magical tliinking obtained by Subbotskii (1985; Subbotsky, 
1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) can also be interpreted in terms of availability and the 
constraining influence of empirical evidence of reality. For example, in Subbotskii 
(1985) the fairy story may have increased the cognitive availability for the possibility of 
the magical outcomes. The adult’s comments about trying out the magical apparatus 
may have contributed to this. There was no evidence available to suggest that the 
magic was not possible. Similarly, in Subbotsky’s (1994) later studies where children 
were shown a magical transformation, all the empirical evidence confronting the child 
suggested the possibility of magical transformations. There was no counter-evidence 
to constrain the resultant increase in cognitive availability.
Overall, pretend-reality confusions and magical thinking amongst children seem most 
likely when there is a lack of empirical evidence of reality to constrain the influence of 
increased cognitive availability for the idea of the magical possibility being genuine or 
for the idea of the imagined entity being real. The same may also be true for adults - 
for example, in the studies by Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff (1986) and Rozin, 
Markwith and Ross ( 1990) the cognitive availability for the idea that the sugar solution 
was cyanide was not constrained since there was no empirical evidence to confirm that 
it was only a sugar solution but a clear piece of evidence (the label) that it was cyanide.
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Childhood fears of imaginary creatures are also consistent with the operation of 
availability - these are at their most severe, and most prevalent at night - in the dark the 
child can not see that the imagined creatures are not real. Indeed, the operation of 
empirical evidence as a constraint on availability might explain why so many children 
are reassured by sleeping with the light on - they can instantly see that the monsters or 
ghosts they are worrying about have not materialised. Similarly, when parents say to 
their children that monsters are not real, and when they check underneath the bed or in 
the cupboard for such a creature, parents are providing their children with direct 
empirical evidence of reality.
In summai’y, the present research has made a clear contribution to our understanding 
of the impact of empirical evidence of reality on children’s ability to differentiate 
pretence from reality. As a result, the paradox between children’s understanding of 
the distinction between pretence and reality on the one hand, and their pretend-reality 
confusions on the other, seems much less paradoxical. These results can be attributed 
to the differential levels of empirical evidence of reality provided in these studies.
The influence of affect on children’s behaviour during pretence
The Golomb and Galasso (1995) pretence continuation account assumes that during 
pretence children will be motivated to behave in ways which increase their experience 
of positive affect and which decrease their experience of negative affect. However, as 
was noted in the initial discussion of this explanation, there are behaviours which have 
been observed experimentally which simply do not fit this model. For example, in 
Harris et al (1991 - experiment 4) some children approached rather than avoided a 
scary monster. An additional problem with the pretence continuation account is that it 
makes no clear statement about how children might prioritise their affect when they are 
prevented fiom responding differentially to both forms at the same time. The issue of 
the influence of affect on children’s pretence has also not been squarely addressed in 
previous accounts of the availability hypothesis (Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 
1994). Although the effects of increased cognitive availability are said to operate for 
harmless as well as frightening creatures, no claims have been made about how these 
effects might vary according to the type of affect evoked by the pretence. Thus, these 
two existing explanations of children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction 
do not offer completely convincing predictions about the influence of affect on 
children’s behaviour during pretence.
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In the present research, the influence of affect on children’s behaviour was explored in 
three ways. First, children were given box selection tasks using positive, negative and 
neutral pretend entities on a within subjects basis (experiments 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7). 
Second, the hierarchical organisation of affect was assessed by placing positive and 
negative affect in conflict in a forced choice task (experiments 4a and 4b). Third, 
children’s spontaneous behaviours towards positive, negative and neutral pretend 
entities were assessed (experiments 6 and 7).
Putting aside the issue of whether the children’s behaviours reflect pretence 
continuation or pretend-reality conflision, the results from the present experiments 
suggest that the influence of affect on children’s behaviour during pretence is less 
straightfoiward than the Golomb and Galasso (1995) account would suggest. 
Moreover, the evidence indicates that affect and the effects of increased cognitive 
availability interact in a predictable manner.
As Golomb and Galasso (1995) would anticipate, the most frequent patterns of 
response on the serial box selection tasks were those in which children consistently 
approached the positive pretend entity and avoided the negative one. In other words, 
the children were presumably increasing their experience of positive affect and 
decreasing their experience of negative affect. However, a sizeable group of children 
consistently emerged who, rather than avoiding the negative pretend entity, elected to 
approach that box sooner than was absolutely necessaiy (opening it second rather than 
last). These children simply do not behave in a way which reduces their negative affect 
on the opening tasks, although they do so on the discarding tasks (the negative box 
was discarded first by these children). It seems that the negative affect evoked by 
fictional mental states is not always aversive. One possibility is that those children 
who behaved such as to increase their negative affect in this research, go on to be 
those children and adults who report enjoying the fear that is aroused by horror films 
(see for example, Allerton, 1995; Johnston, 1995; Murry & Dacin, 1996; Sparks, 
1986; Tamborini, Stiff & Heidel, 1990). That is, perhaps one aspect of the individual 
differences between people is in their ability to view some forms of negative affect as 
pleasurable and that this trait develops at an early age through the child’s emotional 
involvement in their pretend play.
In terms of the hierarchical organisation of affect during pretence, the results showed 
that whilst some children prioritise avoidance of the negative pretend entity, the
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majority prioritise their approach towards the positive pretend entity. This behaviour 
occurs despite the fact that by opening both boxes the children approach the negative 
pretend entity as well as the positive one. The children’s spontaneous behaviours also 
suggested that positive affect was prioritised. Under conditions of equivalent 
availability for positive, negative and neutral pretend entities, half of the children who 
opened one or more of the boxes opened just the positive box. Although the 
children’s failure to open the negative and neutral boxes in these circumstances attracts 
multiple interpretations, the fact that so many children only open the positive box 
strongly suggests some form of interaction between affect and availability. It is 
possible that availability for desirable entities is exaggerated and that pretend-reality 
confusions become more likely for positive entities than for affectively negative or 
neutral ones. This may of course relate to wishful thinking - the fact that children 
would like this outcome to occur (Woolley, 1997a).
Overall, it would seem that affect is a veiy poweiful force in determining children’s 
behaviours towards pretend entities. However, the influence of affect seems to be 
strongly related to whether the child is continuing the pretence or has become 
uncertain about the pretend-reality distinction and this is subject to developmental 
differences. In the section which follows these individual and developmental 
differences in children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction and in the 
influence of affect on children’s behaviour will be considered in some detail.
Individual and developmental differences in children’s understanding of
pretence
The findings from this research are best interpreted in terms of individual and 
developmental differences between children in relation to whether they experience 
pretend-reality confusion or simply continue the pretence and in relation to how these 
differing belief states are reflected in the children’s behaviour. The purpose of the 
discussion which follows is to give an account of the findings obtained for the three 
main age groups studied in this research. In so doing, a statement will be given about 
whether any of the children in the specified age range appear to be sensitive to 
empirical evidence as a constraint on the effects of increased cognitive availability, of 
the types of behaviours displayed by such children and of the types of behaviours 
displayed by children who are best thought of as continuing their pretence in relation
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to the affect it has evoked. The content of this discussion is summarised in Figure 9.1 
(see page 232).
The beliefs and behaviours of four to five year old children
There are four findings from the present research which suggest that at least some four 
to five year old children (younger age group) are influenced by empirical evidence of 
reality. First, providing continual visual confirmation of the oox contents was 
associated with a decrease in the number of children who opened the positive box first, 
neutral box second and negative box last on the serial box selection task. Second, the 
same experimental manipulation was also associated with an increase in the number of 
children who opened the positive box first and then the negative box, leaving the 
neutral box until last. Third, four to five year old children were more likely to throw 
away both a positive and a negative box when they were denied empirical evidence of 
the box contents, than when they were provided with visual confirmation that the 
boxes were empty. Finally, a number of children in this age group described physical 
possibilities and impossibilities and what they had or had not seen happening when 
explaining their pretend-reality judgements. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that for at least some cliildren in this age group, empirical evidence of reality 
constrains the effects of increased cognitive availability and reduces the likelihood that 
they will experience pretend-reality confusion.
This being the case, how do four to five year old children behave when they have 
become uncertain about the reality status of the pretend entities? In other words, what 
behaviours characterise the responses of credulous children within this age group? 
First, they tend to open the positive box first, neutral box second and negative box last 
on the serial box selection task. Second, they discard both boxes when given the 
choice of either opening or discarding a positive and a negative box. Third, they 
explain their behaviour either in terms unrelated to the pretence or in terms of the 
presence of objects inside the boxes. Finally, they spontaneously open one or more 
boxes in the experimenter’s absence. However, this latter behaviour only accounts for 
a quarter of the children in this age group - it is possible that there are more children in 
this age group who experience pretend-reality conflision but who do not approach the 
boxes, perhaps due to their wariness and continued avoidance of the negative entity.
The behaviours described above do not account for all children - some children seem 
to be unaffected by the effects of availability and instead simply respond by continuing 
with the pretence theme. In other words, some children in this age group are sceptical.
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Some of these children open the positive box first, neutral box second and negative 
box last on the serial box selection task and are therefore impossible to distinguish 
from those children who are uncertain of the pretend-reality distinction on the basis of 
this task alone. In other words, this behaviour is generated by two separable, 
differently motivated groups of children. However, some children who continue the 
pretence do so by opening the positive box first, negative box second and neutral box 
last. The fact that such children also tend to open both boxes when positive and 
negative affect are placed in direct conflict suggests that these children are behaving in 
ways which increase rather than decrease their negative affect. Finally, these children 
tend to explain their behaviours in terms that are not related to the pretence.
In sum, amongst four to five year old children there are four clear sub-groups:
i) credulous children who become uncertain of the pretend-reality distinction due to 
the effects of increased cognitive availability
ii) sceptical children who continue the pretence by increasing positive affect and 
decreasing negative affect
iii) sceptical children who continue the pretence by increasing both positive and 
negative affect, and
iv) other children who respond randomly or in terms of perseverative response 
patterns.
The beliefs and behaviours of five to six year old children
Three findings from this research suggest that the behaviour of some five to six year 
old children (middle age group) was influenced by empirical evidence of reality. First, 
providing children with continual visual confirmation of the box contents was 
associated with an increase in the number of children who opened the positive box 
first, neutral box second and the negative box last, and a con esponding decrease in the 
number of children who opened the positive box first, negative box second and neutral 
box last on the serial box selection task. Second, this experimental manipulation was 
also associated with a decrease in the number of children who prioritised the reduction 
of negative affect by discarding both boxes on the forced choice task. Finally, some 
children described what physically could or could not happen, or what they had or had 
not seen happen, when they were justifying their beliefs about the pretence. Thus it 
would seem that some five to six year old children are sensitive to the constraining 
influence of empirical evidence of reality on the effects of increased cognitive 
availability. This being the case, some children must therefore become uncertain of the 
pretend-reality distinction during pretence tasks. How do these credulous children
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behave? First, on the serial box selection tasks they open the positive box first, 
negative box second and the neutral box last. Second, they discard both boxes when 
positive and negative affect are placed in direct conflict. Third, they spontaneously 
open one or more of the boxes when left alone with them. Interestingly, of these 
children about half open the positive, neutral and then the negative box on the serial 
task. This suggests that some of the children producing this response pattern were 
also uncertain of the pretend-reality status of the box contents.
However, some five to six year old children respond in ways that suggest they are 
simply continuing the pretence. Some of these sceptical children open the positive box 
first, neutral box second and negative box last on the serial box selection task and are 
thus impossible to distinguish from children of this age who are uncertain about the 
pretend-reality distinction. These children continue the pretence by opening both 
boxes on the forced choice task and discuss their behaviour in terms of the presence of 
objects inside the boxes. However, given that amongst the children who open both 
boxes, some discuss their uncertainty about the box contents, it is possible that some 
of these children are confused about the pretend-reality distinction.
In sum, the behaviour of five to six year old children suggests that there are four clear 
sub-groups within this age group:
i) credulous children who become uncertain about the pretend-reality distinction due to 
the effects of availability who open the positive, negative and then the neutral box, but 
who prioritise negative affect by discarding both boxes
ii) credulous children who become uncertain about the pretend-reality distinction due 
to the effects of availability who open the positive, neutral and then the negative boxes 
and who prioritise positive affect by opening both boxes
iii) sceptical children who continue the pretence in affectively appropriate ways, and
iv) other children who respond randomly or in terms of perseverative response 
patterns.
Broadly speaking, there are continuities between the beliefs and behaviours of four to 
five year old children and five to six year old children. Within both of these age groups 
there are children who experience pretend-reality conflision due to the effects of 
increased cognitive availability and there are others who instead respond in terms of a 
continuation of the pretence theme. However, the way that these differing beliefs are 
represented behaviourally differs between the two age groups. Amongst four to five 
year old cliildren, pretend-reality confusion is characterised by seeking the positive
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entity, avoiding the negative one and prioritising a response to negative affect. In 
contrast, amongst five to six year old children pretend-reality confusion generates two 
differing sets of behaviours. First, seeking positive entities, avoiding negative entities 
and prioritising positive affect. Second, premature approach to the negative entity and 
prioritising negative affect. Similarly, the behaviour of children who are continuing the 
pretence theme differs in these two age groups. Amongst four to five year old children 
pretence continuation involves prioritising positive affect and either seeking the 
positive pretend entity and avoiding the negative one, or approaching the negative 
entity prematurely. In contrast, amongst five to six year old children, pretence 
continuation consistently involves seeking the positive entity, avoiding the negative 
one and prioritising positive affect.
The beliefs and behaviours of six to seven year old children
The evidence relating to six to seven year old children (older age group) suggests that 
they are not systematically influenced by empirical evidence of reality during pretence - 
their behaviour does not change when they are provided with visual confirmation of 
box contents compared to when they are not. However, this cannot be taken as 
conclusive evidence that these children do not experience pretend-reality confusions. 
It could be the case that the same behaviours are differently motivated such that with 
no empirical evidence of reality the children experience pretend-reality confusion but 
respond similarly even when continuing the pretence when they can see that the boxes 
are empty. One indication that some six to seven year old children do experience 
pretend-reality confusion is the finding that some of these children justify their decision 
to prioritise positive affect in terms of their uncertainty about the box contents. 
However, overall it seems that the children in this age group are most likely to be 
responding in terms of a continuation of the pretence - they open the positive box first, 
neutral box second and negative box last, some of them prioritise positive affect 
whereas others prioritise negative affect, and they tend to discuss their behaviours in 
terms of the objects being inside the boxes. This age group can thus be divided into 
the following four sub-groups:
i) a possible group of credulous children who become uncertain about the 
pretend-reality distinction due to the effects of availability
ii) sceptical children who continue the pretence by approaching positive pretend 
entities, avoiding negative pretend entities and prioritising positive affect
iii) sceptical children who continue the pretence by approaching positive pretend 
entities, avoiding negative pretend entities and by prioritising negative affect, and
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iv) other children who respond randomly or in terms of perseverative response 
patterns.
The beliefs and behaviours of six to seven year old children are rather different to 
those of five to six year old children since there is no behaviourally distinct group of 
six to seven year old children who are susceptible to pretend-reality confusions. 
However, these two age groups continue the pretence in broadly similar ways Both 
groups of children approach positive entities and avoid negative ones, prioritise 
positive affect and discuss their behaviour in terms of the objects being inside the 
boxes. However, unlike five to six year old children, some six to seven year old 
children prioritise negative affect as part of a continuation of the pretence. The 
behaviour of six to seven year old children compares similarly with that of four to five 
year old children as with five to six year old children. Unlike four to five year old 
children, amongst six to seven year old children there is no behaviourally distinct group 
of children who become uncertain about the pretend-reality distinction. Amongst both 
age groups, some children continue the pretence by approaching the positive entity, 
avoiding the negative entity and prioritising positive affect, however amongst six to 
seven year old but not four to five year old children, some continue the pretence by 
prioritising negative affect.
In summaiy, there are clear continuities and discontinuities between the age groups 
studied in this research. These findings are summarised in Figure 9.1 which clearly 
shows that, excluding miscellaneous children who behave randomly or perseveratively, 
in each age group there are three groups of children who differ in terms of their 
susceptibility to the effects of increased cognitive availability. Children’s behaviour on 
the pretence tasks seems to be dependent on an interaction between individual 
differences, the child’s age, affect and whether or not they have visual confirmation of 
the outcome of their pretence. Clearly what is needed now is some longitudinal 
research to investigate how each of these groups of children map onto each other 
developmentally.
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Theoretical explanations of children’s understanding of pretence
The overall findings from this research have demonstrated that both the availability 
hypothesis (Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994) and the pretence continuation 
account (Golomb & Galasso, 1995) are required to explain children’s understanding of 
the pretend-reality distinction. This is because these explanations, rather than being 
competing explanations for the behaviour of all children, are instead complementary' 
explanations for the behaviour of separable sub-groups of children. However, this 
research has also expanded upon our understanding of these pre-existing theoretical 
accounts.
The availability hypothesis
The present research has furthered our understanding of the availability hypothesis by 
demonstrating that the effects of increased cognitive availability can be constrained by 
empirical evidence of reality. Thus, for those children who are susceptible to 
pretend-reality confusions, visual confirmation of the outcome of the pretence is 
reassuring and reduces their uncertainty. This research has also added to our 
understanding of the effects of availability by generating results which suggest an 
interaction between the effects of availability and affect. Under conditions of 
equivalent availability for positive, negative and neutral entities, children tend to 
spontaneously open only the positive box during the experimenter’s absence. It is 
possible that this occurs because the effects of increased cognitive availability are 
exaggerated for entities that children find desirable. The final novel finding relating to 
the availability hypothesis is that pretence is not the only cue that can lead to an 
increase in cognitive availability and uncertainty about the reality status of certain 
entities - the labelling of boxes with pictures can have a similar effect.
The pretence continuation account
The findings from this research have also added to our understanding of the pretence 
continuation account by demonstrating that whilst many children do respond in ways 
which increase their positive affect and decrease their negative affect, others instead 
respond in ways which also increase their negative affect. Furthermore, when forced 
to prioritise either positive or negative affect, although most children prioritise positive 
affect, some instead prioritise negative affect. Thus children’s response to affect 
during pretence is less straightfoi’ward than the original pretence continuation account 
implied.
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The transmigration hypothesis
This explanation of children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction was 
offered by Harris et al (1991) and later by Johnson and Harris (1994) who rejected it 
on the grounds that the children’s verbal justifications for their behaviour very rarely 
suggested any uncertainty about the generative powers of the imagination. That is, 
very few children made any comments that could have been interpreted as suggesting 
that they were unsure of the mles governing when imagined objects can and cannot 
become real. Although the present research did not directly assess this hypothesis, the 
findings fiom children’s verbal explanations support the Johnson and Hartis grounds 
for dismissing this explanation. When asked how they had known that the boxes were 
empty or how they thought the objects had got inside the boxes, less than 10 % of the 
children gave explanations referring to the generative powers of the imagination. Such 
explanations were also given by less than a quarter of the children when they were 
asked whether pretending could ever lead to an imagined object becoming real. 
Importantly, all of these children denied the possibility that their mental states could 
generate real entities. Thus children do not appear to be uncertain of the generative 
powers of their imagination in the way that the transmigration hypothesis would 
suggest. Therefore the transmigration hypothesis is rejected as an explanation of 
breakdowns in children’s understanding of the pretend-reality distinction.
Directions for future research
The present research has successfully contributed to our understanding of children’s 
experience of pretend-reality confusions and their behaviour in response to the affect 
that is evoked by their pretence. In doing so this research has raised further issues in 
need of empirical investigation. The purpose of the discussion which follows is to 
outline the nature of these issues and suggest directions for future research activities. 
These further issues can be sub-divided into three broad areas:
- issues arising from the experimental paradigms used in this research
- farther issues arising from those already addressed in this research, and
- new issues arising from the findings obtained in this research.
Several further issues arise from the current experimental paradigms. First, the results 
fiom the forced choice task (experiment 4) were interpreted as reflecting the 
hierarchical organisation of affect during pretence - it was assumed that children’s 
decisions to open or to discard the boxes were motivated by their desire to prioritise a
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response to one form of affect over the other. However, as was noted previously, 
there are several competing explanations for children’s behaviours in this task. One 
empirically testable possibility is that children elect to open the boxes as a result of a 
stronger behavioural association between boxes and opening, than between boxes and 
discarding. To be able to make any clear statements about the extent to which the 
opening bias observed in this research was a product of the pretence or of box 
function, it is necessary to obtain a baseline measure of rates of box opening and 
discarding that is independent of any pretence.
Second, the final two experiments in this research turned to the analysis of children’s 
spontaneous behaviours in the experimenter’s absence as a way of assessing children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. The contrasts between the two 
experiments raise a number of issues - further experimental work is required to 
establish why so many children looked inside the boxes in the pre-task period 
(experiment 7), why so few children looked inside the boxes in the post-task period of 
experiment 7 compared to the same period in experiment 6, and finally, why the 
children’s behaviours on the box selection tasks differed in experiment 7 relative to 
experiment 6. There are several possibilities which could be explored. For example, 
the possibility that children’s approaches to the boxes during the pre-task period were 
simply an effect of the children trying to work out what the boxes were to be used for, 
could be tested by simply telling the child before the experimenter leaves, what they 
are going to do with the boxes when the experimenter returns. This disambiguation of 
the role of the boxes should reduce levels of box opening if children look inside the 
boxes during the pre-task period to find their function. An alternative possibility is 
that children believe that they were shown that the boxes were empty immediately 
prior to the experimenter’s departure because that fact is relevant to what is about to 
happen. This perhaps raises the children’s suspicions about the experimenter’s 
intentions. To test this possibility an experiment should be designed in which the 
child’s discovei-y that the boxes are empty prior to the experimenter’s pre-task 
departure is accidental or incidental to the experimental proceedings.
The three key issues investigated in this research have generated some further issues 
which need to be empirically investigated. First, in this research the influence of affect 
on children’s behaviour has been examined and throughout the text, claims have been 
made that children were prioritising one form of affect over another, or that they were 
responding differentially to positive and negative affect. However, at present there is 
no independent or objective means of knowing whether any of the children studied
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ever experienced any affect whatsoever. The children’s verbal comments, which often 
referred to their wariness of the negative entity and desire for the positive entity, 
suggest that at least some cliildren experienced affect. However, if the role of affect in 
pretence is to be examined further it will be important to find some independent 
evidence that children do experience affect in relation to the pretence. For example, 
future studies might include physiological measures and explore the relationship 
between differences between children on these measures and on the box selection 
tasks.
Second, this research demonstrated that pretence is not the only cue which can 
increase the cognitive availability for the idea of objects being inside the boxes. 
However, the influence of such non-pretence cues needs to be more fully examined. 
For example, the differences between the pretence and non-pretence conditions were 
attributed to differences in levels of availability in each condition. However, it could 
simply be that children respond differently to the effects of availability when these are 
caused by pretence compared to when these are caused by other methods. This is an 
empirically testable possibility.
Finally, the individual and developmental differences between children that have been 
suggested by these research findings need to be more thoroughly explored. For 
example, further research is needed to examine children’s beliefs and behaviours on a 
longitudinal basis in order that the pathways from pretend-reality conflision to pretence 
continuation can be determined and the continuities and discontinuities in individual 
children’s behaviour can be assessed.
The finding that there are groups of children who experience pretend-reality 
confusions due to the effects of increased cognitive availability raises a number of 
issues. First, what is it about these children that makes them susceptible to 
pretend-reality confusions? It could be that these children are susceptible to 
availability effects in various domains. Alternatively, it could be that these children are 
not effective at deploying their understanding of pretence and reality to control their 
emotional states and that this contributes to, or interacts with, the increase in cognitive 
availability caused by the pretence. Furthermore, there could be temperamental 
differences between these children and those who do not experience pretend-reality 
confusions. Second, the relationship between evei'yday pretend-reality confusions, 
such as fears of imaginary creatures, and those observed experimentally should be 
assessed to establish whether these are the same children or whether one group is a
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sub-section of the other. Finally, a fLirther issue relates to parental strategies for 
dealing with children’s fears of imagined entities. Do the parents of children who 
approach the negative pretend entity earlier than is absolutely necessai-y use different 
techniques compared to the parents of children who avoid negative entities? In other 
words, how do parental behaviours map on to the individual differences observed in 
this research? The answers to these questions may be obtained through longitudinal 
research involving both parents and children.
Conclusion
This program of research consisted of a series of seven related experiments designed 
to investigate the availability hypothesis (Harris et al, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994) 
and the pretence continuation account (Golomb & Galasso, 1995) of children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction. The findings have demonstrated that 
these are not competing explanations for the behaviour of all children, but are instead 
complementary explanations which each account for the behaviour of separable 
sub-groups of children. That is, when placed in a situation whereby there are no real 
life conseq^uences for engaging in magical thinldng and in which there is only limited 
empirical evidence of the outcome of the pretence, some children will become 
uncertain of the reality status of what they have imagined, whilst others will remain 
confident of the pretend-reality distinction and respond in terms of their emotional 
involvement in the pretence. Overall, this thesis offers an account of children’s 
behaviour in pretence which highlights the importance of the child’s age, individual 
differences, affect and empirical evidence as related factors influencing children’s 
understanding of the pretend-reality distinction.
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Line drawings used in the animal selections and non-pretence task 
in experiment 6 and experiment 7
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